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~ P R E F A C E 
The  European  Council,  meeting  in  Brussels  in  December  1978,  asked  the 
Commission  to  provide  a study  of  structural  development  prospects  until  1990, 
and  of  the  implications  of  structural  change  for  the  economic  and  social  situation 
in  the  Community,  in  time  for  its June  meeting . 
..  ,.  The  Commission  therefore  instructed its staff to  carry out  a series of 
' 
technical  studies  based  on  work  done  by  the  departments  and  on  reports  prepared 
by  experts  or  groups  of  experts  called  in  by  the  Commission  dealing  with  the 
structural  problems  of  the  next  ten  years.  In  addition,  Commission  departments 
were  able  to  draw  on  long-term  forward  studies  carried out  in  the  Member  States 
and  by  public  or  private  international  bodies;  they  found  the  very  detailed 
"Interfutures
11  report  by  the  OECD  particularly valuable1. 
On  the  basis  of  these  studies,  the  Commission  submitted  a preliminary 
Communication  on  structural  change  in  the  coming  decade  to  the  European  Council 
meeting  in Strasbourg.  The  Commission  believes  that the most  important  conclusions 
of  the  technical  studies  carried out  by  the  departments  should  be  brought  together 
in  a single document,  so  that the  results  to  date  may  be  reviewed.  Work  on  this 
subject is still going  on  in  the  Commission,  particularly in  connection  with  the 
FAST  project, which  is examining  the  long-term  outlook  for  technology  and  research. 
But  the  Commission  would  like a wide-ranging  discussion  to  begin  as  soon  as  possible 
in  Community  bodies;  for,  as  the  European  Council  so  rightly pointed  out,  the 
outlook  for  the  1980s  is of  crucial  importance.  The  purpose  of  this report is to 
contribute  to  the  discussion. 
'  1  "Facing  the  Future  Mastering  the  probable  and  managing  the unpredictable", 
~ 
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INTRODUCTION 
The  structural  developments  and  even  changes  that the  Community  will 
face  during  the  next  decade  are  already  under way; 
they  will  call  for  radical  transformations  and  major  adjustments  in  economic 
and  social  development. 
This  prospect appears  to  be  causing  serious  concern  in  the  Community,  or  at 
least in  some  Member  States  and  in  broad  sections  of  tne  population.  And  yet,  the 
Community  economies  have  shown  themselves,  over  the  past few  decades,  to  be  very 
adaptable  to  the  vast structural  changes  brought  about  by  agricultural  development~, 
removing  trade  barriers  and,  in  general,  the  establishment of  the  Community. 
Indeed,  it is worth  while  remembering  that when  the  ambitious  plans  for 
building  a  Community  first took  shape,  doubts  and  uncertainties were  expressed 
very  strongly  in  various  places about  whether  this or that country  would  be 
adaptable enough  to  respect the  commitments  involved  in  this vast undertaking; 
it is also worth  while  remembering  how  quickly  these  doubts  were  dissipated. 
These  remarks  help  us  to  bear  in  mind  that when  the  future  is uncertain, 
the  collective awareness  tends  almost  instinctively to worry;  however,  although 
present apprehensions  can  be  partially explained  in  this way,  there  is  no  doubt 
that the  challenges  of  the  next  ten  years  will  be  exceptionally difficult for 
Europe. 
First, these  challenges  are  relatively new;  they  are multifarious,  and 
increasingly acute.  But,  most  important  of  all, they  are  arising in  a socio-
economic  situation that makes  the  adjustments  they  require  all  the  more  difficult 
because  of  slow  growth  in  Europe  over  the  past  few  years,  rising under-employment, 
our  societies'  apparent  inability to deal  with  these  problems,  and  the  growing 
fragility of  social  cohesion. 
. ..  I ... - 6  -
T:1e  changes  of  recent years  have  been  particularly bruta  1  in  a  Corm1uni ty 
accustomed  to  some  degree  of  stability in  its external  relations  and  to  rapid, 
sustained  growth  ensuring  full  employment  and  a considerable  increase  in  the 
average  standard  of  living.  Moreover,  the  Community  now  feels more  threatened 
and  more  vulnerable  than  before,  not  only  because  it is heavily dependent  on  the 
outside world for  energy, raw materials and export markets, but also  because  its cohesion_.. 
so  necessary  for facing  the  great challenges  of the  period  - remains  fragile. 
But  there  is  no  reason  why  Europe  should  meekly  accept  unemployment, 
stagflation, external  dependence  and  gradual  withdrawal  from  the  world  scene, 
which  seem  to  be  threatening  it today.  The  main  structural  trends  of the  next 
ten  years  may  well, it is  true, lead to  decline,  strains and  conflict at national, 
Community  and  worldwide  level.  But  they  also  provide  opportunities  for a  new 
type  of  economic  and  social  development,  if only  Europe  finds  the  way  to  mobilize 
and  coordinate  its intrinsic strengths  and  energy. 
Part  I  of  this  report analyses  the  shape  which  the  major  structural  changes 
expected for the  next  decade  wi 11  take  ·j n the  Community.  Five  rna in  themes  have 
been  studied,  some  in greater depth  than  others:  the  Community's  dependence  on 
external  sources  of energy  and  raw  materials;  the  new  international  economic  and 
monetary  environment;  the  demographic  outlook;  technological  progress,and 
changes  in  social  values,  needs  and  behaviour  patterns. 
The  study  involved  analysing  from  a specifically Community  viewpoint 
(i.e.  both  for the  Member  States and  for  the  Community  as  such)  the  extent, 
constraints,  potentialities and  Community  dimension  of  the  major  trends. 
...  I ... 
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In  Part II, the  same  approach  is adopted  to  describe  the major  challenge 
which  the  employment  situation will  present,  and  then  to  analyse  the  possible choices, 
the  constraints  and  the  inevitable adaptations  of  the  next  ten years  both  as  regards 
the  rate and  content  of  growth  and  as  regards  sectoral  adjustments,  the  search  for 
a  new  social  cohesion,  and  the  Community's  relations with  the  rest of  the  world. 
There  are  three  types  of  challenge  facing  the  Community  in  the  next  ten years. 
First, at national  level,  the  Member  States will  have  to achieve  a  type  of economic 
and  social  development  that is  both  more  likely to  lead  to  the  creation of  jobs, 
and  more  in  keeping  with  new  aspirations  for  a  better quality of  life. Secondly, 
at Community  level, it is  the  existence  of  the  Community  as  such  that is at 
stake:  the  Community  is threatened  with  gradual  decomposition  by  the multifarious 
strains  now  appearing  between  Member  States  as  a result of  present problems.  However, 
it will  be  able  to attenuate  these  problems  and  solve  them  more  easily as  long  as 
national  efforts are  more  closely coordinated  and  the  solidarity between  the 
Member  States  is reinforced.  The  future  organization  and  working  of  the  European 
monetary  system,  and  the  enlargement  of  the  Community,  will  be  important  and 
significant developments  at both  these  levels  over  the  next  ten  years.  Thirdly, 
at global  level, it is  the  Community's  place  in  the  world  that is threatened,  and 
its role  not  only  as  an  economic  power  but  also  as  a centre ofnegotiationcapable 
of  working  efficiently towards  a better balanced  and  fairer system  of economic 
and  financial  relations.  Each  individual  country  and  the  Community  as  such  must 
resist the  temptation  to withdraw,  and  beware  of  the  fond  hope  that it can  deal 
with  new  situations alone,  without  allowing  for  the  legitimate rights  and  interests 
of the  other  nations  of  Europe  and  the  world.  In  particular,  Europe  has  a major 
responsibility to  help  the  countries of  the  Third  World  to  overcome  the  tragic 
poverty  afflicting most  of  them.  It must  not  decline  this responsibility.  The 
very  problems  the  Community  itself is facing  are  also present,  and  to  a much 
greater extent,  in  most  of  the  developing  countries. 
. ..  I ... - 8  -
The  outlook  for structural  change  in  the  next  ten  years  is far from  clear-
cut.  It is  true  that some  of  the  problems  described  in  this report seem  inevitable 
during  the  coming  decade.  But  the  scope  or  even  the  nature  of  most  of  them  will 
depend  on  attitudes  and  actions  over  the  next  ten  years,  which  will  probably  affect 
the  scope,  and  perhaps  even  the  direction,  of  structural  trends  to  1990,  and  almost 
certainly after 1990.  A forward  study  of the  type  carried out  by  the  Commission 
departments  at the  request  of the  European  Council  is particularly difficult, but 
also  particularly valuable,  precisely because  certain problems  are  already evident, 
because  a  range  of  options  are  open,  and  because  the  Member  States may,  on  certain 
conditions,  regain  control  over  their future. 
In  spite of  the  limitations  of  this work,  due  both  to  the  speed  with  which 
it was  carried out,  and  to  the  extreme  difficulty of  the  task,  the  Commission 
departments  submit  in  this report the  main  results of  their preliminary study. C:-iJ\Pl tR  1 
ENERGY  AND  RAW  ~1t-\TEH1/\:...~:  (j·L:  COMMUNi fY 'S  DEPENDENT  POSIT I ON 
All  the  CommwYi ty countr·i es  except the  United  Kingdom  and 
the  Netherlands  are  very  heavily dependent  on  other countries for  their energy 
supplies,  and  this  clearly constitutes  one  of the  Community's  major  areas  of 
vul nerabi 1  i ty  (see A  1).  Howe:v.er  ~  the  r"i sks  i nvo 1  ved  in  the Community's  dependence 01 
imports  of minera1  or~:;  ~1.:1d  cetta·in  agricultural  products  should  not  be  under-
estimated . 
..,  This  state of de 11endence  ·Is  not 'peculiar to 'the  EEC;  it is 
.. 
shared  by  Japan,  which  import~ about  90%  of both  its energy  and  its raw  material 
requirements  (as  a9a·ln~t  511 X  and  75%  respectively for  the  EEC),  and  by  most 
other  European  coun+~~··i es.  It contr·  .. )s ts  wi t:1  the situation of Australia, 
Canada  and,  in  particu;  r'?  the  Unit~:.d States;  the  latter meets  85%  of its raw 
material  requirements  ..:1t1d  a·lmost  50%  of its energy  needs  from  indigenous  supplies. 
Besides  the  bas·:z:- ~~rob1rm of security of supply,  this dependence  has 
inevitable  consequence~ fJr  t~p import  bill, which  is particularly high  for  the 
Community  (see  A  l(a) ) . 
It is  importan·~  ;;.:_,  r·ea1Lze  hm'l  far-reaching  this  problem  of  dep.eMdence 
is.  We  knov~  that enc.  ti.V  con~.umpt·ion  ·:s  related  to  the  consumption  of mineral 
raw  materia.ls,  in  the  cont(~xts  of economizing  or recycling  J.nd  of producing 
substitutes  for  impo:·ted  produt::ts;  but we  should  remember  too,  that the  Community 
is  only  re  1  a ti ve 'ly  0.11  ~~(.morilou:;  for- agri cu 1  tura  1 products,  even  though  its 
agricultural  sector  cov~~rs  the  ons·ic  food  needs  of its population. ~~  the 
Corrmuni ty' s  high 1y  nle::-r:harn  :Zf~cl  and  tt'Chno  ·1 ogy-based  agri cu 1  tura  l  sector,  wi\'al·,··; ts · 
high  consumption  of enr.rgy,  ffrti.lizers,  pesticides  and  compound  feedingstuffs, is 
itself extremely  depf'nch:~nt  on  ·imports  of oil  and  other  raw  materials . 
. ..  I .. . - 10  -
1.1.  The  energy  problem  in  the  1980s 
The  trend  in  the  Community•s  energy  balance  between  19~ and  1978  shows 
a  number  of  satisfactory features when compared with the  energy  policy objectives 
which  the  Community  had  fixed  for  1985  in  the  wake  of  the  1973  crisis. 
It is true  thatgrowth  has  been  much  slower  than  was 
projected  at that time;  this  has  helped  considerably  to  curb  energy  consumption. 
In  1978  this  consumption  was  the  same  as  in  1973,  despite  the  fact that economic 
activity had  increased  in  the  meantime  by  10%.  The  share  of  oil  in  energy 
consumption  fell  from  61%  to  55%  and  dependence  on  imported  energy  from 
63%  to  54%. 
On  the  other  hand,  it must  be  admitted  that output  of  certain energy 
sources  has  not  increased  as  was  hoped;  coal  production  is steadily 
declining;  nuclear  programmes  have  been  delayed  and  sometimes  even  cut back 
significantly. 
The  new  oil  crisis  of  1979  has  once  again  made  it clear that the 
Community•s  oil  supplies  are  extremely  vulnerable,  and  flaY::eserious  threats 
in  terms  of  both  quantity and  price; it has  also  emphasized  the  need  to 
reduce  energy  dependence. 
1.1.1.  The  world  outlook 
There  are  many  substantial  uncertainties which  make  it difficult 
to  assess  the  future  long-term  trends  of energy  supply  and  demand;  forecasting 
is  therefore  particularly hazardous  in  this field.  However,  it would  seem 
possible,  using  combinations  of hypotheses,  to  define  the  limits within  which 
the  market  wi  1 1  move  in  the  medium  term. 
World  energy  demand  (including  the  USSR  and  China),  which  stood 
at 6 200  million  toe  in  1977,  may  well  reach  between  9  200  million  and 
10  600  million  toe  around  1990.  This  would  represent  an  average  annual  increase 
of 3%  to  4 % over  the  period  1976-90,  compared  with  a rate of  4. 8%  a year 
during  the  period  1960-75  (see  A 2). 
. ..  I ... 
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Even  assuming  large-scale  investment,  the  proportion  of this demand 
covered  by  sources  of  energy  other than  oil  (solid fuels,  gas,  nuclear energy 
and  renewable  sources)  will  probably  not  exceed  ~etween 5 500  million  and 
6 500  million  toe.  This  already  represents  a  considerable  increase  compared 
with  their current  contribution of  some  3 500  million toe  (see  A2). 
It would  not  be  realistic to assume  a  situation in  which  high  growth  of 
investment  in  energy  sources  other than  oil  would  c6mbine  with  weak  economic 
growth.  Consequently,  demand  for oil  could  well  increase  from  its present  level 
of  2 800  million  tonnes  in  1977  to  5 000  million  tonnes  per year  by  1990. 
To satisfy tota  1 demand of 5 000  mi 11 ion  tonnes,  OPEC  production  would  have 
•  to  be  between  2 100  million  and  2 750  million  tonnes,  taking  into account 
production  increases  elsewhere  (see  A3).  Present  OPEC  production  is 1 600  million 
tonnes  per  year and  it is prudent  to  assume  that OPEC  countries  may  decide  to 
limit production  to  between  1 800  million  and  1 900  million  tonnes  by  1990.  These 
figures  indicate  the  potential  difficulties and  price increases which  threaten 
.. 
the  world  market  in  the  medium  term. 
Since  1974,  oil  reserves,  which  had  previously almost  quadrupled  in 
twenty  years,  have  not  varied  greatly.  New  discoveries  have  been  made  recently 
(e.g.  in  Mexico),  but it is not  yet possible  to evaluate  them  precisely.  In  the 
longer  term,  account  must  be  taken  of 
11non-conventional
11  sources  of oil(tar sands 
and  oil  shale, etc.), although  the  cost of  setting up  production  is certain to 
be  high  and  lead  times  will  be  long. 
In  view  of the  numerous  factors which  are  likely to  create difficulties 
in the  oil  market  in  the  long  term,  the  hypothesis  of  an  easier situation on  the 
oil  market  towards  the  end  of  the  1980s  is too  uncertain  to  serve  as  a  basis  for 
the  policy of countries which,  for a  long  time  yet, will  remain  largely dependent 
on  imported  oi 1 . 
The  Community•s  energy  policy  should  therefore  be  based  on  the  hypothesis 
that it may  well  be  impossible  to  obtain  more  than  450  to  475  million  tonnes  of 
OPEC  oil  in  1990  without  exacerbating  the  upward  pressures  on  prices  and  without 
increasing  the  risks  to  security of  supply.  To  this figure  can  be  added  some 
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50  milliJn tonnes  from  non-OPEC  sources. 
Net  Community  oil  imports  of  500  to  525  million  tonnes  therefore 
represent,  as  it were,  the  upper  limit of possible  purchases  in  1990,  bearing 
in  mind  the  likely developments  on  the  oil  market  during  the  1980s.  The 
objective actually adopted  by  the  Community  institutions  up  to  1985  is to hold 
imports  over  the  next  five years  to  the  1978  level  (i.e.  470  million  tonnes). 
1.1.2.  The  Community's  energy  balance  for the  period  1978-90 
- Overall  outlook  based  on  Member  States'  projections 
Community energy consumption for 1978 was estimated at 972 mi 11 ion toe (  tonnes of 
oi 1 equ iva  1  ent) . Assuming an average rate of economic growth of 3. 8% per year and an average 
energy  coefficient (ratio of the  growth  of energy  consumption  to the  growth  of  GNP) 
of  0.8  over  the  period,  energy  consumption  should  reach  some  1 400  million  toe 
a  y e a r in  1990  for the  Community  of  Nine  (see  A  4). 
The  main  feature  of  the  1990  energy  balance  established on  the  basis 
of  Member  States'  projections  (made  in mid-February  1979)  is the  reduction  in  the 
share  of  oil  in  gross  energy  consumption  (55%  in  1978;  46  to  47%  in  1990)  and, 
to  a  lesser extent,  in  the  share  of  solid fuels;  on  the  other hand,  the  share  of 
nuc: 1  ear energy  is expected  to  increase  from  3 % to  15  %. 
The  degree  of dependence  on  external  energy  supplies  should  decline~ 
possibly falling  below  50%  (oil  imports  alone  accounting  for  some  40%  at most). 
It should  be  noted  in  this context that, although  all  the  member  countries  are 
committed  to  the  principle of reducing  energy  dependence,  all  (except  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Denmark)  were  still forecasting  at the  beginning  of  1979  an 
increase  in  the  volume  of their oil  imports  between  now  and  1990. 
- Disparities  in  the  situation and  prospects  of  Member  States 
In  the  energy  field,  relatively substantial  disparities can  be 
detected  in  the  situation and  prospects  of  the  different Member  States . 
. . .  I ... 
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- Besides  the  part played  by  institutional  factors  and  disparities 
due  to  geographical  situations  and  the  climate,  this results  primarily from  the 
differences  in  economic  growth;  Member  States  are  not  all  at the  same  stage of 
industrial  development  and,  for  this  reason  especially,  the  sensitivity of their 
energy  consumption  to  changes  in  economic  activity varies widely  from  country 
to  country.  It is particularly great  in  countries  such  as  Ireland  and  Italy, whose 
energy  consumption  is still  relatively low;  owing  to  rapid  industrialization and 
a growth  rate which  in  the  1980s  should  be  higher  than  that in  the  rest of the 
Community,  these  two  countries  are  therefore  likely, over  the years  ahead,  to  seea 
great increase  in  their energy  consumption,  outstripping that of  the  other 
Member  States . 
Furthermore,  some  of  the  member  countries  are  better placed  than  others 
because  they  have  their  own  natural  energy  resources.  The  outstanding example  is the 
United  Kingdom.  It has  oil  reserves  of between  2 400  and  4 400  million tonnes 
and  rapidly developing  production  (75  million  tonnes  in  1979),  which  should  enable 
it to  reach  self-sufficiency in oil  and  energy  during  the  1980s. 
In  addition,  the  United  Kingdom,  together with  a  number  of.:other 
Member  States  (such  as  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany)  has  siza~e  coal  reserves 
which  leave  room  for  higher  production. 
- A number  of  countries  have  stepped  up  their nuclear energy  programmes 
and  these will  bear  fruit in  the  1980s.  This  applies  particularly to  France. 
- Fina'lly,  the  energy-saving  programmes  launched  by  all  the  Member  States 
vary  greatly in  intensity and  extent, as  can  be  seen  from  the estimates for public 
expenditure  allocated in  recent years  to  energy  saving. 
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- The  energy  balance  of  the  enlarged  Community 
Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal  are  as  vulnerable  as  the  present 
Member  States, or  perhaps  even  more  so,  to  the  consequences  of  unfavourable 
developments  on  the  world  oil  market.  Their  degree  of  dependence  (Greece  74%; 
Spain  82%;  Portugal  90%)  is a  good  deal  higher  than  that of  the  Community 
as  a whole  (approximately  55%),  but  lower  than  that of some  of  the  individual 
Member  States.  Their  per  capita energy  consumption  is on  average  less  than 
2 toe  a  year at present, whereas  it is already  3.6  toe  in  the  Community  of Nine, 
but it will  probably  increase  sharply  (see  AS).  Given  the  economic  buoyancy  of 
these  countries,  the  years  ahead  are  likely to  see  a  sharp  rise in  their energy 
consumption  and  therefore  in  their imports,  since  there is relatively little 
scope  for  indigenous  production. 
The  energy  projections  currently available  from  the  three  applicant 
countries  (see  A5)  suggest  that the  Community  must  reckon  with  additional  energy 
consumption  of  some  170  million  toe  (including  imports  of  97  million  toe)  by 
1990  as  a  result of enlargement  (see  A6). 
1.1.3.  The  extent of uncertainty  and  the  scope  for  choice  in  the  Community 
There  are  margins  of  uncertainty and  scope  for  choice  in  the  Community 
both  as  regards  production  of  the  various  forms  of energy  and  as  regards  demand. 
- Production 
(a)  Coal 
Because  of its short-term and  medium-term  rigidity, coal  production 
can  do  little to  increase  the  elasticity of energy  supply  during  the  next  decade. 
The  time  scale  involved  in  investment  in  this  industry means  that decisions 
about  the  level  of  production  must  be  taken  without  delay.  Such  decisions 
also  presuppose  complementary  decisions  on  the  user  side  (increase  in .the  number 
of  coal-fired power  stations,  long-term  commitments)  and  measures  to  improve  the 
competitive  position of  coal.  The  present cost of  production  is such  that much  of 
the  coal  now  produced  is uncompetitive,  either in  relation to  coal  imported 
from  non-member  countries  or  in  relation to  fuel  oil. 
. ..  I ... 
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If these  complementary  decisions  are  not  taken,  the  total  market  for 
coal  will  be  some  40  million  toe  smaller than  forecast  by  the  Member  States. 
Increasing  use  may  also  have  to  be  made  of  imported  coal;  this 
again  requires  that Community  users  enter into  long-term  commitments  in  order to 
enable  producing  countries  to  undertake  the  necessary  investment. 
(b)  Nuclear  power 
There  is a danger  that the  ambitious  nuclear  power  programmes  which 
were  designed  to  increase  the  Community's  nuclear capacity from  80  to  140  GWe 
•  between  1985  and  1990  cannot  be  implemented,  as  even  the  1985  target now  appears 
very  difficult to  achieve.  Compared  with  present projections,  there could  then 
be  a  shortfall  by  1990  of  the  order of  40  million  toe. 
It 
The result,  unless  energy  consumption  patterns  change  radically, would 
be  a  higher  level  of  oil  import~:thus there  is an  absolute  need  to  reinforce efforts 
in  this field.  This  implies,  inter alia,  that the  public must  be  better informed 
about  the  implications  of  the  energy  choices  available and  that more  must  be  done  to 
improve  safety and  environmental  protection. 
(c)  Natural  gas  and  oil 
The production  of  natural  gas  will  depend  on  various 
factors  (the  possibility of  new  discoveries  being  made  in or  near  the  Community, 
the  rate of exploitation of  known  reserves,  price  levels, overall  economic 
activity, etc.) which  might  make  available,  by  1990,  an  extra 30  million  toe 
compared  with  current production.and  import  levels. 
As  for  oil, a  policy which  combines  exploration  incentives 
with productiun  properly  phased  over  time  would  make  it possible  to maintain  in 
1990  a  level  of  indigenous  production  near  to  that likely in  1985  (between  140 
and  150  million  toe). 
As  other  sources  of  primary  energy  (hydroelectric power,  renewable 
energy)  are  not  likely to  make  a  significant additional  contribution  in  the 
period  to  1990,  the  flexibility of  total  indigenous  energy  supply will  be  fairly 
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limited during  the  1980s.  The  drive  to  increase  this supply  must  be  vigorously 
pursued  and  stepped  up  during  the  coming  decade  in  order  to  create the  conditions 
for satisfactory long-term  supplies. 
The  policy  choices  for  the  production  of fuels  cannot  be  dissociated 
from  those  for  the  production,  transformation  and  distribution of  energy.  The 
problem  of  electricity.and the  means  of  producing  it is  particularly 
relevant.  The  Commun i.ty's  heavy  dependence  on  external  oi 1 
supplies  together with  the  fact that production  costs  in  nuclear  and 
coal-fired  power  stations are  lower  than  in  power  stations using·fuel  oil  should 
encourage  the  present strong  tendency  towards  an  increase  in  the  share  of  coal 
and  nuclear  power  in  the  production  of electricity, and  discourage  the  use  of 
electricity  when  it must  be  produced  with  fuel  oil. 
In  the  longer  term,  differences  in  cost structure between  nuclear 
power  and  electricity produced  from  fossil  fuels  may  well  play  a major  role. 
Total  costs  of  nuclear  power  are  determined  mainly  by  capital  costs  and  are  more 
resistant to  inflation as  long  as  fixed  costs  remain  constant over  a period  of 
years.  Nuclear  power  stations should  thus  be  at an  advantage  compared  with 
conventional  thennal  power  stations,which  are  much  .more  vulnerable  to  the 
danger  of  rising fuel  prices. 
Generally  speaking,  the  problems  posed  by  supplies  of different 
types  of  energy  must  be  looked  at in  relation  to  the  structure of uses  with 
which  they  are  related  technically  (because  of  the  nature  of  the  energy  source), 
economically  (because  of  changes  in  relative prices  of  the different sources  of 
energy)  and  strategically  (because  of  the  degree  of  external  dependence  for  supplies 
of  each  source). 
- Demand 
With  an  energy  coefficient of 0. 8, an  increase  pr reduction)  of one 
point  in  the  annual  rate of  GOP  growth  over  the  period  1978-90  would  entail,  by  1990, 
an  increase  (or reduction)  in  consumption  of  some  100  million  toe  per year  for the 
Community  as  a whole. 
. ..  I ... 
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Even  if we  ignore  the  economic  and  social  risks  involved  in  a 
deliberate policy of  low  economic  growth,  it is clear that such  a  policy  is not 
an  acceptable  means  of  saving  energy  over  the  next  decade.  At  first sight, a 
low  growth  rate may  seem  to  lighten  the  burden  of oil  imports,  but  in fact,  in 
the  long  term  it would  probably  make  it much  more  difficult to develop  energy 
saving  and  energy production  in  Europe,  and  it would  not  solve  the  problem  of 
Europels dependence  on  outside  energy  sour~es, or  remove  the  threats  that world  oil 
disequilibrium  involve  for  the  Community.  As  the  report 
11Pour  une  croissance 
econome  en  energie112  points  out, it is  not  paradoxical  to argue  that sustained 
growth  would  be  a  powerful  stimulus  in  the  medium  term  to the  rational  use  of 
energy.  Only  growth  of  this  kind  can  satisfy traditional  economic  and  social 
objectives  and  at the  same  time  play  an  active part in  saving  energy.  It would 
speed  up  the  renewal  of machinery,  buildings  and  means  of transport and  thus 
permit  improvements  in  energy  efficiency.  It would  generate  additional  finance 
for  firms  and  households  and  thus  help  in  adapting  existing equipment  and  housing 
to  the  new  energy  situation.  In  the  short term,  however,  a  return  to more 
sustained growth  would  make  the  energy  problem  more  acute. 
Whereas,  therefore,  the  basic  problem  is to  divorce  energy  demand  as 
far as  possible  from  GOP  ~rowth ("dissociation  ..  is the  expression  used  in  the 
report  referred  to  above),  the  possibility and  means  of achieving  this are  not 
independent  of  the  rate of growth.  There  is  no  guarantee  that the  dissociation 
observed  between  1973  and  1978  in  a  context of slower  growth  (approximately  2% 
a  year} will  continue,  particularly if there  is a  return to a more  satisfactory 
rate of growth. 
With  a  rate of  growth  of about  4%  over  the  period  1978-90,  a  reduction 
in  the  average  energy  coefficient from  0.8  to  0.65  would  produce  additional  savings 
of  100  million  toe.  This  estimate  is based  on  a  not  unreasonable  hypothesis  of 
dissociation. 
According  to  various  studies,  the  potential  for energy  savings,  estimated 
on  the  basis  of  techniques  available  in  the  near  future,  varies  from  15  to  50% 
according  tc sector:  between  15  and  35%  in  industry  and  agriculture;  between 
20  and  35 % in  transport;  up  to  50%  in domestic  use  and  the  tertiary sector. frhese 
gains  could  be  achieved  by  the year  2000,  provided  that the  necessary measures 
are  taken  without delay. 
2 This  report was  presented  by  Mr  J.  Saint Geours  in  June  1979  on  behalf of 
the  group  of independent  experts  which  met  under  his  chairmanship  to  carry out 
this  study  at the  request  of  the  Commission  of the  European  Communities. - 18  -
1.1.4.  The  prioritiesat Community  level 
At  its meetings  in July  1978  and  March  1979,  the  European  Council 
fixed  for  1985  the  double  objective of  reducing  the  energy  coefficient to  0.8 
and  of  limiting oil  imports  to their 1978  level  (i.e.  470  million  tonnes).  In 
June  1979,  the  European  Council  decided  that this  limit on  oil  imports  should  be 
observed  from  1978  to  1985. 
This  objective adopted  at Community  level  should  be  supp.l:emented 
by  the  following  two  objectives  proposed  by  the  Commission  for  1990: 
- to  reduce  the  energy  coefficient to  0. 7; 
- to  limit dependence  on  energy  imports  from  non-member  countries  to  50%. 
In  order  to  achieve  these  aims  (see  alternative energy  balance  in 
Tab 1  e A  4),  convergent  measures  by  the  ~1ember States  and  the  Community  wi 11  be 
required  in  a  number  of  priority aneas. 
First, in  the  area  of energy  production,  the  output of  hydrocarbons 
should  be  increased  to  145  million  toe  of oil  and  130  million  toe  of  natural  gas 
by  1990,  and  research  into  new  energy  sources  should  be  encouraged,  as  should  the 
use  of  such  sources. 
Moreover,  the  share  of solid fuel  and  nuclear  power  in electricity 
generation  should  be  increased  to  70  or  75%  by  1990.  To  achieve  this aim,  coal 
production  must  increase  to  its 1973  level, coal  imports  must  expand,  and 
additional  burning  capacity for  solid fuels  in  power  stations and  certain industries 
must  be  created. 
At  the  same  time,  energy-saving  measures  must  be  reinforced  through 
improved  information,  new  regulations  and  increased  financial  aids;  in  particular, 
standards  of efficiency in  heating  and  insulation systems  in  homes,  offices and 
shops  must  be  improved;  fuel  consumption  by  motor  vehicles  must  be  reduced; 
investments  and  the  application of  new  technologies  and  new  processes  designed 
to  save  energy  in  industry must  be  encouraged. 
. ..  I ... 
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These  convergent  measures  should  be  supported  by  powerful 
incentives  to  investment  and  to  research  and  development  in the  areas  of 
production,  saving  and  more  efficient use  of energy.  They  should  be  based  on  a 
pricing  policy  for  energy  intended  to: 
- gradually establish consumer  prices  that  reflect long-term movements  in 
supply  costs; 
-prevent artificially low prices and limit the reductions allowed on  large quantities; 
- ensure  market  transparency; 
gradually  simplify  and  harmonize  pricing  practices  and  consumption  taxes. 
Finally,  these  measures  will  need  to  be  coupled  with  a drive  to give 
the  public  better information  on  all  aspects  of the  energy  problem  so  as  to 
promote  an  awareness  of  urgent  needs  and  priorities. 
Obviously  national  approaches  to  the  energy  problem  will  differ,  but 
it is vital  that the  differences  should  not  lead  to  increased  problems  and 
imbalances  for the  Community,  and  thus  that national  energy  policies  should  be 
more  closely coordinated. 
Moreover,  the  Member  States must  try to  take  full  advantage  of  the 
benefits  that the  size and  the  solidarity of the  Community  can  afford at both 
domestic  and  international  level.  On  the  domestic  front,  new  or reinforced 
measures  for  Community  cooperation  can  support  national  efforts  by  increased 
use  of  Community  financial  instruments  in  the  field of energy;  by  the  development 
of  joint action  such  as  the  JET project;  by  the  development  of  European  energy 
networks  (gas  pipelines;  international  link-ups  between  electricity networks; 
oil  circuits), and  so  on. 
On  the  external  front,  besides  reducing  their energy  dependence,  the 
Community  countries  must  try to  diversify their external  sources  of  supply,  and 
to  reinforce  stability.  The  Community  as  such  is in  a much  more  powerful  position 
than  any  of the  individual  Member  States  to  negotiate with  other consumer  countries 
and  the  producing  countries,  and  is therefore much  more  likely to  achieve  the 
cooperation  required  to  ensure  stable supplies.  Nevertheless,  the  Community's 
power  of  negotiation  depends  to a  large extent on  how  far it can  promote  close 
coordination  between  energy  policies  in  the  Member  States,  and  ensure  that these 
policies are  really effective,  thus  setting  an  example  to  the  rest of the  world 
and  demonstrating  its cohesion. - 20  -
1.2.  Non-fuel  mineral  raw  materials 
1.2.1.  The  present and  future world  situation in outline 
While  there are  a  variety of possirrle  developments  for the very  many 
mineral  raw  materials, a  number  of general  features  stand out: 
(a)  The  improbability of a  general  shortage  of  raw  materials  in  the  period 
to  2000 
A comparison  of  known  resources  and  reserves with  the  cumulative 
demand  of  the  next  two  decades  (see  A7)  suggests  that there is no  real  risk of 
a general  physical  shortage  of  industrial  raw  materials  through  depletion  of 
reserves  up  to  the  end  of the  century. 
A  1  though  the  ratio of  reserves  to  demand  may  appear 1ow for  some 
minerals; it should  be  remembered  that known  resources  are  on  average  twice  or 
three  times  as  large as  reserves. 
Furthermore,  seabed  resources  have  not  been  included  in  this Table; 
their contribution may  prove  very  significant to  resources  of chromium,  nickel, 
cobalt and  manganese,  provided  that legal  problems  relating  to  the  law  of the 
sea  are  settled.  Finally, it so  happens  that the  scarcest materials  have  possible 
substitutes  (silver and  bismuth  for example)  or are encountering  increasing 
ecological  obstacles  to  their use  (mercury  and  asbestos  for example). 
(b)  The  heavy  geographical  concentration of  known  reserves 
At  first sight,  known  reserves  are distributed in  a  relatively 
balanced  fashion  between  the  major  groups  of countries:  44%  in  industrialized 
countries,  33%  in  developing  countries  and  23%  in state-trading countries. 
Within  each  group,  however,  there  is a great concentration w_ithin 
a  very  few  countries: 
- the  United  States, Canada,  Australia and  South  Africa  possess  90%  of the 
industrialized countries•  reserves; 
- the  USSR  possesses  82%  of  the  state-trading countries•  reserves  (exploration 
is only  beginning  in  China); 
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- seven  deve 1  oping  countries  possess  77%  of the  reserves  of  this group  (  Brazi 1 25%, 
Chile  19%,  New  Caledonia  8%,  Indonesia  7%,  and  Zaire,  Guinea  and  India  6% 
each). 
Resources  of  many  raw  materials  are  very  heavily 
concentrated  in  a  very  few  countries  (see  A  8). 
This  geographical  distribution of  reserves means,  in  particular, 
~  that industrialized countries  other  than  the  United  States, Canada,  Australia 
and  South  Africa  depend  heavily  on  other countries  for  their supplies  of 
industrial  raw  materials. 
«' 
(c)  The  low  level  of mining  investment  and  the  danger  of  imbalances 
between  supply  and  demand  between  now  and  1990 
For  six meta 1  s  representing more  than  95%  of  the  va 1  ue  of mining 
production  in  1974  (iron ore,  copper,  aluminium,  zinc,  nickel  and  lead),  the 
annual  investment  required  to  meet  a moderate  growth  in  world  consumption 
(excluding  state-trading countries)  for the  period  1977-90  has  been  put  by  the 
United  Nations  at  12  000  million  1975  dollars ·(see  A9). 
However,  according  to  the  regular  survey  by  the  Engineering  and 
Mining  Journal,  mining  investment  actually planned  for  these  six metals  for  the 
period  1979-83  is estimated  at some  1>  50 000  million  (i.e.  ~ 10 000  million  a 
year).  For  mineral  raw  materials  generally  (see  A  10),  the  survey  arrives at 
a  total  figure of$ 68 000  million;  it states that, since  last year,  the  volume 
of  planned  investment  has  fallen  by  $4000 million despite  the  fact that investment 
in  uranium  has  increased  considerably  to  reach  an  all-time record. 
Given  the  extreme  volatility of  raw  material  prices, it is  not 
difficult to  see  that such  a  low  level  of  investment  and  therefore  of  production 
may  endanger  prices  or  even  lead  to  a  temporary  breakdown  of  supplies  and  may 
reinforce  the  carteliiation tendencies  of  producing  countries. 
The  poor  financial  position of mining  companies  is currently the 
main  reason  for  this  low  level  of  mining  investment.  By  taking  advantage  of 
their financial  weakness  to  displacethem,or buy  them  up,  the  oil  companies  are 
moving  into this  industry which  offers  them  scope  for converting  their production 
potential.  Their  interest in  these- at present- unprofitable activities is 
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explained  by  the  fact that they expect  a substantial  increase  in  raw 
material  prices  over  the  next  few  years.  Injection of their capital, combined 
with  the  actions  of  international  financial  institutions and  public  authorities 
which  have  become  aware  of  the  problem,  may  well  so  stimulate mining  investment 
that supply  catches  up  with  or even  exceeds  demand  towards  the  end  of the  1980s. 
Until  this  happens,  however,  raw  material  prices  are  likely to  move  up. 
(d)  The  great probabilityofasubstantial  rise in  raw  material  prices 
during  the  1980s 
Whereas  during  the  last three  decades  - if we  exclude  a  number  of 
temporary  upsurges  such  as  that in  1973-74  - raw  material  prices  have  lagged 
well  behind  the  rise in  the  price of manufactures,  this situation will  almost 
certainly be  reversed  in  the first half of  the  next  decade. 
In 
11Raw  Material  Prices  in  the  1980s
11
,  the  Economist  Intelligence 
Unit  forecasts  price  rises for  iron  ore,  leather and  skins, wool,  bauxite  and 
alumina,  copper,  lead,  zinc,  cotton,  rubber,  antimony,  industrial  diamonds, 
platinum,  tungsten,  tropical  woods  and  tin.  It reckons  with  a  long-term  fall 
in  the  prices  of  hard  fibres,  jute, magnesite  and  nickel  only.  This  study  may 
still underestimate  the  impact  on  raw  material  prices  of  the  inadequate  flow 
of mining  investment  in  recent years,  as  with  copper,  for  example. 
This  rise in  raw  material  costs  may  well  lead  to  an  improvement  in  the 
terms  of  trade  of  producing  countries  and  in  particular of developing  countries, 
which  may  consequently  step  up  their imports  from  industrialized countries. 
This  new  trend  in  the  terms  of  trade  compared  with  recent decades 
may  thus  contribute,  provided  the  reversal  takes  place  gradually,  to  a return  to a 
better equilibrium of payments  balances  between  developing  countries  and 
industrialized countries, while  at the  same  time  stimulating world  economic 
activity. 
Rather  than  a  steady  upward  movement  in  raw  material  prices,  however, 
we  may  see  new  and  substantial  fluctuations  over  the  next  few  years, with 
less  favourable  consequences  for  all  concerned.  This  danger  remains  especially 
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even  though  negotiations  on  the  establishment of  long-term  agreements  between 
producer  and  consumer  countries  are  taking  a  turn  for  the  better:  such 
agreements  depend  on  the  existence  of  buffer  stocks  and  cannot  therefore  become 
operational  before  the  second  half of  the  decade;  until then, with  supply 
lagging  behind  demand,  it will  not  be  possible  to  build  up  the  necessary  stocks. 
(e)  The  geographical  imbalance  of expenditure  on  investment  and  exploration 
Estimates  by  the  United  Nations  Centre  for  Natural  Resources  of the 
geographical  distribution of 1977-90  mining  investment  needs  for  the world  (excluding 
state-trading countries)  put  these  needs  at slightly more  than; 100000 million 
in  the  industrialized countries  and  at approximately $50000 million  in  the 
developing  countries.  This  breakdown  broadly matches  that of  known  reserves 
(60%  in  the  industrialized countries  and  40%  in  the  developing  countries). 
For  the  period  1979-83,  43%  of projected. mining  company  invest-
me·rrt  is planned  in  industrialized countries., and.  57%  in  the developing 
countries  (see  A  10) . 
As  lead  times  in  m1n1ng  investment  are eight years  or more,  these 
investment  flows  often reflect implementation  of previous  decisions  rather than 
future  intentions. 
For  this reason,  the  geographical  distribution of exploration expenditure 
is a  better  indicator of  future  investment.  The  United  Nations  Centre  for  Natural 
Resources  estimates  that more  than  90%  of mining  companies•  expenditure  on 
exploration  has  been  concentrated  in  recent years  in  the  industrialized countries 
(mainly  the  USA,  Canada,  Australia  and  South  Africa);  the  10%  spent  in  the 
developing  countries  has  been  largely concentrated  in Brazil, Chile,  Indonesia 
and  the  Philippines. 
The  causes  of  this geographical  imbalance  are fairly clear.  During 
the  last decade,  non-commercial  risks  became  much  too  great in many  developing 
countries.  Nationalization,  withdrawal  from  establishment agreements,  political 
or  financial  instability and  the  climate  of  antagonism  towards  large Western 
enterprises  inevitably led these firms  to  look  elsewhere.  Furthermore,  they were 
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frequently  unable  to  find  the  banking  finance  necessary  for  large-scale mining 
investment  in  countries  which  were  no  longer  able,  or  might  no  longer  be  able, 
to  service  their external  debt. 
(f)  The  growing  trend  towards  on-the-spot  processing 
On-the-spot  processing  is a  very  important  objective for the  raw 
material  producing  countries  and  the  subject of  substantial controversy  in  the 
North-South  Dialogue.  These  countries  use  mafJy  and  v.arious  means  to 
pursue this objective  quantitative restrictions and  taxes  on  exports;  dual 
pricing  (selling  to  national  processors  working  for export  at a price 
appreciably  lower  than  world  market  prices); and  the 
11scissors
11  rtechnique,  which 
combines  dual  pricing for  the  raw  material  with  dumping  of the  processed  product. 
Consumer  countries will  have  to  adapt  to  this trend. 
1.2.2.  The  problems  seen  from  the  Community•s  viewpoint 
Given  this  combination  of likely problems  in  the  next  decade  in 
the  field of  non-fuel  mineral  raw  materials  (uranium  excluded),  the  Community 
finds  itself in  a  rather difficult position. 
(a)  First of  a  11 ,  it is very  he a  vi 1  y dependent  on  other countries 
for  its supplies  of  this  type  of product  (see  All). 
A  high  degree  of  dependence  is  not  necessarily worrying  if 
sources  of  supply  are  sufficiently diversified and  offer lasting guarantees  of 
access  to resources.  However,  what  is worrying  for  the  Community  is, first of 
all, the  combination  of its high  degree  of  dependence  for most  raw  materials 
and  the  concentration of reserves  in  a very  small  number  of  non-member  countries. 
There  is the  further fact that it depends  for  its supplies  of  certain products 
(manganese,  chromium,  cobalt,  platinum,  tungsten,  vanadium,  etc.)  on  a small 
number  of suppliers:  this makes  the  Community  especially sensitive  to  the 
uncertainties of  every  kind  which  may  affect its supplies. 
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This  problem  of dependence  does  not  necessarily  involve  the 
raw  material  itself. Thus,  in  the  case  of  titanium,  the  diversity and  size 
of  known  reserves  of  ilmenite  and  rutile permit  wide  diversification.  However, 
owing  to  a  lack  of  production  capacity for titanium  sponge,  the  Community  will 
depend  for  its supplies,  since  the  USSR  is withdrawing  from  the  market,  almost 
totally on  Japanese  producers  who  are its main  competitors  for  titanium  strip 
and  tubes  used  in  the  construction  of nuclear  power  stations and  desalination 
plants,  the  potential  market  for which  is considerable. 
The  scope  for  improving  the  Community's  degree  of self-sufficiency 
is  limited;  however,  such  scope  does  exist for lead  and  zinc  in  Ireland and 
Greenland.  Enlargement  may  also  bring  improvements  (some  of  them  substantial),mercury 
from  Spain  being  one  example. 
However,  bottlenecks  at primary  processing  level (e.g. for titanium) may be 
overcome  through  coordinated  action  on  the  part of private enterprise and  the 
public  authorities.  Furthermore,  the  development  of recycling  and  economies  of 
use,  which  are  frequently  conditional  upon  increased  research  and  development, 
are  likely to  bring  tangible  results. 
(b)  Community  mining  investment  outside  the  Community  is grossly 
1 n  adequate .. 
Agroup  of  the  main  Community  mining  companies  has  compiled  statistics 
on  its members • investments  during  the  period  1966 to 1977  (see  A  12}. 
Their  annual  investment  ranged  between  ~400 and  500million.  If this 
figure  is compared  with  the  ~ 12 000  million  required  for  the  world  (excluding 
state-trading countries)  and  if it is remembered  that the  Community  is the  largest 
world  consumer  of  imported  raw  materials, and  that part of our  mining  companies• 
investment  serves  to  ensure  the  supplies  of non-Community  consumer 
•  countries, doubts  may  be  expressed  as  to  the  security of  our  future  supplies. 
Furthermore,  European  mining  companies  are  tending  to  concentrate 
their investment  expenditure (75%)  and  a fortiori  their exploration expenditure 
(  60  % in  1966-67;  85%  in  1976-77)  to  the  detriment  of  developing  countries 
(see. A  13).  Expenditure  on  exploration  in African  developing  countries  has 
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plummeted,  falling  (if we  exclude  uranium)  to  zero  in  1976  (see  A14). 
Tne  Community  thus  depends  increasingly  on  the  goodwill  of a  number 
of  its main  industrialized,  raw  material  producing  competitors, which  find it 
easier than  the  developing  countries  to  retain close  control  over  the  production, 
sale  and  processing  of  raw  materials.  By  neglecting  the  developing  countries, 
where  political  risks are  no  doubt  greater, it is at the  same  time  depriving  itself 
of  the  boost  to  exports  which  increased  mining  exploration  in  these  countries  ·~ 
could  well  provide  and  perhaps  also  of a  large  part of  the  positive effects of  any 
rise  in  raw  material  prices. 
A whole  range  of measures  might  be  envisaged  to  stimulate  Community 
mining  investment  in  the  Third  World:  exploration  loans,  refundable  in  the  event 
of  success;  partial  financing  of  feasibility studies;  increased  financial 
participation  by  national  and  international  financial  institutions  (IFC,  IBRD, 
the  EIB  for  the  Community)  in  investment  projects;  better support  for exploration 
credit organizations  for  financing  plant and  equipment;  improvement  of systems 
of  guarantee  against  non-commercial  risks, etc.  The  provisions  relating to  mineral 
raw  materials which  have  been  incorporated  in the  new  Lome  Convention  go  some 
way  in  this direction,  by  increasing  available finance  from  the  European  Development 
Fund,  the  European  Investment  Bank  and  Commission  loans, with  or without  interest 
rebates,  and  even  in  the  form  of risk capital, and  by  allowing  the  Community  to 
sign  specific agreements  for  important  projects. 
(c)  The  impact  of  a  lasting rise in  raw  material  prices  on  Community 
economies  depends  to  a  large extent  on  the  use  made  by  producing 
countries of the  corresponding  increase  in  their export earnings.  The 
risks for  the  Communi tv  associ a  ted  with  such  an  increase  in  prices  are  as 
follows: 
- the  growth  of the  export  earnings  of  the  industrialized raw  material 
exporting  countries  may  lead  to  only a slight increase  in  imports 
from  the  Community; 
- the  growth  in  the  spending  power  of  developing  countries  may  lead 
to  a dispersal  of  their purchases  among  the  industrialized countries, 
so  that the  Community  will  not  receive  the  equivalent of the 
additional  expenditure it incurs  as  a  result of  the  increase  in  raw 
material  prices.  Consequently  the  more  the  Member  States direct 
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their raw  material  purchases  towards  the  developing  countries,  the 
more  they  will  be  able  to  bear  an  increase  in  prices, since  this 
policy creates export opportunities  for  them  which  they  will  have 
to  exploit. 
(d)  Faced  with  the  increase  in  on-the-spot processing,  some  industrialized 
consumer  countries  (in particular Japan)  seem  to  have  come  to  realize, apparently 
more  than  Community  countries,  that security of  supplies  does  not  necessarily lie 
at raw  material  level.  A progressive  dovetailing  of  the  interests of  producer 
and  consumer  countries  at each  of  the  stages  of  production,  distribution and 
marketing  may  create the  degree  of mutual  interest necessary  for  the  long-term 
guarantee  of  supplies  to  meet  the  needs  of  consumer  countries.  However,  this 
means  that the  consumer  countries,  and  particularly the  Community  countries, must 
adjust their industrial  structures, either so  that they  can  implement  suitable 
policies  in  good  time,  or  because  supplies  will  be  getting more  and  more  uncertain 
as  the  producer  countries  apply  restrictive measures. 
However,  if the  objectives  of  the  Lima  plan  are  to  be  realized,  the 
developing  countries•  raw  material  requirements  will  increase  so  rapidly  that 
these  countries  may  not  be  able  to  release  adequate  finance  at the  level  of on-
the-spot processing  to  enable  them  to  supply  the  industries  to  be  developed  further 
along  the  line.  The  only  real  danger  is that they  will  carry out  industrial 
development  by  stages, i.e.  that they  will  begin  by  setting  up  processing  industries, 
and  later create  on-the-spot outlets for  these  industries.  The  industrialized 
countries might  then  have  to  abandon  the  processing  of  raw  materials,  but  be 
obliged  to  take  it up  again  later. 
Moreover,  in  view  of  the  cost of  equipment  for  processing  raw  materials, 
the  high  energy  input of  these  activities, their low  value  added,  their low 
employment  potential, the  instability of  commodity  prices  and  the  problems  of 
pollution,  the  industrialized countries  have  no  real  advantage  in  monopolizing 
this industry and  in  specializing  in  the  least lucrative stage  of  the  industrial 
•  process. 
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Faced  with  these  problems,  which  are  common  to all  Member  States, the 
Community  as  such  has  a role to  play,  particularly in  the  dialogue  with  producing 
countries.  The  Community  dimension  can  give  each  of  the  Nine  much  more 
weight  and  effectiveness  than  could  isolated approaches  and  action. 
However,  a  true  Community  position  has  yet to  be  defined;  this  is  not 
without  its problems,  as  was  shown  by  the  recent discussion  of  the  Commission 
proposals  on  the  promotion  and  protection of  Community  mining  investment  in  the 
~ 
developing  countries;  the  initiative taken  in  connection  with  the 
renewal  of the  Lome  Convention  represents  progress,  even  if~nd also  precisely 
because)  the  ACP  countries  contribute only  slightly to  EEC  supplies  of mineral 
products.  This  initiative should  serve  as  an  example,  on  which  agreements  with 
other developing  countries  could  be  based. 
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1.3.  Commodities  of  animal  and  vegetable  origin 
1.3.1.  The  Community•s  current supply  pattern 
The  Community,  which  is one  of  the  foremost  agricultural  producers 
in  the  world,  is able  to meet  its requirements  (see  A15)for most 
basic  foodstuffs  (wheat,  meat,  sugar,  milk  products,  temperate  zone  fruit and 
vegetables)  and  actually exports  some  of these  products  (see  A17).  Nevertheless, 
it is dependent  on  other  countries  for various  categories of products: 
- tropical  products  (tea, coffee,  cocoa  and  tropical  fruits);  there are 
. no  direct substitutes for  these; 
basic  products  (tropical  vegetable  fats  and  oils, soya,  manioc,  etc.); these  are 
in  direct competitton  with  Community  products,  but are  obtained  at much 
lower  prices;·some  (manioc  and  soya)  have  greatly contributed  to  the development 
of  Community  livestock  Jroduction  (on~ of  the  world•s  most  advanced); 
- certain  products  which  the  Community  does  not  produce  in sufficient 
quantities:  maize,  ~lOad·, .leather and  skins. 
All  in  all, the  Community  is the  largest world  importer  of 
agricultural  products;  in  1977,  it accounted  for more  than  one  quarter of world 
agricultural  imports  (see  A  16),  ifur  almost  50%  of  imports  of  some  products 
(oilseeds,  coffee,  tea,  natural  textile fibres),  anq  for  over  50%  of  imports 
of  others  (bananas,  leather and  skins,  fresh  vegetables,  cocoa  and  cocoa-based 
products,  oil  cakes  and  oil  meal). 
Although  the  Community•s  extra-EEC  exports  have  increased,  their share  in 
world  sales of  agricultural  products  is tending  to  diminish;  the  Community 
has  a growing  agricultural  deficit {114 800  million  in  1969;  l20600million in 
1973;  ,J'29200million  in  1978)  which  reflects a fairly stable ratio of  exports 
to  imports  of  about  30%  to  35_%. 
Half  of  this deficit arises  in  trade with  developing  countries,which 
are  providing  an  increasing  proportion  of  EEC  supplies  (more  than  50%  in  1977). 
It may  thus  help  developing  regions  to  finance  imports  of  industrial  products 
from  the  Community.  It is  therefore not  so  much  the  deficit itself which  is 
disturbing  - although  it is sizable  for  an  area with  substantial  agricultural 
potential  - but  rather the  relative vulnerability which  results for  the  Community 
from  its dependence  on  imports for certain agricultural  inputs  (manioc,  soya)  or 
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non-agricultural  inputs  (fertilizer, oil) that it needs  because  of  the 
technological  level  of  its agricultural  production  methods. 
1.3.2.  Problems  expected  for  the  1980s 
Even  assuming  that,  in  line with  common  agricultural  policy 
principles, a  restrictive price  policy  is pursued  for products  for which  supply 
exceeds  demand  at Community  level, agricultural  productivity will  probably  increase 
further  and  the  tendency  for  surpluses  to  develop  is likely to  continue  and  affect 
most  areas  of  Community  food  production  over  the  next  ten years,  particularly the 
production  of wine. 
On  the  one  hand,  internal  and  international  demand  will  grow 
relatively slowly  during  the  years  ahead.  The  population  of the  Community  of  Nine 
will  increase little and  per  capita  food  consumption  should  expand  only  slowly 
with  a continued  fall  in  the  proportion  of family  budgets  devoted  to  food  and  a 
tendency  for demand  to  switch  to  new  or  high  quality products  involving  high  value 
added processing.  The accession oft_hree newmember countries to the  Community  will add 
-
almost 60'mill ion new consumers;  as the growth of disposabre incomes may well  be more rapid 
in the three new Member States than in the rest of the Community, their demand for ·food 
productswill be  fairly strong.  Nevertheless  there  is every  reason  to  believe 
that enlargement  will  lead  to  increased  imbalance  between  the  supply  and  demand 
for  certain products  (olive oil, wine);  it will  not  fundamentally  alter the 
trend  towards  a general  emergence  of  surpluses.  lJioreover,  effective 
demand  from  Third  World  countries  for  Community  basic  agricultural  products 
should  remain  limited  and  there will  be  stiff competition  from  other producing 
countries, whether  industrialized or developing,  on  world  markets.  This,  combined 
with  a continued  disparity between  Community  and  world  prices, means  that, if 
the  EEC  wishes  to  maintain  its share  of  world  markets,  effective machinery  for 
encouraging  exports  in  a  CAP  context  and  commercial  efforts will  be  even  more 
necessary. 
On  the  other  hand,  production  may  well  increase at a faster rate  than 
demand  mainly  as  a  result of  increased  productivity.  Farmers,  anxious  to  safeguard 
the  rate of growth  of  their incomes,may  well  switch  to more  intensive  production 
by  making  still greater use  of technology,  equipment,  fertilizers,  compound 
feedingstuffs  for cattle, etc.  Labour  productivity  is  likely to  go  on 
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increasing  more  rapidly  in  agriculture than  in  the  rest of  the  economy;  between 
1965  and  1977,  it increased  by  5. 7 % a year  as  against 3. 6 % for the  Community 
economy  as  a whole. 
Utilized  agricultural  area  (93  million  ha  in  the  EEC  of  Nine; 
147  million  ha  in  the  EEC  of  Twelve  according  to  1977  figures)  should  diminish 
between  now  and  1990  in  favour  of an  increase  in  forestry land,  which,  in  1977, 
was  32  million  ha  in  the  Community  of  Nine  and  55  million  ha  in  the  Community  of 
Twelve.  This  change  in  the  use  to which  land  is  put  - already  under  way,  though 
a t  a  relatively slow  pace  - should  be  encouraged  in  order to  reduce,  if not 
within 10 years then at most within 20  to 30 years, the Community •  s very substantia  1 deficit 
(more  than  8 000 mi 11 ion  EUA)  in  wood  and  derived  products,  for which  demand  is 
bound  to  increase  relatively quickly. 
~nerally speaking,  in  the  case  of renewable  raw  materials  such  as 
wood,  leather and  skins,  for  which  problems  of  access  to  resources  will  increasingly 
arise,  the  Community  can  develop  its production.  This  should  be  combined  with  a 
policy  similar to  that for  tropical  products,  aimed  at diversifying  sources 
and  stabilizing conditions  of  supply.  This  policy,  which  should  make  use  of 
the  Community•s  importance  as  the  foremost  world  importer,  might  take  various 
forms.  Thus,  although  the  Community•s  tanneries,  taweries  and  leather and  footwear 
industry  are  experiencing  supply  difficulties because  a  number  of developing 
countries  have  imposed  export  bans  on  skins  and  leather, virtually nothing  has 
been  done  to develop  the  enormous  potential  of African  countries  in  this field. 
Yet  coordinated  action  to  organize  the  rational  slaughter of  animals  in  these 
countries  would  make  it possible  to  increase  the  food  potential  substantially, 
to  guarantee  our  supplies  of  leather and  skins  and  also to sell  refrigerating 
equipment. 
In  the  case  of manioc  and  soya,  which  play  a  key  part as  animal 
feedingstuffs  and  are  therefore crucial  to  the  development  of  Community  meat 
production,  the  Community•s  vulnerability is due  to  its total  dependence  on  other 
countries  for  these  two  products  combined  with  an  extreme  concentration  on  a 
few  sources  of supply.  This  dependence,  a result of the  level  of  technical  progress 
in  agriculture  and  cost differential  between  imported  products  and  Community  products 
that cou 1  d be used as substitutes if they were cheaper (protein from mi 1  k as opposed to protein 
from  soya;  cereals as  opposed  to  manioc),  is  a major  problem  which  will  have  to  be 
solved  during  the  next  decade. 
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CHAPTER  2 
THE  NEW  INTERNATIONAL  ECONOMIC  AND  MONETARY  ENVIRONMENT 
The  last decade  has  witnessed  the  break-up  of  the  international  economic 
and  monetary  order  which  up  till then,  under  the  protection  and  control  of the 
United  States,  had  worked  afterafashion,  largely to  the  benefit of the 
Western  countries.  This  break-up  has  led  these  countries  to question  a  number 
of  vital  elements  of their economic  and  social  development. 
The  salient features  of  our  new  international  environment  as  we  move 
into  thel980sare  the  disruption of the  international  monetary  system,  the  surge 
in  energy  prices,  the emergence  of  competition  on  world  markets  from  countries 
engaged  in  rapid  industrialization and,  on  a more  general  level, a shift in  the 
global  balance  of  economic  and  financial  power  and  an  expansion  of  the  role 
of  certain protagonists  dominating  international  economic  life {States;  banking 
system;  firms  and  particularly multinationals). 
In  recent years  numerous  studies  have  been  conducted,  often  at considerable 
expense,  with  the  aim  of making  a forward  assessment  of international  economic  and 
financial  relations  in  the  next  few  decades.  Under  these  circumstances  and 
particularly in  view  of the  quality of  the  research  carried out  as  part of the 
''Interfutures'' exercise, it would  have  been  superfluous  to  attempt  in  this report 
a further sketch  of  the  world  economy  up  to  1990  or  beyond.  We  have  instead  chosen 
to  review  rapidly the  issues  which  seem  likely to  dominate  the  next  decade  and 
to  highlight  the  significance of the  resultant phenomena,  constraints and  prospects 
for  the  Community  as  such  and  for  the  Member  States as  individuals  and  as  they 
inter-relate with  one  another. 
2.1.  The  broad  outlines of  the  Community's  foreseeable  international  environment 
in  the  1980s 
Apart  from  the  fundamental  problems  described  above  of world  energy  and 
raw  material  supplies,  the  changes  which  can  be  expected  in  the  Community's 
international  environment  in  the198Q~revolvearound three main  phenomena:  a  stronger 
industrialization drive  in  Eastern  bloc  countries  and  certain Third  World  countries 
or  regions;  changes  in  the  international  division  of  labour  and  in  the  conditions 
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of  international  competition;  and  an  alteration in the  terms  and  techniques  of 
international  financing  and  payments. 
2.1.1.  Industrialization of East  European  countries  and  Third  World  countries 
The  trend  towards  greater industrialization, already well  under  way  in 
Eastern  Europe and in  some  parts  of the  Third  World,  is  likely to  accelerate  in  the 
years  to  come.  There  is a  general  consensus  on  this  tendency,  which  should  be 
based  on  these  countries'  factor resources  and  on  the  aptitude of particular 
countries, withsupport  from  companies  and  the  banking  system  in  the  industrial-
ized  countries.  to  exploit them:  raw  materials  for on-the-spot processing; 
availability of  own  capital  (mainly  OPEC  countries)  or easy  access  to  borrowed 
capital  to develop  particular highly  capital-intensive industries,  including  the 
processing  industries;  an  ample  supply  of easily trained  and  cheap  labour  for 
developing  activities  requiring  a  high  input of unskilled  labour. 
The  speed  of  the  industrialization process  depends  both  on  a  number 
of factors  within  these  countries  and  on  developments  in  their relations with 
industrialized countries:  degree  of openness  of markets;  extent, form  and  conditions 
of  help  from  Western  countries, etc. According  to  the  forecasts  of the  "lnterfuturesn 
report,  the  Third  World  share  of the  world's  industrial  added  value  is likely to 
be  multiplied  by  at least two  between  1970,  when  it was  less  than  8%,  and  the year 
2000,  when  it is expected  to  he  between  16.4  and  19%.  A similar trend  is forecast 
for  China  whose  share  should  increase  from  4.2%  to  between  8 and  9.6%,  whereas 
the  share  of  East  European  countries  is likely to  grow  at a slower  rate  (from 
20%  in  1970  to  between  21  and  24%  in  2000). 
Two  important  consequences  of  the  industrialization of  new  countries 
in  a system  of  relatively free  trade  are  the  opening  up  of  new  markets  for certain 
products  of  the  developed  economies  and  the  intensification of competition  in 
markets  for  some  other  products.  Since  the  early  1970s  there 
has  been  some  increase  in  the  developing  countries•  share  of world  trade  in 
manufactured  products  (6.4%  .in  1960;  7.2%  in  1970;  9.3%  in  1977)  and  in  the 
corresponding  imports  of  industrialized countries  (6.3%  in  1960;  6.7%  in  1970; 
8.5%  in  1977).  This  dual  upward  trend, moderate  on  averaqe  and  concealing  an  upsurge 
in  the  share  of  a  few  countries3 and  a decline  in  the  share  of many  other Third 
World  countries,  is much  more  noticeable  for  a  small  number  of  cur rent 
consumption  goods  (textiles, clothing;  leather goods  and  footwear,etc~ and 
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electrical  and  electronic equipment.  On  the  other hand,  exports  of manufactured 
goods  from  the  industrialized countries  to  the  developing  countries, even  the  non-
OPEC  developing  countries,  and  their surplus  on  trade  in  manufactures  with  these 
countries,  are  growing  rapidly  (see A  18  and  A  19). 
Apart  from  the  considerable  development  of  trade  between  developing 
countries,a further  consequence  is  likely to  be  an  accentuation  of  the  differences 
in  situation,  prospects  and  needs  within  the  Third  World.  Only  a  limited  number  of 
developing  countries  are  involved  in the  proce$  of  ra·p.td  industrialization, 
development  and  growing  participation in  international  trade.  On  the  other side 
of  the  coin  we  find  a  group  of poor  countries with  large  populations  (particularly 
in  Africa  and  Southern  Asia)  whose  plight and  development  prospects  give  cause 
for  great concern.  These  two  groups  of countries  represent  the  extremes, constantly 
diverging,  of  a  range  of  situations reflecting  an  ever-increasing diversity of 
abilities and  needs  of the  countries  concerned. 
2.1.2.  Trends  in the  international  division  of  labour  and  international  trade 
The  growing  industrialization of  East  European  and  Third  World 
countries  is one  of  the  new  factorsof change  in  the  international  division 
of  labour  and  in  international  trade,  but  there are other  changes 
which  will  be  at least as  important,  if not  more  so,  in  the years  to  come. 
Firstly,  the  relative competitive  positions  of  industrialized countries 
have  changed  radically in  recent years  and  Europe  in  particular is starting off the 
new  decade  in  a  new  competitive  position. 
Secondly,  the  size of  the  oil  bill  requires  all  consumer  countries 
to  exercise  increased vigilance over  their external  balance  and  their export 
performance;  at the  same  time  export  demand  is becoming  less  predictable  and  shows 
a changing  pattern,  i 11 ustrated by  the  considerable  growth  in  purchases  by  the 
OPEC  countries  and  the  slowdown  in  trade  between  industrialized countries  since  1974. 
This  means  that competition  will  stiffen and  that a  capacity for rapid  adaptation  to 
changes  in  geographical  patterns  and  types  of  product  in  demand  on  world  markets 
(including  of  course  military equipment  and  services  which  are  playing  an  ever 
greater  part in  world  trade)  will  be  a vital  asset. 
Thirdly,  competition  between  industrialized countries  is likely 
to  be  increasingly concentrated  on  capital-intensive industries employing  skilled 
labour;  those  industries which  have  the  greatest contribution  to make  to  technologica~ 
progress  wi 11  take  on  growing  s t rate g  i c importance.  They  wi 11  to a  1  arge  extent 
determine  the  ability of  the  various  industrialized countries  to  cope  with  the 
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changes  in  the  international  division of  labour  and  to  acquire  or  retain a 
certain  freedom  of  choice  in  respect of  the  form  of  their economic  and  social 
development. 
Lastly,  the  nature  and  tenns  of  relationships  in  international 
trade  are  altered  by  the  increasing  role  played  by  governments  and  multinational 
firms.  The  growing  involvement  of the  state reflects  in  the  first instance 
increasing  reliance  on  intergovernmental  agreements  in  trade with  Eastern  bloc 
countries,  OPEC  countries  and  most  of  the  developing  countries.  But  most  of  all 
this situation reflects  the  increased  responsibilities shouldered  by  governments 
in  the  adjustment  process  between  international  trade  and  the  adaptation of  their 
countries•  productive  apparatus,  a  requirement  which  is frequently  an  excuse  for 
the  development  of a variety of  increasingly  threatening  protectionist practices, 
whether  they  involve  aid  to  exports  or  restrictions on  imports  of  particular 
categories  of  products. 
At  the  same  time the multinationals  are expanding  their influence  on 
the  restructuring of  the  geographical  location of  plant and  of  international  trade. 
To  the  growth  of American  subsidiaries abroad  has  recently  been  added  a rapid 
increase  in  direct foreign  investment  by  Japan  and,  to  some  extent,  by  certain 
European  countries  as  well.  The  most  popular  host  countries  for this growing  direct 
international  investment  are  the  newly  industrializing countries  in  the  Third  World 
(particularly noticeable  in  the  case  of manufacturing  and  service  industries), but 
investment  also  takes  place  in  Europe  and  North  America. 
2.1.3.  New  international  financing  and  payments  techniques 
The  collapse  of  the  international  monetary  system  conceived  at 
Bretton  Woods  and  the  effects of  the  oil  price  rises  on  international  settlements 
have  led  to  a  new  style of  international  monetary  and  financial  relations which 
have  evolved  in  a  largely informal  manner. 
Apart  from  the  floating  of  currencies,  the  new  relations  have  the 
following  main  features  which  may  well  survive  in  the  next  decade: 
(i) fairly sharp  fluctuation  in  the  geographical  distribution of 
foreign  exchange  reserves,which  are  increasing  rapidly,  although  at a rate close 
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to  that of world  trade.  At  the  end  of  1972  the  industrialized countries  held 
65%  of world  reserves,  OPEC  countries  around  8%  and  the developing  countries  27 %; 
at the  end  of  1976  these  shares  were  respectively 43%,  30%  and  27%,  and  at 
the  beginning  of  1979,  59%,  16%  and  25%.  The  1379  increase  in oi 1 prices 
is  likely to  chan9e  the  distribution again,  and  the  trend  of gold  prices  should 
also  affect it; 
(ii)  a shift in  the  role of  international  reserves 
The  practice of  drawing  on  assets  (reserves)  was 
generally applied  until  the  early  1~70s  as  a means  of financing  a country's 
external  deficit, except  in  the  United  States,  in  view  of  the  dollar's status 
as  a  reserve  currency;  since  then,  it seems  to  have  been  partly abandoned  and 
replaced  to  a  large  extent by  the  method  of adjusting  liabilities.  Countries  in 
deficit have  tended  to deal  with  the  problem  by  resorting  to  borrowing  rather 
than  by  drawing  on  their reserves, which  are  used  instead  as  security or  as  a 
guarantee  for  these  loans.  This  has  new  implications  for  the  creation of 
international  liquidity and  the  conduct  of economic  policy; 
(iii) the  recourse  to  international  borrowing  - sometimes  on  a 
large  scale  - on  the  part of  Eastern  bloc  countries,  some  of 
the  developing  countries  and  even  a  few  European  countries,  has  been  made  possible 
by  the  growth  in  international  capital  markets,  fed  by  the  excess  cash  from 
countries  in  basic  balance  of  payments  surplus  (particularly the  OPEC  countries 
or  some  of  them),  and  the  American  deficit,  and  fostered  by  the  increasingly 
important  role  played  by  the  western  private banking  system.  This  double  phenomenon 
has  undeniably  had  some  beneficial  results;  none  the  less it raises  a  number  of 
problems  which  may  well  become  acute  over  the  next  few  years.  The  main  problems 
for  the  western  countries  and  Europe  in  particular are, firstly, control  over  the 
creation  and  movement  of  international  liquidity and,  secondly,  in  the absence  of 
a  lender  of  last resort,  the  vulnerability of  the  whole  western  banking  system  in 
the  case  of default of  large  debtors  in  transactions  of  this  kind.  From  the  point 
of  view  of  the  developing  countries,  the  involvement  of  the western  banking 
system,  together with  the  establishment of multinational  firms,  poses  three major 
types  of  problem.  Firstly, it tends  to  obscure  the  plight of  the majority of 
Third  World  countries which  are  unable  to  attract private capital  and  are  hit by 
the  reduction  in  the  volume  of official  development  assistance granted  by  the 
industrialized countr.ies.  Secondly,  in  the  case  of  the  few  Third  World  countries 
in  a  position to  obtain  bank  loans,  while  this  system  apparently  affords  them 
more  freedom  of manoeuvre  in  the  use  &f  funds  and  eases  the 
traditional  constraints  of  aid  in  term5  of allocation,  strings  ( 11tied aid 11 )  and 
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rapidity, it creates  or  reinforces  other constraints:  increased  cost of  credit 
and  attendant charges;  shorter repayment  periods;  uncertainty as  to  the  banks' 
degree  of  commitment.  Finally, it may  tempt  them  to  embark  on  an  industrialization 
process  which  would  increase  the  danger  of  their economies  being  dislocated.  This 
could  entail  two  risks: first,  that the  country  is torn  i.nternally  b~tween 
growth  in  certain sectors  and  slow  overall  economic  and  social  development; 
s e co n dl y, that growth  in  these  sectors without  a sufficient corresponding 
increase  in  mass  consumption  in  the  country  sharpens  competition  on  world  markets 
and  in  western  co.untries  in  particular, and  increases  the  risk of a defensive 
reaction  on  their part. 
The  common  denominator  of most  of these  new  features  of  international 
economic  and  monetary  relations is that,  in  the  absence  of consistent policies 
coordinated  both  internally and  internationally, they  add  to  instability in 
international  relat;ons and,  to  varying  degrees,  to  insecurity for all  parties 
concerned.  Among  the  many  factors  of  international  instability and  insecurity 
which  European  countries  are  likely to  come  up  against  in  the  1980s,  the  most 
important  relate to  the  conditions  of energy  and  raw  material  supplies  {price  and 
quantity);  outlets  in  and  financial  relations with  OPEC  countries  and  newly 
industrializing countries  by  reason  of the  fragility of  their constantly evolving 
economic  and  social  structures;  international  monetary  relations given  the 
floating of  currencies,  uncertainty about  the  American  economy  and  theUS  dollar 
(the  influence  of which,  while  still dominant,  is diminished  and  under  attack), 
the  unpredictability of  the  attitude of the  United  States  and  finally the  unchecked 
expansion  of the  Euro-markets  and  international  liquidity. 
2.2.  Implications  for  the  Community  of  this  new  international  environment 
There  are  at least three  fundamental  reasons  why  the .Community  will  be 
particularly affected  by  these  changes  in  its international  environment  over  the 
coming  decade.  Firstly, throughout  this  period  the  Community  is likely to  remain 
heavily  dependent  on  the.rest of  the  world  both  for  supplies  and  for outlets. 
Secondly,  and  again  throughout  the  1980s,  it is  likely to  have  only  limited  scope 
for  accelerating  the  establishment  of  a  new  more  stable and  more  equitable  system 
of  international  economic  and  monetary  relations;  its freedom  of action will  in 
any  case  depend  on  its degree  of  cohesion,  reflected  in  the  future  progress  of 
the  EMS.  And  finally,  the  Community  Member  States are  already following  very 
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different courses  in  the  area  of  international  specialization and  showing  wide 
differences  in  their ability to  adjus.t  to  foreseeable  changes  in  the  international 
division  of  labour.  Community  countries  cover  a wide  range  of  situations and 
sharply divergent  attitudes in their adjustment  to  the  challenge  of  the  rapid 
industrialization of developing  countries,  in  their capacity  to  take  on  the 
other  industrialized countries  on  their home  markets  and  in  the  extent of  their 
involvement  in  highly  labour-intensive  industries  and  those  with  greatest 
potential  for  technological  progress. 
The  Community•s  attitude to changes  in  the  international  division of labour 
will  without  doubt  be  one  of  Europe•s  dominant  problems  over  the  next  decade.  Some 
of  the  most  important  aspects  of the  issue, described  above  in  general  terms,  will 
be  analysed  in  greater detail  in  the  sections  below.  Clearly, from  this  point of 
view,  it is still  very  unrealistic to  regard  the  Community  as  a unified whole.  While 
it may  indeed  act as  such  in  international  negotiations,  the  task of adaptation 
devolves  upon  the  government  and  industry of  each  individual  member  country;  moreover, 
for  each  of  them  international  rivalry begins  within  the  Community  itself:  the 
interplay between  the  competition  which  sets  them  against  one  another  both  on  the 
Community  market  and  overseas  and  that which  they  face  from  the  rest of the world 
is a  phenomenon  which  must  not  be  forgotten  or  underestimated. 
2.2.1.  The  Community  and  the  newly  industrializing countries 
The  growing  industrialization of  the  Third  World  and  Eastern  ~oc 
countries  is  bound  to  lead  to  a decline  in  the  western  countries•  role  in world 
industrial  production.  In  particular, as  indicated  in  the_ 
11 Interfutures
11  report, 
the  Community•s  share  is likely to  drop  substantially between  now  and  the  end  of 
the  century:  to  between  15  and  16%,  as  against  22%  in  1970.  This  decline,  less 
pronounced  in  fact than  that experienced  by  the  United  States, is not  particularly 
significant in  itself; what  matters  to  the  Community  is the  circumstances  under 
which  it takes  place,  circumstances  which  could  reflect widely  differing scenarios 
of  growth,  international  trade  and,  more  generally,  economic  and  social  well-being • 
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The  industrialization of  the  Third  World  should  also  lead  to  more 
intense competition  from  the  developing  countries  in  the  area  of  trade  in 
manufactures.  Imports  of manufactures  by  the  Nine  from  the  non-oil  developing 
countries  amounted  to  J 22 000  million  in  1978;  this was  similar to  the 
va 1  ue  of  corresponding  imports  by  the  U  S A ,  and  five  times  as  high  as  the 
figure  for  Japan:  J4 400  million.  Per  capita  figures were  ~85  for  the 
Community  as  a whole  {althogh  the  figures  for the  individual  Member  States varied 
widely),  ~ 101  for  the  US A  and  J 38  for Japan  (see  A  19).  However,  the 
share  of manufactures  from  the  non-oil  developing  countries  in  total  imports 
of manufactures  was  much  lower  in  the  Community,  at 8.3%,  than  their share 
in  the  total  imports  of manufactures  by  the  ·usA  (22.9%)  or  by  Japan  (24.8%). 
While  it is true  that this  new  competition  has  affected certain 
categories  of  current consumption  products  in  Europe,  in  particular a small 
number  of textile and  clothing  products,  leather goods  and  footwear,  it 
should  none  the  less  be  noted  that on  the  whole: 
(i)  the  market  losses  suffered  by  European  producers  as  a result 
of  the  advent  of  these  new  competitors  seem  to  have  been 
limited  on  European  markets;  by  contrast the  effects  have 
been  limited  on  European  markets;  by  contrast the  effects 
have  been  more  severe  on  some  overseas  markets  such  as  the 
United  States markets  for current consumption  products,  office 
machinery  and  electrical  goods  (see  A20). 
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(ii)  the  level  of  penetration,  that is to  say  the  proportion of domestic 
demand  satisfied by  imports,  has  admittedly  increased  substantially 
in  European  countries  for  some  of  the  products  exported 
by  the  developing  countries;  but  this  increased  penetration  seems 
to  be  due  as  much  to  competition  from  other  industrialized countries 
as  to  competition  from  the  developing  countries.  However,  it may 
be  that the  estimates  of  European  market  shares,  which  are 
b a s e d  o n  v a 1 u e  r a t h e r  t h a n  v o 1 u  m  e ,  u n  d e r e s t i m  a te  t he 
real  growth  in  the  developing  countries·  market  share  achieved  at 
the expense  of  home  production  and  of  imports  from  other  industrialized 
countries  (see  A  21). 
Generally  speaking,  Europe  seems  to  lag  behind  the  United  States  and  Japan 
in adapting  to competition  from  the  developing  countries  and  appears  more 
vulnerable  to  an  intensification of  this competition  in the  future  because  of the 
trend  and  pattern of the  external  trade of most  Community  countries.  They  tend  to 
export more  and  import  less of  the  type  of  products  produced  by  the  developing 
countries  (particularly products  with  a  high  unskilled  labour  content)  than 
Japan  and  the  United  States,where  the  process  of  adjusting  the  structure of 
production  and  foreign  trade  to competition  from  these  countries  has  been  under 
way  for  longer.  But  one  striking and  worrying  feature  is that there are  fairly 
wide  differences  between  Community  countries.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  is comparatively  less  involved  in  exporting  and  much  more  open  to 
importing  these  types  of  product  and  its manufacturing  industry shows  a remarkable 
capacity for  adjustment.  Italy,  on  the  other hand,  continues  to  specialize strongly 
in exports  of  products  requiring  little skilled labour  and  imports  very  few  of this 
type.  Italy•s external  trade  surplus  for this category  of products  has  increased 
sharply ·since  1970,  whi  1 e  'the  balance  in  the  other  major  European 
countries  was  marking  time  or falling.  Italy•s continued  heavy  specialization in 
labour-intensive activities helps  to  explain  the  remarkable  rise in  Italy•s 
industrial  workforce  since  1970  as  compared  with  other countries.  This  is associated 
with  the  signifi~ant competitive  edge  that Italy  has  maintained  over  its 
m a j  o r  E  u r op ea n partners  in  terms  of 1  abour  costs  and  prices  and  with  the fact 
that its rate of productive  investment  remains  far below  that of most  European 
countries. 
Productive  investment  is also  relatively  low  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  here 
too, this may he 1  p to exp 1  a  in its growing  but relatively ne\tJ speci a  1  i zati on in exrorts of 
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labour-intensive  products.  The  fact that the  United  Kingdom  seems  less 
vulnerable  to  competition  when  the  labour  input is  unskilled~ tends  to 
confirm  that  this  specialization is due  more  to  the United  Kingdom's  low  rate 
of  productive  investment  than  to exploitation of the  relative decline  in  the 
country•s  wage  costs.4 
France,  on  the  other hand,  has  significantly reduced  its involvement  in  labour-
intensive  industries, particularly those  relying  heavily  on  unskilled  labour,  and 
in  exports  of  such  products.  Nevertheless,  despite  the  shift towards  activities 
more  in  keeping  with  the  maturity of its industry,  its position  is still precarious, 
particularly from  the  point of  view  of  imports.  This  suggests  that France,  though 
to  a  lesser extent than  Italy or  the  United  Kingdom,  will  have  to make  a special 
conversion  effort if there  is to  be  growing  openness  to  trade  in  products  from 
the  developing  countries. 
To  sum up, the wide differences between Member States in their relative exoosure to 
competition  from  the  developing  countries, and  the  volume  of  intra-Community"  trade 
1 i a  bl e to  be  affected  by  a  growth  in  such  competition, are  already  posing 
problems  - likely to  be  magnified  in  the  future  - for  a coherent  Community 
strategy of  trading  relations with  developing  countries  and  for  a Community 
approach  to  the  necessary  adjustments. 
Moreover,  it should  be  borne  in  mind  that although  as  yet competition  from 
the  developing  countries mainly  involves  labour-intensive activities requiring 
few  qualifications, it already extends  to  other  branches,  and  will  no  doubt  affect 
an  increasingly wide  range  of products  as  the years  pass.  Some  of  the  non-
industrialized countries  of  the  Third  World  have  already widened  the  range  of 
their output,  and,  when  their means  enable  them  to  do  so, engage  in capital-
intensive activities such  as  the  production  of petrochemicals  and  steel, and 
shipbuilding.  The  Eastern  bloc  countries  are moving  in  the  same  direction,  and 
the  OPEC  countries,  or at least some  of  them,  might  do  the  same  in  the  near  future . 
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4on  the  trend  towards  specialization in  the  various  European  countries, see  the 
report of  the  Group  of  Experts  on  Sectoral  Analyses: 
11Changes  in  industrial 
structure in  the  European  economies  since  the  oil  crisis,  ..  EEC  July  1979;  also 
the  report  by  Mr  Rollet:  .. Forces  et faiblesses  de  la specialisation internationale 
des  pays  de  la  CEE  face  ala nouvelle  division  internationale du  Travail,  .. 
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2.2.2.  The  Nine  in  international  competition  between  industrialized countries 
The  Community  as  a whole  has  succeeded  fairly well  in  defending  its 
position  in  world  trade  in  recent years  and,  while  its share  of world  exports  has 
contracted,  this  is essentially the  result of  the  surge  in  oil  prices  swelling  the 
share  of  OPEC  countries  to  the  detriment  of  the  rest of the  world  (see  A23). 
None  the less,  this fairly encouraging  overall  performance  obscures 
internal  divergences,  particularly between  the  sharp  and  persistent decline  in 
the  United  Kingdom•s  market  share  of world  exports  of manufactured  products  and 
the  stability or even  increase  in the  shares  of  the  other major  European  countries. 
On  the  eve  of  the  new  decade  the  major  problems  which  the  Member  States 
are  likely to  face  in  this field may  be  divided  into three  broad  categories:  a 
shift in  the  geographical  pattern of  trade;  changes  in  the  relative competitiveness 
of the  Nine  both  with  one  another  and  with  the  rest of the  world;  and  Europe•s 
position  in  the  manufacture  and  trade of products with  a  large  technology  content. 
A shift in  the  geographical  pattern of  Community  trade 
The  geographical  realignment  of Community  tradewas  already  a 
feature  of  the  1970s  as  new  competitors  and  new  ma:kets  emerged;  the  boost  to 
trade  from  Community  integration  lost momentum,  a process  which  will  probably 
continue  for  some  years  (see A 24  and  A 25). 
The  share  of  intra-Community  trade  in  the  Nine•s  total 
imports  of manufactured  products  (categories  5 to  8)  increased  until  1973, 
and  is  now  declining:  after rising  from  61.7%  in  1963  to  64.3%  in  1973,  it 
was  only  62.1%  by  1978. 
This  break  in  the  trend  has  occurred  despite  the  accession  to  the 
Community  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland  and  Denmark  in  1973.  As  ~ould be 
expected,  enlargement  led  to an  expansion  of  trade  between  the  six founder 
members  and  the  three  new  members,  but  the  effect was  limited  and  was  in any  case 
insufficient to  compensate  for  the  very  sharp  decline  in  the  share  of  trade  among 
the  Six  (see  A  26). 
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This  represents  a significant change  for  the  Member  States  in 
comparison  with  previous  years,  particularly for  the  Six,whose  economic  growth 
had  received  a  strong  stimulus  from  the  intensification of their trade within 
a well-defined  and  stable Community  framework.  The  boost  from  integration seems 
now  to  be  weakening;  Europe  is  being  obliged  to  turn  increasingly 
towards  new  markets  in  the  developing  and  Eastern  bloc  countries, markets  which 
are  more  uncertain  {Iran  being  a case  in  point). 
Every  effort must  be  made  in  the  context of  the  EMS  andmarket 
integration  in the  Community to  re-establish  stable  trading  conditions  and 
a  new-found  buoyancy  on  the  Community  market,  which  accounts  for more  than 
50%  of  the  Nine•s  trade. 
Changes  in  the  relative competitive  positions  of  the  Nine 
It is not  intended  to  speculate  here  on competitive  trends 
in  theCommunity  countries  during  the  1980s.  However,  it should  be  stressed that 
the  new  decade  will  see  the  emergence  of a  new  pattern of competitive  relationships, 
both  within  the  Nine  and  between  them  and  the  rest of the  world. 
Firstly,  European  wage  costs,  like  those  in  the  other 
industrialized countries,  are  a competitive  disadvantage  compared  with  wage 
costs  in  the  developing  countries.  This  is not  a  new  phenomenon,  although  it 
has  become  more  marked  in  recent years;  what  is  new  is that it is  now  showing 
up  in  spectacular fashion  in  trade with  those  developing  countries  undergoing 
rapid  industrialization. 
S  e c o  n  d 1 y ,  a l 1  t h e  r1 em b e r  S t a t e s  w  i t h o u t  ex c e p t i on  h ave 
experienced  a sharp  deterioration  in  their competitivity  since  1970  compared 
with  the  United  States,  both  in  terms  of  trends  of unit wage  costs  in  dollars 
and  i n terms  of  unit export  va 1  ues  for  manufactured  products  in  do 11 ars  {see 
A 27  and  A  28).  The  degree  of deterioration varies  according  to  ~ember State, 
and  the  differences  reflect a  change  in  the  relative compet1t1v1ty  of the 
European  countries. 
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None  the  les~, the  differential  trends  in  relative unit costs,  both 
wage  costs  and  total  costs,  have  not  always  had  the  expected  effect on  export 
performances  and  the external  balances  of the  countries  concerned.  There  are  three 
main  reasons  for this.  First of all, the  structures of these  differential  cost 
trends  are  not  reflected in  the  trends  of export  prices  (see  A28). 
Secondly,  they  may  leave  untouched  or even  increase what  can  be 
substa-ntial  differences  in  level;  this is certainly true of  relations  between  indust-
rialized  countries  and  developing  countries,  but  may  also  apply  to  relations  between 
industrial_i~ed countries, e.g.  between  Japan,  the  United  Kingdom  or  Italy on  the 
one  hand  and  the United  States,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  the  Benelux 
countries  on  the  other.  It is difficult, of  course,  to  establish  this clearly, 
since  we  possess  figures for the  hourly  wages  of workers  in  manufacturing  industries 
(see  A  2  9)  but  not for the  level  of corresponding  productivity per  man-hour; 
however,  information  concerning  the  levels of apparent  labour  productivity points 
in  the  same  direction.5 The  third reason  is that other factors  influence  these 
performances:  rate of growth,  nature  of  products  traded  and  geographical  pattern 
of  trade;  specific features  of the  exporting  sub-sector compared  with  industry 
generally,  etc. 
The  Community  and  production  activities with  a  large 
technology  content 
We  know  the  strategic importance  for a country•s  future  external 
trade  and  overall  economic  and  social  development  of its capacity  to  develop 
activities that are  in  the  forefront of  technical  progre~s, either because  they 
originate it (fundamental  research,  advanced  technology  industries)  or because 
they  are  its vehicles  (productive  capital  goods)  or  because  they  incorporate it 
(principal  intermediate  goods  used  in  the  major  production  processes). 
The  external  performance  in  respect of  the  corresponding  products 
reveals  a country•s  capacity  to 
11control
11  rather than  to  "be  controlled  by"  the 
international  division of labour,  i.e.  to enjoy  relative independence  in  achieving 
specialization and  at the  same  time  to  have  a degree  of control  over  the  other 
productive  systems  through  the  spread  of its own  production  standards . 
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Commission  studies of trade  in  this  type  of product  show  a 
concentration  of the  corresponding  activities in  three  countries:  the  United  States, 
which  is losing  momentum,  at least in  external  trade terms,  but  is still very 
favourably  placed;  Japan,  which  is making.  a  remarkable  breakthrough;  Germany, 
which  is maintaining  its extremely  strong  position. 
The  position of  the  other  EEC  countries  is less favourable: 
the  decline  of the  United  Kingdom,  already appreciable  in trade  in manufactured 
products  generally,  is even  more  substantial  in  this type  of  pr.oduct.  Owing  to 
their small  size,  the  Benelux  countries  are  at a disadvantage  in  this 
type  of  activity,  where  success depends  not  only  on  R & D but  also on  a  large 
and  buoyant  domestic  market.  France  and  Italy  ha~e made  appreciable  progress, 
although  still  not  enough  to  put them  on  a par  with  their major  industrial 
competitors. 
The  geographical  distribution of exports  of  advanced  technology 
products  is another  element  determining  the  rel;:\tive  positions  of  the  productive 
S.Ystems.  Thus,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  the  United  States and  Japan 
sell  a much  greater proportion  of  th·is  type  of product  to  other industrialized 
countries  than  do  EEC  countries  other  than  Germany. 
The  export  successes  of certain European  countries  (part-
icularly for  plant and  equipment)  have  been  achieved  mainly  on  the  markets  of 
countries  with  a weaker  industrial  structure  (OPEC  countries,  newly  industrializing 
countries).  This  is  by  no  means  a  negligible  performance  since it is essential  to 
gain  a foothold  on  these  growing  markets,  nor  is it an  easy  performance  in  view 
of the keen  competition  between  industrialized countries  on  these markets. 
However,  because  of  the  conditions  in which  this competition  takes  place,  success 
is frequently  due  more  to substantial  involvement  by  governments  (granting 
financing  facilities to the  purchasing  country,  entering  into commitments  on 
imports,  providing  guarantees  to exporting  firms,  protecting national  markets,  etc.) 
than  to  the  technical  superiority of firms  alone. 
No  unduly  simplified conclusions  should  be  drawn  from  this  review 
of  some  of  the  problems  which  already  face  or which  may  in  future  face  Community 
countries  as  a  result of changes  in the  international  division of  labour.  For 
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example,  although  competition  from  developing  countries  is at present concentrated 
mainly  on  product  categories with  a  large  unskilled  labour  content,  this does  not 
mean  that  all the  correspondiryg  a·ctivi ties  are  ipso  facto  condemned 
in  the  industrialized countries;  for  the  industrialized countries  may  adapt  their 
production processes, speci a  1  i zein ~ertai  n areas and capita  1  i ze  on differences in qua 1  i ty. 
Moreover,  the  range  of  products  and  exports  of  the  developing  and 
Eastem  bloccountries will  widen  and  industrial  competition  will  increase  sharply 
in  all  fields of  manufacturing  activity and  not  only  in  activities with  a  large 
technology  content. 
However,  two  points  should  be  emphasized.  The  first is that while 
all  the  industrialized countries  have  alike derived  advantage,  in  terms  of 
exporting  more  sophisticated products,  from  the  industrialization of new  countries, 
the  constraint of adjustment  weighs  more  heavily  on  those  which  are  least able  to 
influence  the  long-term  development  of  the  international  division of  labour.  Most 
of  the  EEC  countries  are  in  this  situation, whtch  is the ·more  difficult as 
they  are  especially dependent  for  export  growth  (in  particular 
of  plant and  equipment)  on  the  dynamic  expansion  of  the  developing  countries. 
A slowdown  in  this expansion,  consequent,  for example,  upon  more  restrictive 
trading  attitudes  on  the  part of  the  industrialized countries, or upon  a  substantial 
and  lasting deterioration in  the  developing  countries'  terms  of trade, would  affect 
this group  of  intermediate  countries  (France,  Italy,  the  United  Kingdom)  far more 
than  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  or the  United  States. 
Secondly,  Community  cohesion  and  solidarity may  be  seriously 
strained by  disparities  in  the  degree  of  adaptation  of  the  productive  systems 
of  the  various  Member  States  to  the  changing  international  division of  labour. 
This  problem  is especially acute  when  considered  from,the  point of  view  of the 
Community's  regions:  the  trend  of the  international  division of labour  may  well 
increase  the  risk of widening  regional  disparities.  The  consequences  of emerging 
competition  from  the  developing  countries will  thus  be  all  the  more  serious  as 
they  affect sectors  that tend  to  be  concentrated  in  a small  number  of regions. 
These  regions  are  also  vulnerable  because. they  may  lose 
activities that can  be  relocated in  developing  countries;  because  their industrial 
structures do  not  enable  them  to  take  advantage  of  the  new  outlets in  the 
Third  World;  and  because  they  are  less  likely than  prosperous  regions  to adjust and 
to  attract new  activities.  Active  regional  development  policies are  therefore 
vital, and  the  efforts of the  less  prosperous  regions  and  countries  to  renew  their 
structures must  be  supported  by  the  countries  and  regions  that have  already  succeeded. - 47  -
CHAPTER  3 
THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  TECHNOLOGICAL  DEVELOPMENT 
Technological  development  is a determining  factor  in  the  industrialized 
countries•  capacity  to  deal  with  changes,  and  its trend  is an  indication of  the 
extent of this capacity.  Over  the next  ten years,  technological  progress  in 
Europe  will  be  conditioned  mainly  by: 
(i)  the  new  supply  situation for energy  and  raw  materials; 
(ii)  the  changing  international  division of  labour,  where  the  transmission  of 
technologies  and  their diffusion througnout  the  world  play  a crucial  role; 
(iii) the  emergence  of  a  demand  for  better working  conditions,  environments  and 
lifestyles; 
(iv)  the  risk of  lasting  underemployment, arising  from  a  combination  of 
economic  growth  rates well  below  those  of  the  past few  decades  and  the 
rapid  expansion  of  the  population  of working  age; 
(v)  some  changes  in  attitudes  to  the  aims  and  implications  of scientific research 
and  technical  progress. 
The  areas  of  innovation  where  research  and  practical  applications  are most 
likely to  gather momentum  over  the  next  few  years  are  easy  to  identify;  however, 
the  scope  of  these  innovations,  and  the  rapidity with  which  they  will  be  diffused 
throughout  the  productive  and  social  systems,  are much  more  difficult to predict. 
There  are  certain factors  of  inertia such  as  the  education  and  training system, 
which  is rigid  and  ill-adapted,  the  high  degree  of  concentration  and  centralization 
in  our  economies,  or  the  lack  of  information  about  technology. 
The  authorities will  have  a major  role  to  play  in  promoting  and  controlling 
the  development  of  technology  in  the  general  interest,  and  in  harmonizing  relations 
between  technology  and  society.6 
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development  and  if possible  Community  action  in  this field,  see  the  Report  by 
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3.1.  Main  areas  of  development 
As  it usually  takes  at least ten  or  twenty  years  for practical  applications 
to  emerge  from  basic  research,  the  main  technological  changes  likely to  have  any 
visible and  significant impact  between  now  and  1990  will  be  based  on  knowledge 
that is already  available.  We  consider  here  the  four areas  that seem  most  important 
from  this point of  view,  as  well  as  from  the  point of view  of  their development 
potential  over  a  longer  period  than  the  coming  decade. 
3.1.1.  Information  technology 
Information  technology  or "telematics
11  in  its widest  sense,  will 
probably  be  the  main  factor  in  technological  progress  during  the  next  decade. 
Information  technology  comprises  all  the  technologies  that can  be  used  for dealing 
with  information:  generating  it, converting  it, storing it, processing  i't., 
transmitting it or  managing  and  controlling it. 
These  new  technologies  use  equipment  which  has  been  strongly 
influenced  - or made  possible  - by  new  departures  in electronics, such  as  electronic 
data-processing,  automatic  word-processing,  measurement  and  control  technologies. 
Progress  in  semi-conductor  electronics (miniaturization  and  integrated circuits) 
although  very  important,  is  not  the  only  determining  factor. 
At  the  moment,  the  se_mi- conductor  element  with  the  greatest 
innovation  potential  is  the  micro-processor.  The  prominent  role of micro-processors 
in  many  parts  of  the  economy  is principally due  to: 
(i)  the  wealth  of  available and  foreseeable  applications  leading  to  innovations 
in  processes  and  products  in  many  sectors of  the economy; 
(ii)  the  short innovation  cycle  in  the micro-processor sector; 
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(iii)  the  fact that micro-electronics,  unlike  many  other advanced  technologies, 
does  not  necessarily  involve  heavy  capital  investment  in  a small  range  of 
industries,  but may  have  very  widespread  applications. 
Although  the  micro-processor  is probably  the  most  striking factor 
of  change,  it would  be  misleading  to  separate it from  general  information 
technology;  the  potential  of  this  new  technology  will  be  fully realized,  and 
the market  for it fully developed,  only  if micro-processor  technology  is 
combined  with  general  computer  and  telecommunications  techniques. 
The  extension  of  computerization  will  have  particularly important 
consequences  in  the  services  sector, accentuating  the  existing trend  tow,ards 
the  tertiarization of  the  economy,  with  more  and  more  services  being  incorporated 
in  production  systems  (particularly in  industry  and  agriculture),  and  with  the 
development  of  automation  and  robotizat1on. 
3.1.2.  Energy  and  raw  materials 
During  the  next  decade  a  considerable  impetus  should  be  given  to 
reinforcing  the  technological  basis  for a  new  energy  system  to  reduce  the 
dependence  of  industrialized countries  on  oil.  However,  although  research  intothe use 
of solar energy,  ... uclear  ene.rgy  lily  fusion,  geothermal  energy  and  .wind  energy  should 
be  continued  and  intensified, it will  have  few  practical  applications  in  the 
course  of  the  1980s. 
The  application of information  technology  to energy,  on  the  other 
hand,  could  well  give  significant results  in  the  control  of energy  distribution 
and  energy-saving  systems.  The  high  price of energy  will  be  an  incentive  to 
develop  energy-saving  technologies  over  a wide  range  of production  processes.  Here 
again,  the  means  of disseminating  techniques  throughout  the  economy  are  as 
important  as  the  techniques  themselves. 
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While  chemicals  and  plastics  have  undoubtedly  played  a major  role 
in  promoting  technical  change,  their future  is sometimes  questioned  because  they 
are  so  dependent  on  oil.  However,  a comparison  of  their energy  content  shows  that 
plastics are  still  in  a more  favourable  position  than  most  metals  (see  A30). 
The  introduction of  techniques  using  coal  could  lead  to  a  new  wave  of  innovations. 
In  view  of  the  growing  variety of  its production,  the  plastics branch  is therefore 
likely to  continue  to  contribute  to  technological  development  in  many  industrial 
branches. 
3.1.3.  The  exploitation of marine  resources 
For  the  moment,  the  exploitation of  the  enormous  potential  of  the 
ocean  is still at the  stage  of hopes  and  projects,  rather than  concrete  achieve-
ments;  aquaculture  production  amounts  to  six million  tonnes  a year  at present, 
and  should  rise to  25  million  tonnes  in  1990  according  to  FAO  forecasts;  thermal 
energy  is still at the  stage  of  small  experimental  power  stations;  23%  of 
world  oil  re5ources  are  thought  to  lie in  the  seabed;  20%  of  present world 
production  comes  from  marine  sources  and  drilling is  going  on  all  over  the 
world;  the  exploitation of mineral  resources  such  as  polymetallic  nodules  is 
a further possibility that has  not yet reached  maturity. 
As  the  Interfutures  report points  out,  progress  in  seabed  mining  -
an area  in  which  conflicts  of  interest are  commensurate  with  the  huge  economic 
potential  of marine  resources  - will  depend  as  much  on  political  decisions 
concerning  the  law  of  the  sea,  as  on  t~chnological  progress. 
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3.1.4.  Biotechnology 
The  development  of  bioscience  and  bio-technology,  and  their 
economic  and  social  applications, will  have  profound  effects  on  the  productive 
apparatus,  the  way  of  life and  even  the  scale of values  of  developed  societies. 
The  sectors most  affected will  include  agriculture and  food,  health,  chemicals, 
energy  and  the  environment.  InJeed,  some  consider bioscience and  bio-technology 
more  significant in  the  long  run  as  forces  of  development  than  data-processing, 
because  of  their enormous  potential  for  guiding  and  controlling natural 
biological  phenomena,  including  human  beings  (see  A31). 
The  aeronautics  industry  and  the  development  of  aero-soace 
technologies  could  also  be  included  with  the  above  four  sectors. 
3.2.  The  role  of  the  authorities 
In  the  past,  the  authorities have  played  a  significant role in  promoting 
technological  innovation,  although  sometimes  with  disappointing  results. 
Although  their future  role  is uncertain, it should  remain  important,  both 
in  financing  and  promoting  R &  D,  and  in  creating a favourable  environment  for 
technological  progress  dnd  for  the  diffusion  of  innovations  throughout  the 
economic  and  social  system. 
3.2.1.  Financing  and  promoting  R &  D 
The  rate of  growth  of R &  0 expenditure  in  volume  has  declined 
considerably since  the  early 1970s,  but  the  share  of this expenditure  in  the G  D  P 
of  the  Nine  remained  more  or  less  stable at least until  1975. 7  R &  D expenditure 
as  a  percentage  of  G  0 P increased  rapidly  in  Japan,  where  the  ratio of  R & D 
specialists to  total  population  is  now  about  twice  as  high  as  in  Europe  for 
approximately  equal  expenditure;  it declined,  however,  in  the  United  States, 
particularly expenditure  financed  by  the  public sector. 
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The  Community  figure  covers  divergent developments  in  the  different 
countries:  R & D expenditure  as  a  percentage  of  GD  P declined  noticeably  in 
France  and  the  United  Kingdom,  while  in  Germany  it increased  rapidly  and  is  now 
greater than  in  the  other two  countries  combined  (see  A32). 
These  developments  raise a  number  of questions,  particularly the 
question  of  public  intervention.  In  the  Member  States,  public expenditure  accounts 
for about  50%  of  total  R & D expenditure;  over  recent years,  governments  have 
been  cutting  down  on  their interventions:  public  financing  of  research  as  a 
percentage  of  the  total  budget  and  of  GD  P has remained  steady  or  declined  in 
most  cf the  member  countries. 
Apart  from  the  purely  quantitative aspect,  there is also the 
question  of  the  direction and  effectiveness  of national  R &  D policies.  To  justify 
public  intervention  in  certain areas  of civilian R &  D,  it is usually argued  that 
major  decisions  are  too  costly and  too  risky  to  be  taken  by  the  private sector in 
the  context of  the  market. 
The  validity of  this argument  is confirmed  by  observation  in  the 
two  main  competitor countries,  Japan  and  the  United  States, where  government 
intervention  in  R & D is very  active; moreover,  the  United  States  can  count 
on  a vast,  unified domestic  market,  and  thus  on  a  very  powerful  private sector. 
At  present,  too  much  R & D expenditure  in  the  Community  falls 
between  two  stools:  national  government  policies  lack  the  reso.urces and  the 
market  to  become  economic,  while  even  the  larger national  markets  are  too  small 
to  sustain  private sector  R & D on  the  required  scale.  Community  buyers,  particularly 
in  the  smaller  Member  States,  therefore  have  a choice  between  Japanese  or  American 
products,  and  uncompetitive  European  products.  The  result of their choice  is obvious. 
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To  solve  this  problem,  two  types  of  approach  are  possible at 
Community  level.  First,  R & D policies could  be  better coordinated  throughout 
the  Community,  so  as  to  share  costs, avoid  duplication,  and  make  the  most 
successful  results available  to  the  whole  Community.  The  research  programme  into 
nuclear  fusion  - the  JET  project - is a solitary and  salutary example  of  this 
approach. 
Secondly,  the  Community  could  speed  up  the  integration of  the 
Common  Market,  so  that more  large  projects would  be  profitable in  the  Community, 
and  the  degree  of  risk acceptable  to  private enterprise.  An  important  step  in 
this direction would  be  the  opening  of  public  procurement  policies, for  example 
in  telecommunications  and  aircraft. 
A separate question  is the  reliability of  R & D decisions  taken  by 
the  authorities.  Clearly,  centralized decision-making  involves  a  high  risk of 
error and  of excessive  concentration,  amply  illustrated in  many  decisions  taken 
by  European  countries  in  the  recent  past. 
Scepticism  about  the  ability of  the  authorities  to  take  R &  D 
decisions  can  also  lead  to  the  extreme  view  that governments  should  not  choose 
which  areas  of  R&D  to  support,  but  should  supply  general  unselective  suooort 
for  R & D expenditure  by  private  firms.  Opinions  differ widely  on  this point 
within  the  Community.  However,  non-selective  R &  D support  is a  practical  option 
only  if sufficient  resources are  available; moreover,  both  Japan  and  the 
United  States  have,  in  the  main,  rejected this alternative.  Vigilance  will 
obviously  be  required  to  neutralize the  shortcomings  of  public  R &  D policy, 
whose  main  faults  are  centralization, concentration  on  large  programmes  and 
the  difficulties of disseminating  the  results  to  the  economy  as  a whole . 
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3.2.2.  The  dissemination  of  information  technology 
The  number  of organizations  operating  in  the  information  sector 
has  been  growing  very  quickly during  recent years,  and  the  technical  and  market 
conditions  for the  full  development  of the  computer-related  information  sector in 
the  industrialized countries wi  11  be  ready  for the  beginning  of  the  1980s.  The 
EURONET  system  is  in  line with  this development. 
However,  European  companies  are  in  a  rather weak  position compared 
with  US  firms and  organizations,  which  already  have  a major  share  of  the 
European  information  market.  Unless  strong  efforts are  made  in  Europe  to  change 
this  unfavourable  situation, a further development  of  the  European  market  may well 
lead  only  to  an  extension  of US  supremacy. 
The  inadequate  development  of  the  European  information  industry 
within  the  Community  is due  to  a variety of  factors:  the  small  size of  national 
markets;  the  attitude of  users  and  potential  entrepreneurs  towards  this type  of 
activity;  the  lack  of  suitable technical  and  service  infrastructures;  the 
unfavourable  legal  and  tax  arrangements,  and  so  on. 
But  the  information  industry is a  key  sector and  its development 
is particularly important  because: 
(i)  information  services  are  an  indispensable  infrastructure 
for  economic  development,  for effective scientific, technical 
and  industrial  activities, for  reducing  the  Community's 
technological  dependence,  and 
1for  increasing  Community  exports 
of  technology  and  know-how; 
(ii)  the  European  information market  must  be  widened  if the  potential 
of  the  corresponding  industrial  sectors  is to  be  developed 
(computers,  telecommunications,  electronics); 
(iii)  the  development  of  computer-related  information  services  can 
create many  skilled jobs,  increase  value  added  in  the  branches 
dealing  with  economic,  commercial  and  industrial  information, 
make  information  more  easily available  to  small  and  medium-
sized  firms,  encourage  the  exploitation of  new  inexpensive  media 
which  could  greatly increase  the  range  of  potential  users,etc; 
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(iv)  the  availability of  new  information  services, with  improved 
opportunities  for  access,  will  make  the  use  of  information  more 
democratic,  and,  at European  level, encourage  all  aspects  of 
Community  integration. 
The  extension  of activity in  the  information  sector requires  active 
public  intervention at both  national  and  Community  level,  because  of  the  risks 
and  costs  these  activities involve  for  the  private sector,  and  because  of their 
economic,  social  and  political  implications.  The  authorities must  therefore 
strengthen market  forces  and  make  sure  that the  information  sector develops  in 
a  way  consistent with  the  public  interest.  They  should  involve  all  public  and 
private companies,  both  profit making  and  non  profit making,  which  collect, 
process,  and  disseminate.i nformation,  and  should  take  account  of  differences 
between  the  aims  and  nature  of all  these organizations.  A special  effort will 
be  needed  in  the  areas  of  industrial, economic  and  business  information,  which  is 
as  yet inadequate,  and  for  which  there  is  a  large  potential  demand. 
3.2.3.  The  need  for  a comprehensive  innovation  policy 
In  general,  national  and  Community  authorities will  have  to  try to 
encourage  the  more  rapid  transformation  of  the  results of  R &  D into  new  products 
and  services,  in  spite of  the  generally discouraging  economic  situation.  Two 
approaches  are  required  at the  same  time:  specific action to  improve  the  conditions 
and  environment  in  which  innovation  is  taking  place;  and  special  programmes  to 
hasten  innovative  applications  in  key  sectors.  The  authorities must  be  ready  to 
reconsider fundamenta 1 po 1  i ci es with a view toe  1  imina ti  ng  1  ega 1  , tax and other barriers 
to  innovative  solutions,  and  to  increasing  the  economy•s  capacity  to  respond  to  new 
socio-economic  requirements.  Special  importance  should  be  given  to  the  more 
flexible  parts  of the  economy,  e.g.  small  and  medium-sized  firms.  Moreover,  the 
growing  problems  arising  in  connection  with  relations  between  technology  and 
society will  have  to  be  solved. 
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3.3.  Technology  and  society 
Some  recent scientific and  technological  developments  have  been  widely 
criticized because  they  cause  pollution,  they  have  been,  or  may  be,  dangerous, 
they  reduce  variety  and  choice  by  standardizing  products,  and  above  all, they 
are  seen  as  helping  to  i-ncrease  unemployment. 
Thus,  to  differing degrees  in  different countries  and  social  groups,  the 
consensus  which  favoured  technological  innovation  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  is 
weakening  in  Europe,  preci.se ly  at a time  when  the  need  and  opportunity for 
continued  innovation  is greater than  ever  before.  Greater  R&D  efforts must 
therefore  be  accompanied  by  attempts  to  create a favourable  economic  and  social 
environment  for  technological  progress. 
3.3.1.  Technology  and  employment 
The  relations  between  technology,  investment  and  employment  are  not 
understood  well.  We  know  that they  vary  considerably  from  period  to  period,  sector 
to  sector and  country  to  country;  we  also  know  that the  innovation  and  growth 
taking  place  in  a sector are  related to  the  size of  the  resources  devoted  to 
the  development  and  application of  technology. 
But  these  relations,  particularly relations  between  technology  and 
employment,  are  surrounded  by  uncertainty, which  is likely to  increase.  In 
particular,  as  new  technologies  appear  and  spread,  they  engender  both  worries 
and  hopes,  because  of  the  radical  social  changes  they  imply,  which  are  already 
apparent:  the  elimination  of  repetitive jobs;  the  creation of qualified  jobs;  the 
transformation  of  working  conditions  and  the  opportunity for decentralizing 
responsibility,  and  so  on.  It is difficult to analyse  the mechanisms  by  which 
technology  affects employment.  It should  be  borne  in  mind  that technological 
development  is often  intended  to  compensate  for  some  short-coming  in  the  labour 
force,  or  that it can  be  hampered  by  the  lack  of  suitably qualified  labour.  More-
over,  the  relation between  technology  and  employment  should  be  considered  in  a 
very  broad  context  including  not  only  the  elimination of  jobs  but  also  the  more 
favourable  aspects  of  technological  progress  such  as  the  emergence  of  new  products, 
or  the  boost  to  demand  afforded  by  declining  relative costs  and  prices. 
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Telematics,  for  instance, will  hamper  the  expansion  of employment 
(or  even  cause  a decline)  in  certain industrial  branches,  particularly where  the 
production  prooess  involves  assembly  lines,  and  in  the  services  sector  -mainly banks, 
insurance,  office services  and  teleconwunications  services.  The  effec~of the  new 
technologies on employment over the next  ten.v.~ars will depend on a variety of factors: the 
rate at which  new  technologies  are  introduced  and  the  rate of  investment;  the 
rate of  productivity gains  in  the  economy  as  a whole;  the  extent to which 
administrative  and  office staff can  be  transferred  to  other  tasks  or  to  new  types 
of service.  They  will  also  depend  on  how  fast  new  jobs  are  created  in  the  data-
processing  industry  and  in  the  production  of  new  types  of equipment,  and  in 
general  on  how  fast  new  production  processes,  new  products,  new  services  and 
new  markets  appear  in  a  number  of areas:  household  appliances,  leisure equipment, 
communication  and  information,  energy  production  and  energy  saving,  car manufacturing, 
medicine  and  so  on. 
Apart  from  their effects  on  the  number  of  jobs,  the  new  technologies 
will  mean  considerable  changes  in  the  level  and  structure of qualifications,  and 
on  working  conditions.  Public  opinion  and  the  working  population  will  accept 
innovations  all the  more  readily as  they  contribute  to  a genuine  improvement  in 
living  and  working  conditions,  to  increased  job  satisfaction and  to  the  development 
of  individual  responsibility.  Technological  progress  will  be  helped  along, 
moreover,  if innovations  are  discussed  and  negotiated  within  industries  and  firms, 
and  if suitable  training  schemes  are  organized. 
3.3.2.  Education  and  training 
The  capacity of  present education  and. training  systems  to  cope  with 
rapid  technological  change  and  encourage  greater  labour  flexibility varies  widely 
from  one  Member  State  to  another. 
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A major  problem  is the  time  lag  between  technological  change  and  the 
adaptation  of the  educational  system  and  the  labour  force. 
The  demand  for staff with  new  qualifications and  special  training over 
the  next  ten  years  will  clearly be  too  large  to  be  satisfied simply  by  the  normal 
turnover  of the  labour  force.  This  means  that a  reform  of  the  secondary  education 
system  alone  will  not  be  adequate  to  solve  the  problems  of adapting  the  labour 
force,  for  example  by  improving  general  knowledge  and  adaptability among  those 
entering working  life.  It means  that a considerable effort must  be  made  to 
develop  and  improve  recycling  and  adult education. 
The  capacity of the  European  countries  to  speed  up  the  adaptation  of  their 
education  systems  will  be  reflected to  some  extent  in  unemployment  trends  over  the 
next  ten  years.  It will  also  have  a determining  influence  on  the  position  and  the 
role  of  these  countries  in  the  world  powerleague,  not  only  the  technological  and 
economic  power  league,  but  also  the  intellectual  and  cultural  power  league. 
3.3.3.  Controlling  innovation 
Over  the  past  few  years,  public  opinion  and  governments  have  become 
particularly sensitive to  the  risks  involved  in  certain scientific and  technical 
developments;  this  sensitivity has  been  increased  by  a small  number  of serious 
accidents. 
These  accidents  should  not  be  used  as  an  excuse  to inhibit 
technological  development,  but  they  do  illustrate the  need  to examine  more  severely 
and  more  generally all  the  consequences  of  introducing  a  new  technology,  and  to 
take  all  the  necessary  safety precautions. 
The  first problem  is environmental  protection, and  reduction  of 
pollution  and  nuisance;  the  basic question  of  individual  liberty is involved . 
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Scientific and  technological  progress  in  the  next  few  years  will  produce 
increasingly  powerful  and  sophisticated  technologies,  which  will  contribute  to 
the  development  of  increasingly complex  systems  of organization.  This  trend  could 
lead  to  greater freedom,  decentralization,  and  more  creative  participation  by 
individuals  in  social, economic  and  cultural  life.  However,  if suitable social 
innovations  are  not  introduced,  it could  also  lead  to more  generalized  and 
more  oppressive  subordination  of  the  individual  to  central  management  and  control 
bodies;  for example,  the  role  of  the  mass  media,  or certain developments  in 
the  social  sciences  (medicine,  biology,  psychology  and  so  on),  have  clearly been 
ambivalent. 
Not  only  must  the  authorities  be  particularly vigilant,  but  also 
public  opinion  as  a whole  must  be  aware  and  committed;  it is therefore of  primary 
importance  to  inform  public  opinion  as  completely  and  objectively as  possible. 
This  is an  essential  condition  for  removing  psychological  barriers 
and  unjustified apprehensionthatmay  hamper  the  technological  development 
Europe  needs,  now  more  than  ever. - 60  -
CHAPTER  4 
CHANGES  IN  SOCIAL  VALUES,  NEEDS  AND  BEHAVIOUR  PATTERNS 
From  the  end  of  the  second  world  war  until  quite  recently,  Europe  was 
going  through  a remarkable  period  of  growth  and  material  prosperity,  rising 
average  standards  of  living  and  widespread  education  and  social  protection. 
As  the  satisfaction of essential  needs  was  gradually guaranteed  for  the 
majority of  the  population  {although  it should  not  be  forgotten  that real 
poverty  still exists in  Europe),  new  aspirations  appeared.  Over  the years,  these 
aspirations  have  become  increasingly  important,  and  have  often  reflected a 
reaction by  public  opinion,  or certain sectors of  public  opinion,  to against various 
consequences  of  the  economic  and  social  development  in  European  societies 
over  the  past  thirty years: 
(i)  the  persistence of wide  inequality in  the  distribution of  income  and 
wealth  and  inequality of opportunity;  these  inequalitieswerenot spontaneously 
reduced  by  growth,  as  some  had  hoped;  indeed,  growth  has  tended  to aggravate 
rather than  attenuate  regional  disparities; 
(ii)  damage  to  the  environment; 
(iii) the  deterioration of certain aspects  of  living  and  working  conditions: 
social  isolation,  insecurity,  problems  of life in  large  towns;  long 
journeys  to  work,  impersonal  tasks  at work  and  extremely  fine division 
of  labour,  etc.; 
(iv)  the  constraints of increasingly bureaucratized  social  and  economic  life; 
(v)  lack  of  economic  and  political  democracy;  etc. 
The  recent crisis has  probably  slowed  down  the  transformation  of  social 
values  and  needs,  and  contributed  to  concentrating  attention on  more  immediate 
requirements  such  as  the  defence  of  living  standards  and  employment.  However, 
as  the  Report  on  Economic  and  Social  Concepts  in  the  Community  points  out  in 
its analysis  of  these  transformations,  the  new  aspirations  have  not  disappeared, 
for  they  are  much  more  than  simply  a  luxury  permissible only  during  a period 
of  prosperity.  They  correspond  to  the  expectation of something  that goes  much 
deeper  than  mass  consumption,  the  improved  living  standards  of the  past few 
decades  or  the  present  ideology  of  necessity  born  of the  crisis.  However,  there is 
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no  doubt  that their relative importance  and  urgency  has  changed  over  recent 
years.  Emphasis  is  now  on  equality of sacrifices.  Similarly,  regional  claims  now 
include  not  only  the  traditional  objective  of  narrowi.lg  the  difference; between 
income  levels, but  also  the  rejection of  indis·criminate  geographical  mobility 
and  the  defence  of  the  specific character of  the  regional  way  of  life  ~nd 
cultural  heritage. 
The  changes  in  values  and  behaviour  patterns, which  are  often  imprecise 
and  incoherent,  vary  in  intensity and  content  from  one  Member  State to  another, 
as  various  studies,  including  the  periodical  Eurobarometer  surveys,  have  shown. 
There  is  thus  a  great danger  that any  generalizations  on  this subject will  be 
misleading;  moreover,  as  the  Interfutures  report so  rightly points  out, it is 
very  difficult to  analyse  the  prospects  for changing  social  values  and  the 
complicated  links  between  these  values,  needs,  demand  and  economic  and  social 
development. 
We  have  already mentioned  the  changing  attitude of  European  societies 
towards  science  and  technology.  We  shall  deal  in  Chapter  6 with  working  conditions, 
and with the even more  basic question. for some sections of the population at least, ofwork  a~ 
a soci a  1 va.l ue.  It seems useful in this Chapter to refer to three other major themes to i 11 ust-
rate the changes, three themes  that \'li 11  a  1  so be  very important to the future of the Community 
over  the  next  ten  years:  changing  needs  and  private  demand  patterns;  changing 
attitudes  to  the  role  of government;  and  the problem  of the envi.ronment. 
4.1.  Needs  and  private demand 
Ways  of  life and  consumption  habits  in  Europe  changed  radically during  the 
post-war  decades  as  a result of the  steady  and  generally rapid  improvement  in 
living  standards,  urbanization,  the  increasing  number  of wage  and  salary earners 
and  the  rapid  growth  of the  number  of  women  going  out  to  work.  These  changes  led 
to  profound  alterations  in  the  structure of private expenditure,  which  was  devoted 
more  and  more  to  the  purchase  of  consumer  durab 1  es (private  mean~ of  trt\nsport, domestic 
equipment)  and  services  (health, education,  entertainment)  at the  expense  of 
necessities  (food,  clothing,  footwear).  Consumption  structures  in  the  different 
Community  countries  also tended  towards  greater similarity, although  there  are 
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still  some  wide  differences,  in  particular the  very  large  proportion  of total 
private expenditure  devoted  to  purchasing  food  in  Italy (see  A  33). 
In  recent  low-growth  years,  the  earlier trends  of  the  structure of  private 
demand  have  not  changed  much,  except  for expenditure  on  the  equipment  and  upkeep 
of  homes,  which  slackened  off and  sometimes  even  declined,  and  is  no  longer  a 
dynamic  factor  of  private  demand.  The  decline  is  particularly marked 
for expenditure  on  electrical  domestic  appliances,  and  is  linked  to  the  slower 
rate of  residential  building,  which  absorbs  a  large  proportion  of this type  of 
new  appliance,  to  the  fact that almost  all  households  already  possess  household 
equipment,  and  to  the  extreme  sensitivity of.this demand  to  changes  in  incomes. 
However,  expenditure  on  transport and  communications,  health,  leisure, education 
and  culture have  gone  on  increasing at a  faster than  average  rate.  As  usual,  for 
expenditure  on  items  with  a  large  input  of services, these  trends  should  be 
assessed  with  caution  since it is very  difficult to  evaluate  the  price of  services 
precisely. 
furthermore,  the  corresponding  items  contain  b0th  goods  and  services,  in  this 
connection we  must  stress  the  buoyancy  of  demand  for  goods  intended  for  leisure and 
cu1tural activities,  and  the  maintenance  of  an  above-average  rate of  consumer  ex-
penditure  on  purchases  of  private means  of  transport,  despite  the  increase  in  costs 
associatecl  with  their use. 
Present  behaviour  patterns,  unlike earlier ones,  show  differences  between 
the  various  countries.  However,  a five-year  period  is too  short  to  be  a valid 
basis  for  forecasting  the  consumption  trends  of  households  over  the  next  ten  years. 
It seems  likely, nonetheless that the  radical  qualitative changes  in  the 
way  of  life of  households  that have  taken  place  over  the  past few  decades  will 
slow  down: 
(i) first, it is  probable  that migration to  large  industrial  and  administrative 
centres  will  go  on  slowing  down  (see  Chapter  5), and  that there will  be· 
a  reaction  against the  construction of  urban  centres  too  distant from  work-
places; 
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(ii)  secondly,  even  though  the  desire  for  larger homes  and  individual  houses 
seems  to  be  growing  in  most  of the  Community  countries,  the  crisis in  public 
finances  expected  for  the  1980s  combined  with  insecure  employment  and  a 
slower  rate of  growth  of  incomes,  which  make  households  hesitate to  go  into 
debt,  should  affect the  rate  of  residential  building. 
Although  the  construction of  individual  houses  is expanding  more  rapidly 
than  that of  blocks  of flats, it has  also  been  strongly affected  by  the  crisis; 
the  extension  of  suburban  estates has  thus  slowed  down,  and  with  it the  extension 
of the corresponding suburban life-style and consumption pattern. The  slowdown will probably 
be  least marked where social protection against unemployment, sickness and so on is best; 
(iii) since  European  households  are  already well  equipped  with  cars  and  electrical 
domestic  appliances,  demand  for  these  will  be  more  sensitive to  a  lower 
rate of  increase of  incomes,  even  though  it can  still  be  sustained  to  some 
extent  by  demand  for  up-market  replacements  or  supplementary  goods  (second 
or third car, etc.); 
(iv)  there is a tendency  to  retreat into the  nuclear family,  perhaps  due  both  to 
a feeling of insecurity (at work and outside the home), and to  a gradual  increase  in 
free time  (shorter working  hours);  this  tendency  means  that the  home  is  a 
privileged  centre of activity outside working  hours,  which  should  sustain 
demand  both  for  furnishings  and  upkeep,  and  for individual  goods  required 
for  leisure activities. 
ln  general  technological  development  and  the  trend  of  labour  costs will streng-
then  private demand  for  consumer  durables  (which  are  becoming  more  efficient 
than  before  and  cheaper  relative to  services)  to  enable  the  household  to  produce 
for itself the  services it used  to  buy  or  consume  outside  t~e home.  There  are 
abundant  examples  of this tendency,  which  was  already  apparent  in  the  oast for 
domestic  services:  televisions,  radios  and  hi-fi  equipment  in  the  field of  cultural 
and leisure activities;  individual  tools  for  home  improvement  and.~pairs; camping 
equipmentand  caravans  for  tourism,  and  so  on. 
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Thus,  as  households'  more  basic  needs  are  gradually satisfied,  private 
demand  is transferred to needs  which  require  a  higher  than  average  input of 
services  to  satisfy them,  but  this does  not  necessarily mean  a  parallel  expansion 
of  service activities; 
(v)  finally,  there are  still  substantial  latent needs  for  health,  education, 
communications  and  leisure;  however,  there may  well  eventually  be  a 
financing  problem  for  the  services mainly  provided  by  the  State, since 
public  finances  are  in  disequilibrium  in  many  countries. 
The  main  trends  of  private consumption  structures over  the  next  ten years 
can  thus  be  summarized  as  follows: 
(i)  continued  slow  growth  of expenditure  on  food  and  clothing; 
(ii)  slower  growth  of  demand  for  cars  and  especially electrical  domestic 
equipment; 
(iii) greater importance  of  furnishings  and  goods  required  for  leisure activities, 
such  as  consumer  electronic goods; 
(iv)  sustained  high  demand  for  health  and  education  services,  but expanding  at 
a slower  rate  because  of  population  trends; 
(v)  average  growth  for  other services  to  households,  except  tourist services 
and  telephones. 
But  beyond  the  incidence  of traditional  or objective factors determining 
these  trends  (growth  and  expansion  of  incomes,  changes  in  relative prices, 
population  trends,  amount  and  quality of equipment  already available, etc.), the 
main  question  over  the  next  decade  will  be  concerned  with  changing  attitudes 
to  the  type  of  need  to  be  satisfied and  to  the  organization of  supply  of  the 
corresponding  services.  First, there  is the  changing  attitude to  consumption, 
to  excessive  consumption,  to  the  social  significance of  consumption,  to ostentatious 
consumption.  In  the  final  analysis, the  question  is  how  far  we  have  advanced  on 
the  road  to  a 
11different share-out of the  'dividends'  of economic  and  social 
development  between  tangible factors  (individual  or collective consumptions)  and 
intangibles  (gains  in  leisure time,  improved  environment,  better social  and 
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personal  relationships, etc.)"8.  Increased  free  time,  shorter working  hours  and 
in  general  the  change  in  the  amounts  of  time  devoted  to  different activities 
could  have  a very  significant effect on  the  structure of  demand;  these  factors 
could  also  lead  to  the  creation of  a  new  non-market  sector run  by  private 
enterprise  and  thus,  as  we  shall  see,  raise the  question  of  the  changing  role 
of  government. 
8 See  the  Report  on  "Economic  and  Socia 1 Concepts  in  the  Community". - 66  -
4.2.  The  changing  role of government 
The  governments  traditional  functions  have  been  supplemented  over  the  past 
few  decades  by  growing  responsibilities  in  a  variety of  vast fields  such  as  the 
general  guidance  of development  through  legal  provisions  and  general  macro-
economic  regulation;  the  organization  of economic  and  social  transfer payments; 
the  production  and  management  of  goods  and  services,  and  so  on.  The  gradual 
extension  of  the  State's responsibilities  has  engendered  three  series of questions, 
or  even  criticisms, which  are  particularly significant in  a context of  rapid 
structural  change. 
4.2.1.  The  question  of  the  importance  of public  finances  in  the 
national-economy---------------------
The  State's economic  and  financial  importance  has  grown  steadily 
s i nee  1960,  when  it represented  about  25%  or  30%  of  GOP,  unti 1 it now  represents 
some  45%  to  55%  (see  A34).  The  total  burden  of  taxes  and  other compulsory  levies 
and  pub 1  i c service  charges  has  a  1  so  increased  (see  A  35) . 
This  percentage,  and  the  mechanical  factors  of further increase, 
raise a  serious  problem  concerning  the  optimum  level  of  compulsory  levies,  the  most 
suitable  form  for them,  and  the  best allocations.  In  general,  attempts  have  been 
made  at least to  stabilize the  share  of  public expenditure  in  national  product  in 
most  of  the  Member  States.  Most  of  the  efforts in  this direction  have  involved 
discretionary  interventions  (infrastructures, education,  social  services  and 
so  on).  Attempts  to  cut down  on  social  transfer payments,  and  in  particular on 
social  security,  have  been  much  more  limited.  Indeed,  the  autonomy  of social 
security  f u n ds  and  the  operation  of predetermined  mechanisms  governing 
expenditure  have  often meant  that expenditure  increased  steadily at a  rapid  rate. 
It is generally  recognized  that the  burden  of public  finances  must  be  lightened, 
because  alternative uses  for  resources  are  in  much  fiercer competition  in  a  period 
of  slow  growth  and  rapid  structural  adjustment.  But  new  ways  will  have  to  be 
found  to  satisfy economic  and  social  needs  that are  now  dealt with  by  social 
transfer payments. 
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4.2.2.  I_h~ _g_u~s_!i.Q_n_o.f. _!h!  _g_ore!.n~e!!t~s_f_!!n~t_:!_o!!~ 
The  development  of the  State•s responsibilities  in  a  large  number 
of  directions  is giving  cause  for  concern,  sometimes  for contrasting  reasons, 
beyond  the  simple  question  of  the  burden  of public  finances  in  the  economy  and 
society.  It is  therefore  impossible  to  make  linear projections;  the  adaptability of 
government  functions,  and  the  possibility of  alternative solutions, must  be 
considered. 
We  have  already mentioned  one  of  the  most  important  functions  of 
government:  organizing  social  transfer payments;  the  volume  of  these  payments 
is generally expanding,  however  the  circuits are  organized.  It is often very 
difficult to  assess  the  economic  and  social  impact  of  the  financing  and  allocation 
of  transfer payments,  and  their contribution  to  reducing  inequality.  This 
uncertainty,  combined  with  the  increase  in  these  payments,  has  led  to  growing 
criticism - often contradictory - of the  various  transfer mechanisms  now  employed. 
Expected  popu 1  ati on trends, shorter working careers and more widespread demands  for 
security are  some  of the  other factors  that will  create a  need  for a detailed 
study  of  transfer mechanisms  and  for a  new  approach  to  the  questions  of equality 
and  social  protection. 
Another  important  function  of government  is that of  producing  goods 
and  services  for  the  market  and  organizins  non-market  services  such  as  education 
and  public  health.  There  again  the  problem  of the  growing  burden  of public  finances 
is indissociable  from  the  problems  raised  by  the  increasing  importance  of  this 
function.  The  responsibilities undertaken,  their scope,  and  the  arrangements  for 
carrying  them  out  vary  from  one  country  to another  because  of different historical 
backgrounds.  Their  structural  tendency  to  expand,  however,  has  been  sufficiently 
g e n  e r a  1 ,  a g a i n s t  a  back g r ou n  d  of  s c  ·a r ce  res o u  r c e s ,  t o 
g i  v e rise to  considerations  about  how  the  relations  between  the  public  sector, 
the market  sector and  the  private administrative sector could  be  improved.  Many 
ways  have  been  suggested:  new  mechanisms  for responding  to  the  growing  demand 
for collective services,  through  the  extension  of  non-market  services  supplied  by 
associations  of private  individuals  (the 
11Third  sector
11
,  or 
11informal  sector
11
); 
differential  conditions  for access  to  public  services  previously  supplied  free 
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of  charge  to  all, and  financed  from  taxation;  possibly,  a  specific role  and  specific 
means  for  the  public market  sector in  current industrial  re-organization,  and 
so  on. 
The  last-mentioned  point  is closely  linked  to  another  of  the  State•s 
important  functions,  that of managing  and  controlling economic  and  social 
development.  Besides  laws,  statutory provisions  and  its powers  of macro-economic 
regulation,  the  State also  uses  more  and  more  sophisticated and  varied  intervention 
techniques  with  a  structural  purpose.  ~Jh atever  role  is  assigned  to 
competition,  and  in  spite of  the  reservations expressed  about  bureaucratic 
interventions  in economic  mechanisms,  the  development  of the  market  economies 
has  led  the  authorities  and  large  private  groups  to  attempt  to  influence 
industrial  structures;  in  some  cases,  this even  led  to formal  experiments  in 
planning. 
At  the  same  time,  various  types  of support  to  firms,  and  in 
particular investment  aids, were  becoming  important.  In  general,  since  such 
action  is to  some  extent selective, it is usually  presented  as  a  pragmatic  means 
of  helping  spontaneous  structural  adjustments  - sometimes  by  changing  their course  -
and  of  dealing  with  localized  socio-economic  problems.  Moreover,  the  crisis and 
the  slackness  of  investment  activity have  led  to  a considerable  reinforcement  of 
incentives  to  capital  formation  in  general. 
An  attempt  was  usually made  to  define  industrial  policy objectives, 
to  apply  planning  to  various  fields  and  for  various  purposes,  and  to  introduce 
general  or selective  incentives  to  investment,  in  the  framework  of a  system  where 
the  market  would  play  a major  role  in  regulating  and  guiding  the  economy;  the 
techniques  of  public  intervention were  designed  to  complement  market  mechanisms 
and  not  to  interfere with  them. 
Government  intervention must  increasingly reckon  with  the  growing 
importance  of  the  decision-making  power  of  large firms,  trade  unions,  professional 
organizations  and  so  on,  which  have  also  consolidated  their influence  and 
extended  their scope.  This  situation leads  to  a  paradox  that was  already apparent 
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before  the  present crisis:  the  more  the  State intervenes  in  economic  mechanisms, 
the  less  scope  it has  to exercise  its powers.  This  paradox  raises  the  general  question 
of  how  economies  and  societies based  on  liberal  principles  can  be  regulated. 
4.2.3.  Relations  between  citizens  and  government,  and  the  expression  of 
The puDlTc-interest-----------------------
The  extension  and  diversification of  the  role of  government  has  led 
to  ever-growing  management  problems.  The  traditional  notion  of  the  State as  being 
responsible  for  general  consistency  and  for  protecting  the  public  interest has 
come  up  against differences,  and  even  contradictions  between  the  interests of 
different economic,  social  and  professional  groups,  different regions  and  so  on. 
Individual  citizens are  having  to  deal  with  more  and  more  administrative 
formalities,  complicated  criteria for  assessing  situations  and  making  public 
decisions,  and  the  excessive  bureaucratization of  information  and  decision-making 
channels.  Obviously  the  attitude to  State  intervention and  the  intervention methods 
used  vary  from  one  member  country  to  another,  particularly in  the  extent of 
decentralization and  the  accessibility of the  decision-maker  to the  private 
individual,  in  the  responsibility of workers•  and  employers•  representatives  in 
industrial  relations  and  so  on.  It is therefore difficult to  assess  the  trends 
of public  intervention without  taking  these  factors  into account,  and  without 
allowing  for  individual  involvement  in  intervention decisions.  In  view  of what 
has  been  called  the  .. ungovernability  of  government .. ,  and  the  problems  resulting 
from  bureaucratization, it is getting more  and  more  difficult to  define  and 
express  the  public  interest.  However,  if the  future  is to  remain  under  control, 
the  public  interest must  be  defined  and  expressed  because  the  requirements  for 
social  adaptation,  both  now  and  in  the  future,  are  great,  and  because  social  needs 
and  aspirations  are  so  many  and  varied. 
. ..  I ... - 70  -
4.3.  The  ~tection of  the  environment 
In  Europe,  where  industrial  and  demographic  density is high,  the  problem 
of  supply  and  rational  use  of  natural  resources  is extremely  important.  All  the 
Member  States  share  this  problem,  and  must  cooperate  closely to  solve it, perhaps 
even  adopting  a  common  policy.  The  Community  is small  in  terms  of territorial 
dimension;  the  various  countries  share  certain seas  and  river networks;  trade 
and  all  kinds  of exchange  relations  between  them  are  intense.  All  this means 
that a strictly national  approach  to  the  problem  is too  narrow~ and  that the 
Community  dimension  is  in  many  ways  the  most  suitable. 
The  need  toprotect the  environment  has  made  itself felt gradually  and 
relatively recently  in  Europe.  Over  the  past fifteen years  a certain amount  of 
action  has  been  taken,  often  in  an  uncoordinated  way,  but  with  undeniable  success 
and  usually at remarkably  low  cost.  This  action  has  in  general  concentrated  on 
pollution:  the  reduction  of sulphur  dioxide  emissions,  the  elimination of smog, 
the  reduction  of  river pollution  in  some  areas,  and  so  on. 
But  environmental  protection  is not  restricted to com ba tingpollution; 
it also  includes  the  use  of  land,  the  problems  of urbanization,  the  growing 
supremacy  of  communications  networks  and  industrial  activities  and  the  entire 
range  of  damage  caused  to  nature,  in  particular by  the  development  of certain 
agricultural  techniques. 
The  environment  will  still  be  under  heavy  pressure over  the  next  ten  years; 
the  exact  burden  will  depend  on  the  growth  rate,  and  also  on  how  the  structures 
of  output  and  consumption  develop,  and  on  technological  production  methods.  The 
environment  will  be  in  danger  as  a result of several  factors,  including: 
(i)  the  growing  share  of the  chemicals  industry, electrical  engineering  and 
mechanical  engineering  in  industrial  output;  these  sectors  are  the  main 
producers  of  synthetic chemical  compounds  and  heavy  metals  which  are often 
highly  toxic,  persistent and  bio-accumulable; 
(ii)  the  continued  high  rate of  increase  in  pollution from  emissions  of sulphur 
dioxide,  in  spite of  the  decline  of  some  of  the  industries  that contribute 
to  this  pollution; 
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(iii)  the  increasing  use  of fertilizers and  pesticides  in agriculture;  the 
consumption  of  these  products  is very  high  in  Europe,  much  higher,  for 
example,  than  in  the  lJSA  or  the  USSR; 
(iv)  the  expected  rapid  expansion  of tourism; 
(v)  the  increase,  slower  than  before it is true,  in  the  number  of  cars  and 
the  volume  of  traffic, which  will  add  to  noise,  congestion  on  roads,  and 
emissions  of poisonous  gas.  It is difficult to monitor  exhaust fumes, 
and  the  efficiency of anti-pollution equipment,  particularly for  private 
cars, diminishes  rapidly as  the  vehicle  ages;  unless suitable measures  are 
taken,  increased  traffic will  lead  to  a  steady decline  in  the  quality of urban 
1  i fe; 
(iv)  the  production,  distribution and  consumption  of energy,  and  in  particular 
the  development  of nuclear  sources  and  the  return  to the  use  of  coal. 
The  demand  for environmental  protection will  become  increasingly pressing  in 
Europeas  the  need  for it grows;  several  surveys  carried out  in  European  countries 
have  shown  keen  and  widespread  interest in  the  improvement  of  the  environment. 
Attention  should  be  concentrated  on  preventive measures;  cleaning  and 
purifying  operations  are  very  costly and  difficult, and  the  economy  is becoming 
increasingly dependent  on  activities that damage  the environment.  It was 
estimated  recently in  France  that by  1995,  a  policy for dealing  with  a damaged 
environment  aiming  for  a return to the  1970  level  of pollution could  cost about 
2%of  that year's  GOP,  while  a  preventive  po]icy  could  br~n~ pollution  20%below 
the  1970  level  at a  cost equivalent to  about  0.6%  of  GD  P •  Not  only  is 
prevention  less expensive,  not  only  does  it facilitate the  application of  the 
11polluter pays
11  principle  recommended  at Community  level,  but  it also  leads 
naturally to  a  comprehensive  and  more  coherent approach  to  the  problems  posed . 
9 11 Environment  et  r~orientation de  la croissance
11  Ministry  of  the 
Environment,  Paris  1978. 
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It should  be  borne  in  mind  that present  industrial  structures are  largely 
the  result of  past trends  and  of decisions  taken  at a  time  when  environmental 
considerations  were  not  given  due  importance. 
Thus,  the  available State aids  to facilitate structural  transformations 
required  to  ensure  respect for  provisions  concerning  environmental  protection 
must  be  complemented  by  proper  allowance  for environmental  considerations  when 
new,  competitive  industrial  structures are  developed. 
It has  often  been  said,  for example,  that the  costs  of  pollution control  are 
a burden  on  firms,  hampering  growth,  affecting productivity,  fuelling  inflation, 
creating  problems  of  international  competitivity and,  all  in  all, endangering 
employment.  A number  of macro-economic  studies  in  Europe,  the  United  States 
and  Japan  seem  to  indicate  that these  adverse  effects are  often  negligible or 
non-existent.  The  expansion  of activity in  the  industries  producing  anti-
pollution equipment  may  even  have  favourable  economic  effects,  and  a  number  of 
studies  have  shown  that environmental  protection measures  sometimes  lead  to  the 
creation of  new  jobs. 
Indeed,  environmental  protection measures  are  not  only  wholly  compatible 
with  general  aims  for  economic  and  social  development,  and  in  particular with 
job  creation,  but  they  even  contribute  to  achieving  these  aims. 
The  economic  growth  rate is not  in  itself a satisfactory criterion  for 
measuring  a country's economic  and  social  development,  or  the  improvement  of 
welfare  and  the  quality of life.  Nevertheless,  a  high  rate of expansion  of economic 
activity does  make  it easier to  create  new,  competitive  industrial  structures 
and  to  carry out  investments,  particularly in  the  area  of environmental  protection. 
Such  investments  contribute  not  only  to  improving  the  environment,  but  also  to 
creating  new  jobs;  they  will  therefore  contribute  to  the  industrial  and  regional 
development  the  Community  must  ensure  over  the  next  decade. - 73  -
POPULATION  :  THE  OUTLOOK  FUR  THE  198Cs 
The  main features  of the  outlook for population in the 1980 s  are a 
slow  increase  in total population combined  with very rapid growth of the popu-
lation of working age  (particularly before 1985)  while the  ratio of the very 
young and the very old (i.e. those outside the labour force)  to total population 
will  continue to decline. 10 
Although these trends are to be  welcomed  on  some  counts,  they have 
two  worrying aspects  :  first,  they will mean  serious  employment  problems  over the 
next  few  years,  since potential labour will expand vigorously between now  and 
1985,  and unemployment  is already very high in Europe;  secondly,  in the longer 
term,  these trends will mean  an aging and declining population in Europe unless 
behaviour patterns  change. 
Demographic  trends are expected to follow the  same  pattern in all the 
Member  :Jtates except  Ireland,  but  developments  will differ in level,  timing and 
scope  from  one  Member  State to another,  and  from  one  region to another. 
5.1.  The  features  of the  next  decade 
Fairly reliable forecasts  are possible up  to the not-too-distant date 
of 1990.  Mortality is stable,  and there  should not  be  much  migration from  the 
Community  to the  rest  of the  world.  The  populations of working and retirement 
age  in 1990  are  already known,  and the school-age population can be  estimated 
fairly precisely.  The  unknown  factor1  w~ich past experience has  :shollm.  t·o  be a 
major  source  of error,  is the trend of fertility rates. 
Such uncertainty surrounds this determining factor that  any forecasts 
covering more  thantenyears can be little better than conjectures;  however,  it 
may  still be useful to analyse the possible  implications of such forecasts.  For 
example  the  demographic  factor in economic variables such  as the  long-term burden 
of pension payments  can be  estimated. 
.;  ... 
10  The  data supplied here are mainly drawn  from  an  experts'  report to  the Com-
mission of the European  Communities,  published in June 1978,  entitled 
"The  economic  implications of demographic  change  in the European Community 
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The  next  ten years will  be  decisive  for any attempts to change the  course of pre-
sent  demographic  trends  in Europe,  which  are giving cause  for serious concern 
about  the more  distant  future. 
5.1.1.  Slow  population growth 
Population growth depends  on  :  (i) the trend of fertility rates and 
the population structure by age  groups,  an~  ( ii) migratory flows. 
Migratory flows 
Population movements  were  a  very  important  factor of Community  demo-
graphic trends  in the 1960s.  Between  1963  and 1973,  the net  increase  in the popu-
lation of the  Six due  to  immigration amounted to 4,600,000 people,or_.almost ope ~bird 
of the total increase in the  resident population.  Immigration declined somewhat 
with  enlargement  (since emigration exceeds  immigration in Ireland and the United 
Kingdom,  as  in  Italy~ see A36),but  during the  l960~ it aq~o~~ed ~q~  ~·  ~onsid~rable 
increase in the labour force  ~·the net  inflow of  for~ign labour into the Community 
of Six was  2,200,000 between 1965  and 1973.  It also led to substantial changes 
in the population structure by age  and  by sex.  Until the beginning of the 1970s, 
most  of the  immigrants  were members  of the labour force;  since 1973  there has 
been an  increasing tendency for whole  families to immigrate. 
In view of the present  and  foreseeable problems of employment,  the 
next  ten years will probably see the introduction of severely restrictive  immi-
gration policies.  Two  of the three Mediterranean countries now  applying for 
membership,  Spain and  Portugal,  have high  emigration rates;  when  they join the 
Community,  their nationals are more  likely to replace migrant  workers  from 
non-member  countries  in the present Member  States than to add to  immigration. 
Fertility rates 
After rising sharply in the 1950s and early 1960s,  the fertility rate 
has  once  more  been declining rapidly over the past  fifteen years.  This  develop-
ment  amounts to a  restoration of the downward  trend that had characterized ferti-
lity rates  since the end  of the 19th century,  from  which  the post-war baby boom 
now  appears to have been a  spectacular but  temporary deviation. 
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F
1ertility rates in the  Community  now  range  between 1.3 in the  Federal 
Republic  of Germany  and  3.5 in Ireland.  In  seven of the Member  States the  rate 
is lower than 2,  although  a  rate of 2.05 is required to keep  the popuation stable. 
Even  in Italy it is only slightly higher than this. 
The  population of all the Member  States except  Ireland will  inevitably 
decline if these fertility rates do  not  change  over the next  50  years,  unless 
there  . is  net  immigration.  The  decline has already begun  in Germany  and  Luxembourg, 
and  it will probably gain  impetus after 1990. 
Slower demographic  growth  in Europe 
The  main  difference between  Community  population projections and 
national projections  concerns the assumptions made  about  fertility;  the Community 
projections are based  on  the dual  hypothesis that  fertility rates will be  relati-
vely  low,  and  that  they will tend to converge  in the various Member  States; 
although they will still remain different,  the differences will be less marked 
than national projections  imply. 
However,  all the projections  conclude that,  by the  end  of the  century, 
population growth  in the Community  of Nine  will be  zero.  Over the next ten years 
alone,  the population will probably not  increase by more  than 0.2%  a  year,  com-
pared with an annual  average of almost  0.6%  from  1960  to 1980. 
COMMUNITY  POPULATION  TRENDS 
- - - ~-- ..  ...  -
Millions  Annual  growth rates  Millions 
1980  1985  1990  1980/1960  1990/1980  2015  2050 
D  61 .1  60.6  60.2  0  .. 49  -0.15  53 .. 5  38 ... 4 
F  53.5  54.6  55.6  0.79  0.39  58,9  57.5  .. 
I  56 .. 9  57.8  58.6  0.63  0  ... 29  60 .. 6  58.3 
NL  13 .. 9  14.3  14.6  0.97  0.5  15.2  13,35 
8  9.8  9.9  9.9  0.36  0  ... 13  9,.8  8.7 
L  0.36  0.36  0.35  0.63  -0  .. 08  0.32  0,24 
UK  56.1  56.5  57.0  0.33  0!"16  58 ... 3  55 .. 2 
IRL  3.3  3.5  3.8  0.79  1.36  5  .. 1  6  .. 5 
DK  5.1  5.2  5.3  0.57  0.26  5.4  5.2 
EEC  260 .. 2  262 .. 7  265.4  0.57  0  .. 2  267.1  243.4 
-·  ---- --- ··-
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However,  population growth  is much  more  vigorous  in Greece  and  the other two 
Mediterranean countries applying for Community  membership.  The  populations of 
Spain and  Portugal  should each  expand  by more  than o.B%  a  year in the 1960s. 11 
5.1.2.  Large  increase in the labour force 
There will be  significant  changes  in the structure of the Community 
population pyramid over the next ten years;  the  changes are easy to predict,  since 
the  only uncertain factor is the percentage of children ,~ed ten·and under jnthe··, 
population in 1990.  On  the  assumption· that, fertility rates will gradually tend. to-· 
gether,with9ut  converg~ng completel17the  __ percentage·of under-15s  in the populatioh 
·should  decline,from  2I~4%.to 19.7%  betwee~·l980 and  1990.At~the same·time,  the per-
centage  of those aged  65  and over should  d~elineia~.first-from 14.i%  in i980  to 13.2% 
in 1985,  rising again to 13.8%  in 1990.  The  population of working age,  i.e.  from 
15  to  65,  should rise from  64.5~ in 1980 to 66.9%  in 1985,  falling again slightly to 
66.6%  in 1990(see A 37  to 39). 
The  development  of the population pyramid  in the  Federal  Republic of 
Germany  in the 1980s will  represent  an  extreme  case.  The  percentage of those aged 
15 and under should decline considerably,  although less than in the Netherlands 
and  Italy,  where  the initial percentage  is much  higher;  the percentage of those 
aged  65  and  over will also decline rapidly,  as  in France  and Belgium,  but  it will 
still remain much  higher than the average for the Community  as a  whole,  as  in the 
United Kingdom  and Denmark.  The  combination of these two  trends will mean  that, 
at least until  1985,  the ratio of the population of working age to the total popu-
lation will  increase faster than elsewhere,  even though the annual  growth  rate 
of the population of working age will not  be the highest  in the  Community  (see 
A 37  to 39). 
1985 will be  an  important year for population trends in the Community  as 
in many  of the Member  States;  for it will see  changes  in the trends of the various 
age  groups.  The  size of the 0  to 15 age  groups will decline by almost  1.3% between 
1980  and  1985,  but  remain more  or less stable between 1985  and  1990.  The  popula-
tion aged  65  and  over will decline by 1%  a  year in the first half of the 1980s, 
and  then rise by 1%  a  year in the second half. 
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-Tt According to UNO  forecasts  (medium-growth  ~ernative), the population of 
Greece  will  rise from  9.0 to 9.9 million between 1975  and 1990;  that  of 
Spain from  35.6 to 40.5 million,  and that  of Portugal  from  9.4 to 10.8 
million_; thus,  the aggregate population of these three countries should 
increase  from  54 to 61.2 million. - 77  -
In particular,  the population of working age  will increase by 0.9% a  year from 
1980  to 1985,  but  only by 0.1%  a  year  from  1985 to 19.90  (compared  with·~n average 
rate of .0.5%  a  year from  1950 to'  l980).~(ooe:.A37 1Q  39). 
The  dependency ratio (i.e. the population aged under 15  and  over 65ex-
·pressed as a  percentage of'the population of working age) should;there!.dre decline 
considerably,from 55%  in 1980 to.so.2%.tn.l990;  the  lo~est ·point  will be·reached in 
1985  (49.5%),  after which  the trend will be  reversed. 
A mechanical  extrapolation of the  Community  projections shows  a  depen-
.dency ratio of 51.2%  in 2015,  with a  considerably smaller proportion of under-15s 
and  a  considerably larger proportion of over-65s. 
In  Greece,~in and Portugal the population of working age  should 
increase by about  0.8% a  year between now  and  1990,  faster than in the Community. 
This will mean  a  further increase of about  3  million in the population aged 15 
to 64  over the next ten years  in addition to the  increase of about  9  million 
(including 8 million between 1980  and 1985)  expected for the Nine. 
5.1.3.  Continuing wide  disparities between regions,  and internal population 
movements 
In Ireland,  the Mezzogiorno  and the  countries applying for membership, 
the population of working age  will rise faster and  for longer than in the  rest of 
the Community.  Disparities between demographic  trends are  even wider at  regional 
than at  national level.  The  population aged between 15 and  64  in the less pros-
perous  regions,  where  high fertility rates have  been recorded in the past,  will 
continue to rise faster than the Community  average  (see  A40  and  41). There are 
obvious  exceptions  :  the  increase  in the population of working age will be  rela-
tively moderate  in the less prosperous  regions of the United Kingdom,  while it 
will be  very vigorous  in the  eastern Netherlands. 
The  outlook  for population movements  within the Community  in the 1980s 
is largely uncertain.  Population movements  have  changed  radically over the past 
.;  ... - 78  -
few  yQe.rs.  Until the end of the 1960s  and  the early 1970s,  the population of the 
poorer regions  was  much  depleted  by massive  emigration  :  about  5 million people 
left the Mezzogiorno  and  Ireland between 1951  and 1971,  or a  quarter of the popu-
lation in one  generation.  At  the  same  time,  the population of the large conur-
bations expanded  ste~ilY• Over the past  few  years,  these tendencies have practi-
cally disappeared,  for several reasons  :  slack demand  for labour in the more 
prosperous  regions  of the  Community;  better and  wider national  insurance cover; 
fewer  departures  from  the  land,  partly because the rural population of working 
age  is older than before  (44%  of farmers  and  25%  of all persons  employed  in agri-
culture  in the  Community  were  over  55  in 1975);  unpleasant  living conditions  in 
the large towns,  and the attractions of a  more  agreeable  environment  in some 
less prosperous  regions  (particularly on  retirement);  the  growing desire to live 
and  work  in one's native  region,  and so  on. 
Obviously the situation varies  from  one  region to another,  and  contrary 
tendencies are  apparent  within the Community.  In southern Italy and the prospective 
Member  States,  there will still be massive movements  from  the  countryside to the 
large towns.  3erious  imbalances are developing in the prospective Member  States, 
where  population,  industrial activity and  services are concentrated in the large 
towns,  while many  rural areas are becoming depopulated. 
In other Community  regions there is a  tendency towards  deconcentration. 
First,  there is a  movement  away  from  the  regions  where  traditional  industries  such 
as steel, textiles and  shipbuilding are declining.  This  is true of Lorraine,  the 
Saar,  Nord-Pas-de-Calais  and  Strathclyde.  Secondly,  there is a  movement  away  from 
large towns.  During the 1960s,  activities and  residents were  moving  out  offue 
inner cities, while the growth  of large towns  was  slowing down,  and  small  and 
medium-sized towns  were  developing.  For the past ten years,  the larger towns  have 
actually been declining  (and not  just the  inner cities), as retired persons and 
the better-off have moved  away,  to be  replaced by young people  and  foreign 
workers. 
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5.2.  The  implications of these trends 
The  expected population trends  for the next  ten years,  and  in particu-
lar the  change  in the trend of the population of working age  in 1985,  will raise 
e major problem  :  that  of employment,  which  we  consider in detail below. 
The  trends will also affect the  structure and the rate of expansion of 
demand.  It would  seem  reasonable to  suppose that  slower population growth will, 
all other things being equal,  lead to slacker demand;  however,  the  importance 
of this factor at  European level  should not  be  overestimated.  It is true that 
the expansion of demand  has already been affected by population trends in the 
Federal  Republic of Germany,  and that  a  decline  in the Community population would 
have  similar effects in the very long run.  However,  demand  is more  likely to be 
affected  by other factors  over the next  ten years,  and  in particular by the 
changing shape  of the population pyramid.  Two  aspects of demand  will certainly be 
affected  :  the demand  for education and the demand  for health services. 
There will be  a  considerable decline  in the number  of children of school 
age,  which has  been falling since 1972,  when  it broke all records.  In 1972, 
there were  61,300,000 children aged between 0  and 14 years  in the Nine;  in 1980 
there will be  55,700,000,  and by 1990,  according to present  forecasts,  only 
52,200,000.  Although the number  of children aged between 0  and 4  years will  in-
crease considerably over the next ten years  (even if fertility rates do  not  rise), 
it will still be  smaller than at the beginning of the 1970s.  The  number  of children 
aged between 5  and 14 years will decline rapidly,  particularly up  to 1985  (from 
39,200,000  in 1980 to 34,800,000  in 1985)4  this development  will affect primary 
education for the first half of the 1980s,  and  secondary education thereafter. 
The  potential numbers  undertaking higher education (if the rate of participation 
does  not  change)  will  increase  rapidly until 1985  and then decline,  in view of 
the trend of the population aged between 15 and  24 years.  These trends  should 
make  it possible to  improve  the quality of education,  but will lead mainly to 
a  reduction in the number  of teachers  (which  is already excessively large  in 
some  countries)  and  in the volume  of  investment  in the education system.  The 
system ought, ·however,  to  remain sufficiently flexible to deal  with an increase 
in the number  of young people during the last decade  of this century,  and 
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a  possible rise  in the fertility rate.  It will also have to deal with  investment 
problems  due  to population movements. 
A number  of studies have  shown  that the  curve  of health expenditure as 
a  function of age is U-shaped,  if the  costs of confinement  and  ante-natal  and 
post-natal  care are attributed to the child rather than to the mother.  Expenditure 
declines rapidly in the early years of life, then increases again at a  growing 
rate with  age.  According to present tentative estimates, health  costs in the 
Community  could rise by about  9%  (at 1975 prices)  between 1975 and 1995  as  a 
result  of changes  in the  shape  of the Community  population pyramid;  the increase 
in costs for this reason will be particularly large in Ireland  (22.9%)  and the 
Netherlands  (20.9%),  but  very small  in the Federal  Republic of Germany  (3.5%), 
Belgium  (2.9%)  and the United Kingdom  (6el%),  and  close to the Community  average 
in the other countries. 
Popdation trends may  have  some  effects on the demand  for accommodation, 
but  it is difficult to predict the  incidence of the various  factors at work  :  fami-
ly size,  large  increase  in the number  of young people of marriageable age,  regional 
disparities,  dislike of large towns  and  so  on. 
In the longer term,  the demographic  outlook beyond 1990 will raise pro-
blems  that  should be  considered as early as possible,  such as the problem of the 
burden  of retirements.  This problem will not  be felt  for at least twenty years, 
unless  the_retirement ·age  is reduced  substantially.~e popu~ation agedoveri5,~ich 
increased considerably between 1975 and 1980  (particularly in Germany,  Italy and 
the United Kingdom)  will decline between now  and 1985,  rising gradually thereafter. 
By  1990,  the number  of those aged over 65  will be  about  the  same  (36,5QO,OOO)  as 
in 1980(see A39).  Although there are considerable differences  from  one  Member 
State to another,  they are unimportant  up  to 1990.  In fact,  unless population 
growth  regains momentum,  the more  rapid aging of the_population will not  cause 
serious problems of financing retirements until the year 2000.  The  countries 
most  affected will be  Germany,  the Netherlands  and Luxembourg,  where  the percentage 
of older people will  increase -very rapidly between 1990 and  2015. 
A further,  pressing problem will be that  an aging European population, 
the  result of demographic decline,  could significantly damage  the dynamism  and 
adaptability of the Community,  and its capacity for innovation and dialogue,  in 
a  worldwhere the aspirations of young,  poor and rapidly increasing populations 
will  be  increasingly urgent. 
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5.3.  Europe  in world  demographic trends 
According to the most  recent  UNO  projections 12  ,  world population 
could  increase by about  53%  between 1975  and  2000,  on  the basis of medium-growth 
assumptions  considered the most  plausible by UNO  experts.  At  the  same  time,  the 
population of the Nine  would  increase by  5%,  and that of the enlarged Community 
of Twelve  by a  little over 1%. 
The  United Nations projections  cover the period from  1975  to 1995, 
comparable to that  covered by the Community  projections. The  results of both 
sets of projections  for the growth  of population in the Nine  are very similar 
(UN  projections  :  increase of 3.3%;  Community  projections  :  increase of 3.6%). 
On  the basis of these results,  the population of the Nine  will represent  4.3% 
of world population,  that of the Twelve  5.4%,  in the year 2000  compared  with 
6.4%  and  7•7%  respectively in 1975  (see  A42). 
The  decline  in demographic  growth,  in all the northern European 
countries besides the Community,  is more  marked than in the other developed  coun-
tries, particularly the USA  and Japan,  although  even there the rate of demographic 
growth  is noticeably falling (see A  42'),.  Indeed,  the share of the developed regions 
in total world population will drop  from  28.~ in 1975 to  21.8%  in the year 2000. 
The  natural growth  rate of the developing regions will still be much  higher than 
that  of the developed countries,  in spite of a  sharp  drop  in birth rates, partially 
offset by a  drop  in death rates.  Between 1975  and 1980,  the population in the 
developing countries will  grow  by 2.2%  a  year,  compared  with 0.7%  a  year in the 
industrialized countries;  the respective  rates between 1995  and  2000  will be 1.85% 
and  0.54%. 
By  the year 2000,  the populations of Brazil  (212 million)  and Mexico 
(114 million)  will together be  equal  to the entire population of the Community 
of Twelve  (335  million),  while  in 1975  they were  equal to only 54%  of that popu-
lation. The  Arab  countr-ies  of the Mediterranean seaboard and the Arabian 
peninsula could have  269  million inhabitants,  or about  the same  number  as the 
Community  of Nine,  by 2000,  compared  with  52%  in 1975. 
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These  populations will be  young;  although the proportion of those 
under 15 will be  declining,  it will still be  considerable at  somewhere  near 
4o%,  or even more.  At  the beginning of the  21st  century,  there will be  twice 
as many  under-15s  in the Arab  countries of the Mediterranean seaboard and the 
Arabian peninsula as  in the  N~ne (107 million  and  54 million respectively), 
although the numbers  were  approximately the  same  (about  60  million)  in 1975• 
In Brazil and Mexico  together,  there will be 135 million young people  in the 
year 2000,  compared  with  73  million in 1975;  the number  of under-15s will 
decline  in the Community  of Twelve  from  74,900,000 in 1975 to 68,100,000  in 
the year 2000. 
The  under-45 age  group  will  also be  smalle~ in the Community  than 
elsewhere in the year 2000.  This group will represent  about  63%  of the total 
population of Europe,  about  65%  of the population of the developed countries 
and  almost  82%  of the population of the developing world,  compared with 65%  , 
69%  and  83%  respectively in 1975• 
These  population forecasts  for the end  of the century m~  turn out 
to be  mistaken,  in particular if the birth rate falls more  rapidly than expected 
in the developing countries;  it has  already begun to decline  considerably,  and 
should go  on  doing so  at an increasing rate,  especially in South-East  Asia. 
However,thegeneral  trend towards  an aging Community  population and a  young 
Third World  would still be apparent. - 83  -
PART  TWO 
THE  CHALLENGES  FACING  THE  COMMUNITY  IN  THE  NEXT  TEN  YEARS - 84  -
Population  trends  in  Europe  over  the  next  ten years  may  make  the  present 
unemployment  problems  f~ing most  of the  Member  States  considerably worse. 
The  main  questions  now  being  asked  about  the  opportunities  and  dangers 
of  the  next  ten  years  are  increasingly concentrated  around  the  crucial  issue 
of  unemployment,  which  will  determine  the  solutions  to  problems  of economic 
and  social  development,  sectoral  adjustment,  social  cohesion,  relations with 
the  rest of  the  world,  and  all  the  challenges  facing  the  Community.  All  these 
matters  are  dealt with  in  Part Two  of  this report. - 85  -
CHAPTER  6 
EMPLOYMENT  :  A m  a j  or issue for  the  1980s 
After  declining  in  1975  and  1976,  employment  has  once  again  been  expanding 
in  the  Community  over  the  past  two  years;  nevertheless,  by  1978  total  employment 
was  still  less  than  it had  been  in  1973.  This  general  trend  covers  developments 
in  different directions, at different rates  and  of varying  scope  in  the  individual 
Member  States.  For  example,  employment  declined  rapidly  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  from  1973  to  1977,  particularly in  1974  and  1975,  and  then  recovered 
perceptibly  in  1978;  in  Italy,  on  the  other hand,  employment  increased considerably 
during the  same  period  (see  A  43). 
Although  immigration  has  ceased,  and  in  spite of the  economic  situation, 
which  has  discouraged  many  potential  job-seekers  from  entering  the  labour  market, 
the  recent  recovery  in  employment  was  not  vigorous  enough  to  offset the  increase 
in  the  labour  supply  due  to  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  population  of working  age. 
The Community Is civi 1  ian 1  abour force increased by two mi 11 ion from 1975 to 1978' a 1  arge 
increase,  but  still  smaller than  the  increase  of  4,600,000  expected  for  1975  to 
1980. 
The  recovery  of employment  has  not,  then,  been  sufficient to  achieve  more 
than  the  stabilization of  unemployment  since  the  middle  of 1977;  as  many  as 
six million  people,  or  about  5.5%  of  the  Community  labour  force,  are  now 
unemployed.  Women  are  particularly hard  hit (about  6.7%  of  the  female  labour  force 
was  unemployed  in  1979,  compared  with  5%  of  the  male  labour  force),  as  are 
young  people:  over  40%  of  the  unemployed  are  under  25  years  old. 
Unemployment  trends  and  situations vary  widely  from  one  Member  State  to 
another.  The most remarkable case is that of the Federa 1 Republic of Germany, where  the rate 
of unemployment  has  been  declining  since  1975,  while  it has  increased  in  all  the 
other  countries  except  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark  (see  A  43)  ;  unemployment 
structures  by  age  and  sex  also  vary,  as  do  average  periods  of  unemployment. 
Differences  between  regions  are  even  greater than  those  between  countries. 
The  total  level  of unemployment  is very  high  indeed  in  some  of  the  outlying  areas 
of  the  Community  (see  A  44  and  45),  where  the  1  eve 1 of  unemp 1  oyment  among  young 
people  is  sometimes  particularly serious  (see  A 46). 
The  Community  is therefore entering  a  new  decade  with  a seriously disturbed 
labour  market,  and  the  problem  is  likely to  get worse  rather than  better over  the 
next  few  years : 
...  I ... I 
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(i) first, because  the  size of  the  available  Community  labour  force will  expand 
at an  exceptionally rapid  rate; 
(ii)  secondly,  because  the  changes  and  adjustments  required  in  view  of  the  new 
international  environment,  the  structural  development  of  internal  demand 
and  technological  progress  will  involve  far-reaching  changes  in employment 
because  of  conversion  and  the  need  for  new  qualifications. 
6.1.  The  labour  supply  in  the  1980s 
According  to  Community  demographic  projections,  the  supply  of  labour 
(abstracting  from  population  movements)  could  expand  at an  annual  rate of 
0.9%  from  1980  to  1985,  and  of 0.66%  from  1985  to  1990,  or  an  annual  rate of 
0.75%  over  the  decade  as  a whole  (while  national  projections  predict a  rate 
of 0.45%).  The  Community  figures  cover  a variety of differing national  trends 
(see  A  47);  they  correspond  to  an  increase  in  the  labour  force  of about  nine 
mi 11 ion  peop 1  e,  65%  of whom  are  women,  between  1980  and  1990  (see  A  48).  70% 
of  this  increase  is due  to  increased  population, while  the  rest is due  to  a 
rising participation rate  among  women. 
LABOUR  FORCE  TRENDS 
- Annual  growth  rates  -
--- - .. 
1975/1950  1980/1975  1  1985/1980  1  1990/1985  1  1990/1980  1 
F.  R.  Germany  0.54  0.65  0.78  0.35  0 ... 55 
~r;;ncc 
I 
0.65  2  0.98  0.34  0.59  0  .. 72 
! ~ -=.ly  -0.03 2 
1 '03  1 . 11  1. 11  1 .11 
I 
· Netherlands  0.86  1. 60  1.90  1. 67  1.79 
1 
:  •.:  L-,·ium 
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EEC 
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0.72  2  0.79 
0.35  0.65 
-0.49  1.24 
0.66  0.43 
0.31  0.85 
0.78  0.78  0.78 
0.63  o.oa  0.35 
0.74  0.42  0.58 
1 .9Q  2.00  1 .95 
0.52  0.39  0.45 
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The  component  due  to  chan~ing participation rates  is not  at all  easy  to  predict. 
We  know  what  factors  affect participation, but  they  are  not  easy  to  quantify.  In 
the  long  term  there will  probably  be  a decline  in  participation rates at both 
ends  of  the  working-age  range.  The  participation rate among  those  members  of  the 
working-age  population  who  are  still young  enough  to  be  undergoing  full-time 
education  has  declined  rapidly  since  the  war;  the  decline will  probably  continue, 
but  more  slowly  than  before,  since  participation in higher  education  may  have 
reached  saturation point.  At  the  other end  of  the  scale,  the  participation rate 
among  the  over-55s  is  highly  likely to  fall  because  of  increased  opportunities 
for early retirement.  However,  the  determining  factor will  be  the  participation 
rate  among  women,  particularly married  women  aged  25  to  55.  This  rate will  depend 
to  a  large extent on  economic  and  social  developments  in  the  European  countries. 
It is much  easier to  assess  the  demographic  component,  i.e.  the  effect of 
increased  population  if there is  no  change  in  participation rates; it is larger 
in  the  first half of  the  decade  {where  it comprises  4 100  000  people)  than  in 
the  second  (2  200  000  people).  In  particular, unless  participation rates  in this 
age  group  decline,  the  number  of young  people  aged  15  to  24  in  the  labour  force 
will  increase  by  1 100  000  between  1980  and  1985,  much  more  than  between  1975  and 
1980,  when  the  increase  amounted  to  600  000;  after 1985,  this figure will  decline, 
slowly  at first, but  very  rapidly from  1990  to  1995  {see  A48). 
As  we  pointed  out  in  Chapter  5,  trends  are  expected  to change  around  1985  in  the 
Community  as  a whole,  and  somewhat  later than  elsewhere  in  southern  Italy,  Ireland 
and  the  prospective  Member  States, where  the  population  of working  age  will  expand 
more  rapidly and  for  longer  than  in  the  rest of the  Conmunity  {see  A  40  and  41). 
Young  people  will  also  be  arriving  on  the  labour market  in  large  numbers  in  France. 
It is  therefore  probable  that these  regions,  which  are  already  much  less prosperous 
than  the  rest of  the  Community,  and  where  unemployment  rates are  already  higher 
(see  J\44  and45),  will  suffer increasingly from  underemployment. 
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6.2.  Qualitative  and  structural  adjustments  on  the  labour  markets 
The  employment  problem  is not  simply  due  to  the  size of  the  labour  force; 
it also  has  a  very  important  qualitative and  structural  aspect,  involving  two 
closely interdependent factors:  the  transfer of  labour  from  one  sector to  another; 
qualitative imbalances  between  geographical  regions,  between  the  supply  of  and 
demand  for  specific qualifications,  and  between  working  conditions. 
The  transfer of  labour  from  one  sector to  another  is a continuous  process 
that has  been  increasingly important  in  Europe  over  the  past twenty  years,  because 
of  movement  away  from  the  land,  adjustments  within manufacturing  industry,  and  the 
rapid  development  of  services.  These  transfers could  be  made  relatively easily 
when  growth  was  vigorous;  they  are  now  more  difficult because  of the  slower  rate 
of expansion,  and  also because  some  of  the  factors  of qualitative imbalance  have 
become  much  more  important over  recent years13. 
Qualitative  imbalances  have  always  existed;  indeed,  they  are  an  integral 
part of  the  mechanism  of  labour  markets.  However,  their scope  has  widened  in 
recent years:  a  large  number  of vacant  posts  often  coincides with  a  h1gh  rate of 
unemployment.  These  imbalances  have  contributed  substantially to  increasing 
under-employment,  and  are  hampering  policies to  stimulate  demand  and  reduce 
production  costs. 
13see  Commission  working  document  SEC(79)  634  final: "Reduction  of  the 
Qualitative mismatch  between  the  supply  of  and  demand  for Labour: 
Guidelines  for  labour  market  policy  and  working  conditions  policy". 
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Moreover,  the  problems  caused  by  qualitative imbalances  now  s9em  to  be 
taking  on  a  new  aspect,  as  a  result of radical  changes  in  the  economic  and  social 
environment  and  in  the  behaviour  of job-seekers  and  potential  employers. 
Employers'  attitudes  to  recruitment  and  training are  changing.  Firms  are 
tending  to  reduce  their expenditure  on  training,  because  of increasing  financial 
problems,  and  public expenditure  has  probably  not  offset the  decline  in  private 
initiative.  Furthermore,  firms  are  imposing  increasingly selective conditions  for 
recruitment,  since  new  legal  provisions  have  made  it much  more  difficult to 
dispense  with  unwanted  staff, outlets are  subject to  growing  uncertainty,  and 
potential  employers  are  in  a  very  strong  position  on  the  labour market.  The  great 
flexibility with which  firms  used  to  take  on  workers  who  did  not  necessarily 
meet  all  their requirements  made  conversion  and  restructuri-ng  mu.ch·~atfer t·n 
the  past;  but  this flexibility is  no  longer  a feature of recruitment.  The  new 
situation is particularly unfavourable,  not  only  to  older and  handicapped  job-
seekers,  but  also,  and  especially,  to  women  and  young  people  (and  a fortiori  to 
young  women),  who  will  represent  an  increasing  proportion  of the  labour  force 
over  the  next  ten  years.  In  1977,  men  under  25  represented  14.5%  of the  1  abour 
force,  and  women  under  25  22.3%;  in  September  1978,  men  under  25  represented 
35%  of  registered  job-seekers,  and  women  under  25  50%. 
Two  main  features  of workers' attitudes  should  be  noted:  first, wage  and 
salary earners  are  increasingly unwilling  to  move  away  in  order  to  find  ~job. 
This  unwillingness  is partly due  to  the  fact that the  spouse  may  already  have 
work,  and  to  the  difficulties associated with  leaving  or  finding  accommodation. 
Secondly,  new  demands  in  relation tq  production  conditions  and  working  hours  are 
being  pressed more  vigorously.  Living  standards  and  educational  levels in  the 
population  are  rising steadily, while  there  are still many  jobs  that are  excessively 
tiring both  mentally  and  physically.  Many  wage  and  salary earners  are employed  in 
jobs  that leave  no  scope  for  their potential  qualities of initiative or  autonomy . 
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The  increasing  size of  production  units  is the  more  intolerable as  workers  feel 
like anonymous  tiny cogs  in  a  large  and  complicated  machine,  where  production  is 
divided  into a very  large  number  of  repetitive and  apparently meaningless  tasks. 
Workers  resent  the  low  social  status attached  to  certain jobs. 
But  there  may  be  a  way  of  reconciling  the  requirement  for  increased 
productivity with  this growing  hostility towards  present working  conditions  and 
the  constraints  of a  productivist.economy.  For.higher  productivity does  not  always 
mean  gigantic production  units, it may  sometimes  be  achieved  through  the  re-
organization  of  production  processes:  management  could  be  spread  more  widely,  if 
not  decentralized;  tasks  could  be  divided  out  differently;  teams  could  be  set up 
to  carry out  complicated  work  programmes,  and  so  on. 
The  consequences  of  this hostility in  some  sections  of the  population, 
however,  are  giving  serious  cause  for  concern,  when  it is directed against work 
itself.  "At  a  time  when  young  people  in  search  of their first job  are  very  hard 
hit by  unemployment,  /~his hostility ii/ firmly  established  in  a  labour market  that 
is becoming  increasingly discriminatory.  There  is discrimination  in  incomes, 
obviously;  discrimination  in  job  security;  discrimination  in working  conditions 
(risk of  accidents,  hours  of  work,  time-keeping  and  so  on).  Work  is still  an 
important element  of  social  discrimination.  Indeed,  the  labour market  itself has 
split into  two:  what  the  experts  call  the  'primary market',  for  the  nucleus  of 
privileged employees  who  are  protected  by  law  and  collective bargains,  and  the 
•secondary market•,  where  badly  protected  categories  such  as  young  people,  women, 
handicapped  workers,  older workers  and  immigrants  pass  through  and  are  often 
exploited."  14 
It is clear from  this brief analysis  that the  quantitative and  qualitative 
aspects  of  employment  and  labour  involve  crucial  problems  for  the  future  of 
European  societies, which  are  seriously affected  by  the waste  of  human  resources 
and  the  exacerbation  of disparity and  discrimination due  to underemployment. 
There  is no  doubt  that the  present serious  situation is largely attributable 
to  the  very  low  growth  rates that Europe  has  experienced  since  1974;  growth  is not 
vigorous  enough  for the  labour  supply  to  be  absorbed,  and  slow  growth  has  made 
sectoral  change  and  structural  adjustment  on  the  labour market  much  more  difficult. 
Thus,  while  better and  more  energetic labour  market  policies, education  policies, 
vocational  training  policies  and  measures  to  improve  working  conditions  are 
absolutely essential,  nothing  will  be  achieved  unless  economic  and  social 
development  is brought  back  under  control,  so  that new  jobs  can  be  created. 
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CHAPTER  7 
THE  OUTLOOK  FOR  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  DEVELOPMENT  IN  EUROPE  IN  THE  1980s 
Most  of the  European  countries  seem  to  have  become  trapped  over  the  past 
few  years in as  i tuati  on of s 1  ow  econorni c growth  from which  they cannot escape  in  spite 
of  their efforts.  The  longer  this situation lasts,  the  greater are  the  economic, 
social  and  political  risks it involves. 
First, it adversely effects employment  now,  as  well  as  making  any  future 
improvement  more  difficult to  achieve  as  each  year  passes;  for it leads  to  a decline 
in  productive  investment  and  thus  weakens  production  potential.  Since  new  jobs 
are  not  created  in  sufficient numbers,  strong  social  and  political  pressures  build 
up  to  defend  existing  jobs, even  those  whose  continued  existence  is unprofitable 
and  so  costly that many  other jobs  are endangered  in  their turn. 
The  problems  experienced  in  certain sectors  and  regions  are  transformed  in 
a  situation of  low  growth  rates  into acute  crises, which  are  often dealt with  by 
uncoordinated  government  intervention at specific points;  the  temptation  to  take 
protectionist measures  becomes  stronger,  although  such  measures  are  bound  to 
hamper  structural  adjustments  and  accentuate  the  rigidity of  economic  structures. 
Low  growth  rates  make  it even  more  difficult to  finance  budgets  and  social 
security funds,  and  thus  reduce  the  authorities•  margin  for manoeuvre  by  calling 
into question  the  economic  and  social  progress  achieved  earlier.  They  contribute 
nothing  to  the  satisfaction of  new  needs  and  aspirations;  indeed,  they  make  it 
more  difficult and  less  likely.  For  example,  although  they  encourage  the 
tendency  towards  shorter working  hours,  the  reduction  in working  time  is not 
regarded  as  an  integral  part of  a  new  plan  for  society,  but  rather as  an  instrument 
to  restore  balance  to  the  labour market;  the  efficiency of such  an  instrument  is 
questionable,  to  say  the  least, especially against an  economic  and  social  background 
that Makes  its use  so  much  more  complicated. 
Although  low  growth  rates  may  have  helped  to  attenuate  certain problems  in 
Europe,  they  are  nevertheless  undesirable.  But  they  are  not  inevitable.  They  are 
not  due  to  the  saturation of  domestic  or  international  demand,  or to  the  exhaustion 
of  technical  progress.  They  are  the  result of  a variety of  macro-economic, 
structural  and  socio-political  barriers associated with  radical  economic  and  social 
change,  whirnare  reinforced  by  the  crisis itself, and  by  the  defence  mechanisms  it 
stimulates,  but which  can  be  weakened  or  removed. 
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The  excesses  ef lhe  very  rapid  growth  in  the  twenty-five years  leading  up  to the 
crisis,  nav~ .b&en  justly crtticized, and  with  them  the  GU}t  of the  growth  objective 
as  an  end  in  itself.  The  criticisms, which  were  already vigorous  by  the  later 1960s, 
questioned  the  significance,  the measurement  a~d the  implications  of  growth;  at 
the  same  time,  the  idea  of  a more relaxed form  of  economic  and  social  development, 
more  in  keeping  with  new  individual  and  social  needs  and  aspirations,  began  to 
appear. 
The  recent  crisis has  changed  the  terms  of  the  problem  of  transition to  a 
new  type  of economic  and  social  progress,  although  it has  not  removed  it. Legitimate 
concern  for  the  qualitative aspects  of  growth  must  not  be  allowed  to overshadow  the 
requirement  for a restored high  rate of expansion, which  can  help  the  European 
countries  to  combat  underemployment,  although  it will  not  provide  a  complete  solution 
to  the  problem. 
It would  be  useless,  and  indeed  impossible,  to  try to define  a  European 
model  of  economic  and  social  development  for the  next  ten years;  for  the  member 
countries  have  widely  different collective preferences  and  behaviour  patterns, 
and  their socio-economic  structures are  not  all  at the  same  stage of development. 
Nevertheless,  it is possible  and  useful  to  isolate the  common  factor of  the 
measures  which  all  the  Member  States  can  and  must  take  if they  are  to improve 
the  outlook  for  economic  growth. 
7.1.  Improved  growth  prospects 
Experience  over  recent years  and  a study  of  the  main  structural  trends  to 
be  expected  in  the  1980s  imply  that priority should  be  given  to:  reducing  the 
adverse  effects of  the energy  problem  on  growth  prospects;  restoring a more  stable 
framework  for the  external  relations of the  Member  States,  particularly their 
mutual  relations;  improving  the  conditions  of growth  in general. 
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7.1.1.  The  energy  problem 
The  outlook  for  growth  over  the  next  few  years  is seriously compromised 
in  most  of  the  European  countries  by  uncertainty about  supply  prices  and  quantities 
of  oil, and  by  the  adverse  effects of  numerous  past increases  in  price  and 
reductions  in  supply. 
It is therefore obvious  that the  Community  must  pursue  the twofold 
aim  of  (a)  reducing  its dependence  on  external  energy  sources,  and  (b)  cooperating 
at least at national  and  European  level,  to  find  ways  of  reducing  the  effects 
of  oil  crises such  as  those  of  1973  and  1979,  which  may  well  arise once  again 
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( a )  Reducing  the  Community •  s  dependence  on  externa 1 energy  sources 
The  oil  crisis of  1979  illustrated  how  little progress  had  been  made 
towards  reducing  dependence  on  external  energy  sources  since  1973,  and  how 
urgent  is  the  need  for much  greater efforts if European  societies are  to escape 
from  the  paralysing  constraint of excessive dependence. 
The  main  lines of  action  to  be  undertaken  were  described  in Chapter  1: 
(i)  to  diversify the  geographical  sources  of  imported  energy,  stabilize 
political  relations with  oil-producing  countries  and  replace  unilateral 
European  dependence  on  these  countries with  mutual  economic  dependence 
between  them  and  Europe ; 
(ii)  to  develop  alternative primary  energy  sources  in  the world  and  within  the 
European  economies ; 
(iii) to  promote  energy  saving  and  weaken  the  link between  energy  consumption 
and  economic  growth. 
Commission  communications  to  the  Council,  and  the  report entitled 
11  In  Favour  of  an  Energy-Efficient  Society 
11  have  already  described  the 
implications  of  this  type  of action;  we  shall  not,  therefore,  go  into  them  here. 
But  we  may  recall  three  of  the  main  conclusions  reached: 
(i) first, that a vigorous  investment drive will  be  required  in  the  energy 
sector.  The  investments  necessary  over  the  next  ten years  to achieve  the 
aims  for national  energy  production  in  the  various  Member  States  (see 
table  (A 49)  are estimated  at a  relatively high  figure,  and  even  this 
estimate may  be  too  low.  On  the  other hand,  we  are still unable  to  assess 
how  much  investment  expenditure will  be  required if certain assumptions 
about  energy  saving  are  verified ; 
(ii)  secondly,  that significant energy  saving  and  a  less  rigid  link between 
energy  requirements  and  growth  rates will  not  be  possible  unless  life-
styles  and  attitudes  to  the_  use  of energy  change;  this in  turn will  have 
important  repercussions  on  the  content of growth; 
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(iii) thirdly,  that vigorous  political  action will  be  needed  to  change  production 
and  consumption  structures  by  means  of  the  entire range  of available 
instruments  used  in  a  consistent way:  better information,  standard  rules 
governing the use of energy, taxi ncenti ves  and si zab 1  e financial rewards, encourage-
ment  for  R&D,  and  in  particular the  readjustment  of  relative domestic  prices 
for  the  various  energy  sources. 
( b )  Con tro  11 i ng  the  spread  of  the  effects  of oil  crises 
After  oil  prices were  multiplied  by  four  in  1973,  the  adverse  effects of  the 
increase  on  the  economic  situation were  amplified  by  divergences  and  confrontations 
which  influenced  economic  policies  and  the  behaviour  of  governments  and  the 
various  socio-economic  groups  in  the  oil-importing  countries,  particularly those 
of the  Community.  At  both  national  and  international  level,  vain  attempts  to 
pass  on  the  burden  of  increased  oil  costs  to  other States  or other economic 
groups  led,  through  the  ratcheting  up  of  incomes  and  snowballing  balance  of 
payments  disequilibria,  to  much  faster  inflation  and  much  slower  growth  than 
would  have  resulted  from  the  primary  effects of  higher  oil  prices  alone. 
The  consequences  of  these  developments  for  investment,  growth,  employment 
and  productive  structures, which  varied widely  from  one  Member  State  to  another, 
had  not  yet been  dealt with  in  spite of  the  substantial  progress  made  in 
correcting  the  distortions  that have  appeared  since  1973,  when  a  further sudden 
rise  in  oil  prices  caused  the  same  risks  aDd  problems  to  reappear  in  1979. 
Experience  over  the  past few  years  shows  that if further  likely crises  over 
the  next  ten  years  are  to  be  dealt with,  agreement  must  be  reached  on  certain 
basic  principles: 
(i)  Increases  in  oil  prices must  be  passed  on  rap·idly  and  entirely in 
energy  prices  in  general  and  in  the  prices  of finished  products  whether 
or  not  they  are  energy  products.  This  rule  should  be  accompanied  by 
specific compensations  for  the  least privileged members  of  society so 
that sacrifices may  be  fairly shared  out;  but it must  be  respected  if 
energy  is  to  be  saved,  if supplies  are  to  be  available for  all  countries 
and  if alternative sources  of energy  are  to  be  developed. 
. ..  I ... - 96  -
(ii)  The  secondary  effects of  increased  oil  prices,  both  inflationar~ and 
recessionary,  must  be  limited  as  far as  possible.  The  application of  this 
principle raises  a  problem  of  general  regulation  policy;  its success  will 
depend  on  how  the  behaviour  of workers  and  employers  affects  incomes  and 
prices,  and  on  how  far  nominal  increases  can  be  avoided,  since  their final 
effect is  to  increase  the  burden  of rising oil  prices  on  real  incomes. 
(iii) The  temporary  deterioration of  the  balance  of  payments  position resulting 
from  changeQ terms  of  trade must  be  accepted ; if the  two  principles 
described  above  are  respected,  this deterioration should  not  be  excessive, 
and  it should  eventually  be  neutralized  by  the  development  of exports  to 
the  oil-producing  countries. 
Obviously  this will  require  the  development  of  international  financing 
to  help  the  more  vulnerable  countries. 
7.1.2.  Stabilizing the  framework  for  the  international  relations of  the  Member  States. 
A study  of  the  mechanisms  and  effects of  the  system  of flexible exchange 
rates  over  the  past  few  years  clearly shows  that the  restoration of more  stable 
exchange  rates will  be  vital, at least in  the  European  countries,  to  improving 
the  outlook  for  growth,  employment  and  inflation. 
Recent  experience  has  shown  that,  in  countries  where  the  discipline of 
adjustment  was  accepted  early on,  the  currency  was  often subject to  strong  pressure 
and  had  to  be  revalued,  sometimes  by  more  than  relative cost trends  justified. The 
tendency  of  the  stronger currencies  to  appreciate,  and  the  uncertainty about  their 
future  exchange  rates,  have  affected  profit margins  and  thus  discouraged  investment 
and  reinforced  the  effects of stabilization policies  beyond  the  point  required  by 
considerations  of growth.  Moreover,  if the  percentage  revaluation exceeds  the 
percentage  difference  in  cost trends  in  national  currencies,  inflation is 
•exported  .. (or 
11re-exported  .. )  to  the  partner countries. 
The  depreciation of  the  currencies  of structurally weaker  and  more 
vulnerable  economies,  on  the  other hand,  weakens  the  constraint of foreign 
competition  in  negotiations  concerning  the  distribution of  income  and  thus 
increases  the  risk of  an  inflationary wages  and  prices  spiral  fuelled  by  the 
effects of  devaluation  on  the  terms  of  trade.  At  the  same  time,  devaluation 
constitutes a disincentive  to modernize  and  adjust structures  in  the  exporting 
sector,  and  therefore  undermines  competitivity  in  the  long  term. 
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By  maintaining  more  stable exchange  rates,  the  European  Monetary  System,  or  EMS, 
can  considerably  attenuate  the  problems  of  inflation in weak-currency  countries 
and  the  problems  of excessively  sluggish  or  precipitate structural  adjustment 
that have  accompanied  flexible exchange  rates over  the  past few  years.  It can 
also  reduce  the  uncertainty weighing  down  on  investments  and  exports,  and  enable 
the  growth  stimuli  created  by  concerted  action  to  be  transmitted.  It can  therefore 
be  an  important  factor  in achieving  more  sustained  and  structurally better balanced 
growth  in the  medium  term.  As  it encourages  inflation rates  to  converge  at as  low 
a  level  as  possible while  avoiding  deflationary effects,  the  Et1S  helps  to  create 
a  zone  of  monetary  stability in  Europe;  this  should  contribute  to more  satisfactory 
economic  and  social  development  in  the  medium  term.  EMS  central  rates  can  be 
adjusted  - preferably a little at a  time  - for  structural  reasons  or  when  cost 
trends  persistently diverge;  this facility helps  to  eliminate  the  disadvantages 
of  delayed  exchange-rate adjustments,  which  were  a feature  of the  Bretton  Woods 
system. 
The  effectiveness of  the  EMS  will  depend  to  a  large extent on  how  central 
rates  are  adjusted;  and  in  particular on  a fair distribution of  responsibilities 
and  burdens  between  the  Member  States;  otherwise  the  system  will  collapse as  a 
result of  excessive  inflation or  equally dangerous  deflation.  If the  system  is 
to work,  the  Member  States will  have  to  strive for  concertation and  solidarity, 
especially since external  pressures, difficult or  impossible  to  control, will 
make  it all  the  more  difficult to  manage. 
The  other  threat to  the  external  relations of  the  Member  States, and 
thus,  because  the  States  are  so  open  to  the  rest of  the  world,  to  their growth 
prospect~ is rising  protectionism,  which  is apparent  not  only  in  the  rest of 
the  world  but  also  in  the  Community  itself. This  development  is very  dangerous 
for  the  Community;  first,  because  its dependence  for energy  and  raw  materials 
means  that exports  are  vital  to  the  Community,  and  any  barriers to  free  trade 
are  undesirable;  secondly,  because  the  production  apparatus  of  the  Community 
economies  is  principally geared  to  exporting  - much  more  so  in fact than  the 
economies  of many  other  large  industrialized countries  - and  the  expansion  of 
exports, which  could  be  compromised  by  more  widespread  protectionism,  is vital 
for  employment. 
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Moreover,  a  study  of the external  trade structures of the  Member  States 
shows  that those  most  likely to  resort to defensive  measures  of  this  type  are 
also  those  liable  to  suffer most  from  the  escalating  protectionism  their action 
could  provoke  (see  Chapter  2), which  could  well  undermine  the  foundations  of  the 
Community. 
For  all  these  reasons,  and  by  virtue of the  Community's  international 
responsibilities, the  member  countries  must  work  together  to  neutralize this danger. 
But  they  can  accept  the  rules  of  international  competition  only  if their partners 
do  so  also,  particularly the  rule  on  mutual  arrangements  and  fairness. 
It is of  course  true  that the  absence  of barriers  to  trade with  the  rest 
of  the  world  places  a  heavy  burden  on  the  Member  States,  and  that efforts to 
reduce  this  burden  in  the  long  term  should  not  be  neglected.  These  efforts could 
be  h e 1 P  e d  over  the  coming  decade  by  a reduction  in  the  Co11111uni ty •  s  dependence 
on  outside  sources  of energy  and  raw  materials,  the  development  of service 
activities,  and  a change  in  consumption  habits  and  life styles.  It is nonethe  less 
certain that the  economic  and  social  development  of the Community  countries 
over  the  next  ten  years  will  depend  to  a very  great extent on  how  far these 
countries  manage  to  adjust to  changes  in  the  international  division of labour, 
and  to  take  advantage  of the  opportunities  these  changes  afford ;  on  how  we 11 
they  can  face  up  to  the  new  requirements  for competitivity  and  flexibility these 
changes  create.  This  involves  inflation control,  a  suitable distribution of 
incomes,  the  recovery  of productive  investment,  technological  progress,  increased 
labour mobility  and  so  on. 
7.1.3.  Improving  the  general  conditions  of  growth 
One  of  the  most  worrying  aspects  of recent economic  trends  in  Europe 
is  the  sharp  decline  in  the  rate of investment.  By  1978  the  volume  of gross fixed 
capita  1 formation i.n the  Commuki.ty. had  expanded  again  to  about  the  &i ze-..racordea. in 
1973; the  annual ·rate of 1nyesW,ent  (gross  fixed  capital  for.wation  M  a  percentage 
of  GOP)  fell  from  22.4%  on  -average  in,the years  from  1964  to  1974  to  21%  on 
average  in  the  years  from  1976  to  1979.  Although  investment  trends  have  varied 
considerably  from  one  Member  Sta-te  to  another  (see A  50), the  prob_lem  is 
urgent  in  all  of  them  since  the  recovery  of rates of investment i~ a basic 
condition  for  restoring  growth,  reducing  unemployment,  renewing  the  structure 
of  the  productive  apparatus  and  protecting  competitivity. 
. ..  I ... - 99  -
This  recovery  will  require determined  efforts, more  arduous  in  some 
countries  than  in others,  to  restore general  conditions  that are  more  conducive 
to  growth,  both  on  the  supply  side  and  the  demand  side: 
(i)  a  general  stable framework  for economic  development,  and  a climate  of 
confidence  such  as  to  encourage  productive  investment;  this means 
reducing  uncertainty about  the  economic  environment  (inflation, exchange-
rate fluctuations,  energy  supply,  etc.)  and  about  the  legal  provisions 
governing  business  activity; 
(ii) steadier wage  trends,  more  consistent with  reducing  inflation rates and 
stabilizing business  profits; over  the  past  ten years,  the  distribution 
of  income  has  become  enormously  distorted  (see  A51,  showing  the  trend 
of  the  share  of wages  in GOP); 
(iii) in  the  field of public  finance,  tax  arrangements  less  likely to  constitute 
a disincentive  to  work  and  investment,  as  well  as  medium-term  stabilization 
of  public  finances;  these  conditions  are  generally  considered  necessary, 
but  situations,  and  opinions  on  how  they  can  be  created  in  practice, differ 
from  country  to  country  and  even  within  countries; 
(iv)  in  the  field of specific policies  (competition  policy,  regional  policy  and 
so  on),  policies that are  no  longer  geared  to  defending  and  maintaining 
out-of-date structures;  here  again,  all  the  member  countries  agree  on  this 
condition  in  p~nciple, but  they  differ widely  as  to  the  rigour with  which 
the  principle should  be  applied  and  as  to  how  the  aim  of a determined 
adjustment  policy  can  be  reconciled with  the  requirements  of social  policy; 
(v)  the  multifarious  problems  of  supplies  and  costs  could,  for  their part,  be 
more  easily solved  once  obstacles  to  growth  have  been  eliminated,  for  demand 
could  then  begin  to  expand  vigorously  once  more,  and  would  indeed  be 
directly stimulated  (for example,  new  demands  would  arise if energy-saving 
and  energy-production  aims  were  achieved).  The  recovery  of  investment  will 
require  not  only  improved  profits  but  also a higher  capacity utilization 
rate and  a favourable  outlook  for  demand;  demand  support  to  boost 
growth  can  also help  to  reduce  the  adjusted  share  of wages  by  raising 
the  rate of  increase  of real  wages;  the  realization of  potential  productivity 
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gains  can  weaken  inflationary pressures,  and  neutralize the  temptation 
to  resort to  defensive  policies;  sectoral  adjustments  and  the  medium-term 
stabilization of  public  finances  are  easier to  achieve.  A Community  approach 
could  help  to  realize potential  demand  in  the  less developed  regions  of 
the  Community,  the  Mediterranean  countries  applying  for membership,  and 
the  developing  cou~1tries
15 .  The  use  of  Community  financial  instruments 
could  be  enlarged  for  the  same  purpose. 
All  these  more  strenuous  efforts that will  be  required  over  the 
next  ten years  to  restore  the  conditions  of more  sustained  growth  along  new 
lines  and  in  pursuit of  new  aims  must  be  actively supported  by  all  economic 
and  social  categories  working  together  (we  enlarge  upon  this point in Chapter  9). 
National  solidarity, moreover,  will  have  to  be  accompanied  by  greater cooperation 
and  solidarity between  nations  so  that national  efforts are  not  only  consistent 
and  convergent,  but  also more  efficient; with  the  introduction of the  EMS,  this 
aspect of  the  problem  is  now  more  than  ever  the  central  concern  of the  Community 
bodies. 
7  .2.  Growth and the restoration of equilibrium to the labour market  during  the  1980s 
Over  the  next  ten years  the  Community  will  have  to  face  the  difficult 
task  of  restoring equilibrium  to  the  labour market. 
If the  Community  is to deal  with  the  rapid  increase  in the  potential 
labour  force  between  now  and  1990,  and  if it is to reduce  unemployment  to a 
more  tolerable  level  (about  2.5%  by  1990),  then  employment  will  have  to  increase 
by  some  0. 7%  to  1%  a year  over  the  next  ten years.  To  i 11 ustrate what  this 
means,  we  note  that if the  trend  towards  shorter working  hours  continues  along 
the  same  lines  as  over  the  past twenty  years  (with  reduction  of  between  0.5% 
and  1%  a year), or  speeds  up  slightly, if growth  rates of close  to  4%  are 
achieved,  and  if hourly  productivity  increases  slightly less  rapidly  (by  about  3% 
to  3.5 %) ,  then  employment  would  expand  at the  rate quoted  above. 
• 
15see  the  Recort  oo7certain Structural  Aspects  of  Growth;  Commission, 
Brussels,  June  19  8. 
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These  developments  are  not  entirely impossible  if the  various 
constraints  on  growth  are  loosened,  but  they  give  rise to  a  number  of questions. 
First,  the  future  trend  of productivity gains  is  the  subject of great 
uncertainty.  Secondly,  even  if they  occur,  unemployment  will  still  be  high 
over  most  of  the  decade.  The  higher  rate of expansion  of the  labour  force 
up  to  1985  calls for a high  growth  rate in  the  early  198~  if there  is to  be 
any  inmediate  improvement  in  unemployment  figures;  but it is in  fact unlikely 
that the  constraints  on  growth  can  be  loosened  far enough  and  fast enough  to 
allow  growth  to  gain  much  impetus  so  soon.  Moreover,  the  gravity of the employ-
ment  problem  and  the  chances  of restoring  vigorous,  job-creating growth  vary 
from  one  Member  State to another,. and  there  is a great risk that regional 
disparities will  become  intolerable. 
The  Community  must  therefore  be  ready  to  fight any  tendency  towards 
protectionist measures  among  the  Member  States; it must  also explore  all  possible 
ways  of restoring  balance  on  the  labour  market  without endangering  the  restoration 
of major  aggregate  equilibria,  and  the  cohesion  of  the  Community. 
Data  concerning  labour  productivity should  be  interpreted very 
cautiously,  since gains  are  difficult to  assess  and  figures  are  not  always 
internationally comparable.  However,  there  is no  doubt  that since 1973,  hourly 
productivity and  per  capita  productivity have  been  increasing at a much  slower 
rate  than  before  in  Europe  and  in  most  of  the  other industrialized countries. 
The  loss  of momentum,  which  is apparent  even  in  the  figures  adjusted  for cvr.lical 
variations,  contrasts  sharply with  the  rapid  growth  of  productivityob$&rved 
&arli~r, par~\_cuJarly in the  industrial  sector  (s&e  A5£  an<h53). 
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An  analysis  of  past  productivity  trends  and  their causes  is not  much 
help  towards  predicting  the  underlying  trend  of  labour  productivity over  the 
next  ten  years. 
But  it may  reasonably  be  expected  that the  long-run  rates of gain  observed 
over  the  period  from  1960  to  1973  will  not  be  restored  in  the  foreseeable  future 
for  various  reasons,  including:  the  steady  rise of capital-output ratios 
increase  in  energy  costs;  the  possible  lasting slackness  of foreign  trade;  the 
___ .......__ 
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weakening  of  the  favourable  effects on  structures of transfers associated with 
•ovement  from  the  land  (except  in  Ireland,  Italy, Greece  and  the  other  two 
potential  member  countries);  the  development  of  the  services  sector, where 
productivity gains  are  on  average  lower  than  elsewhere;  measures  to  improve 
living  and  working  environments;  and  the  problems  of  removing  administrative, 
institutional  and  social  obstacles  to  the  geographical  and  occupational 
mobility of  labour. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  long-term  decline  in  productivity gains  will  not 
be  too  sharp,  for  a  number  of  factors  will  help  to  boost  productivity:  for 
example,  the  improvement  in  training  and  qualifications of  thosearriving on 
the  labour  market,  or  the  effects of introducing micro-electronic systems,  or 
greater automation,  in  services  branches.  Moreover,  since  there  has  been  a 
certain amount  of  unused  production  capacity  in  industry for  some  time,  there 
are  still  reserves  of  productivity that could  be  mobilized  over  the  next  few 
years. 
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Europe  is,  in fact,  suffering  from  the  productivity paradox; 
productivity gains  are  not  only  the  basis  for  improved  well-being,  social  progress 
and  international  competitivity,  but  also  a factor of declining  employment  when 
aggregate  growth  does  not  keep  up  with  the  underlying  trend  of  productivity gains 
and  with  population  growth.  In  the  past few  years,  the  adverse  aspects  of 
productivity gains  have  been  most  influential, and  there  could  be  pressure  in  some 
countries  to  slow  down  the  rate of  increase  in  the  apparent  productivity of  labour 
by  artificial means,  in the  hope  of  creating extra jobs  or  delaying  the  reduction 
in  employment  in  some  branches.  The  artificial  means  used  could  include  defensive 
measures  to  delay  required  adjustments  and  slow  down  innovation,  or  to  divorce 
sectors  protected  from  international  competition  (particularly the  public  sector) 
from  the  general  trend.  The  long-term  dangers  of  this approach  for  the  economy 
should  not  be  ignored,  nor  its short-term dangers  for  economic  equilibria, if its 
implications  for  the  expansion  and  distribution of  incomes  are  not  fully recognized. 
The  basic  requirements  for  incomes  should  be  constantly borne  in mind  in  the  context 
of  a two-fold  form  of  development  in  European  societies, where  a highly  competitive 
exporting  sector responsible  for  covering  necessary  imports  would  coexist with 
a protected  sector that could  be  extended  so  as  to  provide  new  jobs.  These 
requirements  should  also  be  borne  in  mind  if working  hours  are  reduced  so  as  to 
share  out  existing work. 
7.2.2.  The  reduction  of working  hours 
A lasting discrepancy  between  available labour  resources  and  the 
volume  of  demand  for  labour  may  provoke  other  types  of  intervention  in  the 
labour  market.  The  most  radical  intervention,  which  is questionable  for social 
reasons,  consists  in  measures  to  exclude  (or  discourage)  certain categories  of 
potential  workers.  These  measures  include  lowering  the  compu~sory retirement 
age,  discouraging  women  from  working,  restricting immigration,  and  setting a 
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statutory school-leaving  age  higher  than  that required  by  educational  considerations. 
The  development  of  insecure  forms  of  employment  (temporary  employment,  employment 
on  fixed-term  contracts, moonlighting  and  so  on),  is a second  type  of reaction 
to  a situation of  slow  and  uncertain  growth,  and  of  lasting underemployment.  These 
forms  of  employment  have  been  spreading  recently,  and  will  continue  to  do  so  as 
long  as  the  situation described  above  continues  to  exist.  They  are  very  difficult 
to  control  administratively or  legally,  and  they  raise the  question  of  more 
efficient management  of  the  labour market. 
The  third major  method  of adjusting  the  labour  market  involves  changes 
in  how  work  is  shared  out  and  a more  rapid  reduction  in working  hours.  Working 
hours  (in the  broadest  sense,  i.e.  covering  the  working  week,  the  working  year, 
short-time  work  and  part-time work)  have  decreased  considerably  over  the  past 
few  years  (see  A54  and  55).  The  process  was  not  steady;  it jerked  along  as  a 
function  of wage  negotiations  and  cyclical  variations  in employment.  In  general, 
the  reduction  in  working  time  seems  to  have  pushed  hourly  labour  productivity 
upwards.  Labour  productivity gains  in manufacturing  industry  have  been  greatest 
where  working  hours  declined  most  rapidly  {Italy, the  Netherlands,  Belgium),  and 
smallest  where  they  declined  least rapidly  {the  United  Kingdom). 
Empirical  studies  of  the  relation between  shorter working  hours  and 
greater productivity  seem  to  show  that a  reduction  in  working  hours  entailed 
in  relatively equal  shares  an  increase  in  productivity and  an  increase  in 
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These  empirical  obs_ervations  illustrate short-term  relations  in  the 
past, when  the  growth  situation was  different,  labour  was  scarce and  capital 
intensity was  high;  they  cannot  therefore  be  used  directly to  assess  the  long-
term  repercussions  of  future  reductions  in working  hours.  Indeed,  the  whole 
question  has  changed,  for  the  reduction  of working  hours  at a considerably faster 
rate  is  now  seen  as  a means  of  restoring  balance  to  the  labour  market  and  not, 
as  in  the  past,  as  a means  of  sharing  out  productivity gains,  possible  only 
because  productivity gains  were  large  and  real  incomes  were  rising fast. 
The  choice  between  shorter working  hours  and  higher wages,  i.e.  the 
question  of  wage  compensation  for  shorter working  hours,  is  the  crux  of  the 
matter.  The  problem  is all  the  more  difficult as  output,  and  thus  national  income, 
grows  more  slowly. 
A reduction  in  working  hours,  and  a consequent  redistribution of 
available employment,  cannot  solve  all  the  problems  of employment.  However,  under 
certain conditions,  they  might  help  to  restore full  employment  during  the  period 
when  growth,  although  gaining  momentum,  is not  yet fast enough  in  spite of 
considerable  efforts,  and  when  the  labour  force  is increasing  rapidly. 
However,  the  main  point at issue  over  the  next  few  decades  will  be 
the  social  aspect  of  reduced  working  hours,  the  opportunities  the  reduction  will 
afford,  the  requirements  it will  create, and  the  consequences  it will  have  for 
the  economic  and  social  development  of  European  societies.16 
16see  the  Commission  Communication  to  the  Council  on  Worksharing,  EEC, 
Brussels,  May  1979;  and  for example,  "le  temps  libre, espoir d'un  nouveau 
developpement"  and  conclusion  to  part 1 of the  report  by  Mr  Danzin  "Science 
et Renaissance  de  l'Europe
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CHAPTER  8 
SECTORAL  ADJUSTMENT 
Throughout  this study,  the  major  problem  has  been  how  to  draw  general 
conclusions  from  a mass  of  heterogeneous  information  about  situations and 
attitudes;  this  problem  ·is  perhaps  most  acute  in  connection  with  the  study  of 
sectoral  change:  not  only  do  national  economies  differ, not  only  do  sectors 
differ,  but  there  are  even  differences  within  economies  and  sectors,  because 
firms  are  so  different in  size,  legal  status, organization  and  working  methods. 
The  risk of  over-generalization or  excessively detailed conclusions  is 
all  the  greater as  so  little statistical  information  is available about  suitable 
aggregates  that would  make  it possible  to  draw  general  conclusions  without 
betraying  reality by  oversimplifying  a  complex  and  varied  situation. 
These  problems  are  acute  in  the  study  of the  industrial  or  the  services 
sector;  they  become  even  more  so  in  the  study  of  interaction between  sectors  in 
an  industrial  economy;  for  there  are  increasingly  complex  relations  between  the 
various  branches  of  production,  and  they  make  it very  difficult and  even  hazardous 
to  interpret data  about  sectoral  changes. 
After  summarizing  the  outlook  for  adjustment  in  European  agriculture,  this 
chapter  concentrates  on  the  problems  of adjustment  in manufacturing  industry.  As 
for  the  services  sector, it was  not  thought  feasible, at the  present stage of 
work  being  carried out  by  Commission  departments,  to  add  any  further comments 
or  questions  to  those  found  elsewhere  in this report, for  example  on  the  chapters 
dealing  with  technology,  or  the  trends  of  needs  and  private demand. 
The  services  sector is preponderant  in  the  Community  economies:  it represents 
about  50%  of  gross  va 1  ue  added,  and  employs  55%  of  the  1  abour  force.  Its 
relative  importance,  particularly in the  creation of  jobs,  has  increased  even 
further with  the  decline  in  industrial  expansion  of  the  past few  years.  Indeed, 
one  of  the  major  problems  of the  next  decade  is estimating  how  far it can  go 
on  playing  this crucial  role;  for  new  technologies  are  being  introduced  that will 
have  far-reaching  effects  in  a  number  of service activities. 
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Some  of  the  basic  factors  that might  affect the  outlook  for  the 
development  of  service activities supplying  private consumer  demand  {about 
40%  of output  is consumed  by  households)  have  already  been  mentioned:  the  problems 
of  public  financing  and  organization;  the  production  of services  by  households 
for  their own  consumption,  with  the  help  of  consumer  durables;  the  important 
effects of a radical  change  in  lifestyles if the  growth  rate went  on  slowing 
down  and  working  time  decreased  substantially,  and  so  on. 
However,  there  is a fundamental  point  that should  be  made~ in  the  larger 
European  countries,  40%  to  50%  of  the  output of services  is used  as  inputs 
for  other  productive  activities, particularly industrial  activities.  The  percentage 
is even  as  high  as  60%  to  90%  for  some  types  of  service,  but  it varies  from 
country  to  country.  In  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany,  for  example,  where  the 
services  sector is less developed  than  elsewhere  in  the  Community,  the  proportion 
of  output  used  for  intermediate  consumption  is higher  than  in any  other country. 
The  opposite  is true of  Italy and  the  United  Kingdom,  where  the  output of a 
highly  developed  services  sector mainly  supplies  final  demand.  It would  be  difficult 
not  to  see  some  link  between  these  features  and  the  respective  performance  of 
the  productive  apparatus  in  the  three  countries mentioned. 
The  development  of  the  services  sector should  be  regarded  not  only  as  the 
corollary of  a shift in  private demand  and  social  needs,  but  also, and  perhaps 
more,  as  the  necessary  condition  for  the  smooth  functioning  of  an  economy 
characterized  by  a very  fine division of  labour  and  very  advanced  technology, 
in  which  industry can  rely on  an  efficient services  sector. - 108  -
8.1.  European  agriculture  in  the  1980s: the  outlook  and  the  problems 
The  relative economic  importance  of  the  agricultural  sector will  continue 
to  decline  in  the  1980s.  Agricultural  output accounts  for  7%  of  GDP  in the 
future  Community  of  Twelve  at the  moment;  by  1990  this  share will  probably  have 
declined  to  about  4%  or  5%. 
However,  the  decline  in  the  relative importance  of  the  agricultural 
sector will  be  offset by  an  increase  in  the  importance  of  branches  that supply 
agricultural  inputs  (equipment,  fertilizers  and  so  on)  or  process  agricultural 
products;  two-thirds  of agricultural  output  is already  used  as  inputs  in  these 
processing  industries.  The  relative importance  of  the  agro-food  complex  made 
up  of  the  agricultural  sector and  the  industries supplying  its inputs  and 
consuming  its outputs  should  therefore remain  fairly stable, accounting  altogether 
for  about  15%  of  G  DP. 
8.1.1.  The  development  of agricultural  structures 
The  agricultural  labour  force  too  will  continue  to  decline: in  1977, 
8 300  000  people  were  occupied  in  agriculture  in  the  Community  of Nine,  and 
13  600  000  in  the  future  Community  of Twelve;  the~e figures  represent respectively 
8%  and  11%  of  the  tota  1  1  abour  force.  The  future  rate of decline  wi 11  depend 
mainly  on  general  economic  trends,  the  trend  of agricultural  incomes  and  the 
age  structure of  the  agricultural  labour  force. 
By  1990,  the  agricultural  labour  force  in  the  Community  of Nine 
may  have  decreased  by  almost  three million; it would  thus  represent  less  than  5% 
of  the  total  labour  force  by  the  end  of the  next  decade.  The  reduction will  be 
even  greater  in  the  Community  of Twelve;  although  it is difficult to estimate 
the  reduction  exactly, it is probable  that some  three  and  a  half million  to 
six million  people  will  leave  the  agricultural  sector during  the  1980s. 
The  figure  of three and  a  half million corresponds  very  broadly  to 
the  f~gure for retirement from  the  agricultural  sector:  agricultural  workers 
in  the  Community  are  often middle-aged.  In  1975,  44%  of farmers  and  25%  of all 
those  occupied  in  agriculture  in  the  Community  of Nine  were  over  55.  In  view  of 
the  general  employment  problem  in  the  European  economies,  the  rate of  reduction 
in  the  number  of  workers  and  the  rate of  labour  productivity gains  in agriculture 
will  depend  closely on  the  rate of  retirement over  the  next  few  years.  Retirements, 
in  their turn, will  depend  mainly  on  the  incentives  and  on  expectations  of  income . 
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The  number  of  farms  should  also  continue  to de_cl i ne 
over  the  next  ten  years (from  9 million  in  1975  to  6.6 million  in  1990 
in  the  Community  of Twelve),  while  their average  area  should  continue  to  increase 
{from  17.2  hectares  to  24  hectares  in  the  Community  of  Nine),  with  production 
increasingly concentratedin medium-sized  and  large  farms.  Moreover, 
part-time activity in  the  agricultural  sector could  become  more  widespread 
(in  1975,  64%  of farmers  worked  part time,  and  two-thirds  of  these  part-time 
workers  devoted  less  than  50%  of their total  working  time  to  agriculture), 
because  it is difficult to  leave  agriculture and  find  a full-time  job  elsewhere. 
The  trend  towards  part-time  work  in  agriculture illustrates once  more  the 
importance  of the  general  problem  of  job-creation in  the  European  economies. 
It should  also  encourage  the  development  of  complementary  activities in  local 
industry  and  sidelines such  as  tourist activities in rural  areas,  and  services. 
Agricultural  workers  will  also  be  led  to  diversify their occupations  as  it 
becomes  more  difficult to  find  outlets for  some  of  the  traditional  products 
of  the  agricultural  sector  in excessively  large  supply. 
8.1.2.  ~e combination  of  factors  of  production  and  increased  costs 
Operating  costs  will  most  probably  increase  substantially.  Purchase 
prices  and  rents  for  agricultural  land  will  increase steadily because  of more 
intensive  production methods,  inflation and  the  pressure  of demand  for  land  in 
general  (i.e.  for  non-agricultural  purposes),  except  in  sparsely-populated 
areas  with  poor  infrastructure, where  there will  be  little demand  of this  type. 
High  rates of  labour  productivity may  be  achieved  in  these  areas  by  the  use  of 
extensive  agricultural  methods  quite different from  the  industrial  methods  used 
elsewhere. 
Agricultural  activity is becoming  increasingly capital  intensive; 
the  ratio of gross  fixed  capital  formation  to  value  added  has  increased  rapidly 
over  the  1  as t  ten  years.  It amounted  to  between  20%  and  36%  in  1977  in the 
Member  States for  which  data  are  available,  compared  with  between  15%  and 
27%  in  1970.  In  many  Member  States  the  ratio in  agriculture is close  to  that 
of  the  economy  as  a whole  - and  it is even  higher  in  some.  Capital  intensity 
in  agriculture will  probably  continue  to  increase  as  greater productivity gains 
are  sought,  and  the  financial  costs  of  operating  could  thus  become  heavier . 
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Europe•s  agricultural  sector is a  large  consumer  of  fertilizers, 
chemical  products  and,  directly or  indirectly, energy;  it will  therefore  suffer 
from  rising energy  prices.  Energy-saving  production  techniques  might  develop 
in  agriculture  precisely because  of the  high  cost of oil  and  energy. 
Over  the  next  ten  years, more  suitable pricing  policies will  have 
to  be  found  for  products  that are  in  excessively  large  supply;  one  of  the major 
problems  facing  the  agricultural  sector will  be  that of finding  the  most  efficient 
combination  of  production  factors,  and  this will  raise the  question  how  far 
agricultural  methods  can  be  made  more  intensive. 
8.1.3.  Prices  policy, gluts  and  the  costs  of  the  CAP 
In  view  of  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  any  structural 
surplus  in a  Community  product  should  lead  to  a  cautious  price  policy;  the 
problem  of  agricultural  gluts  is likely to  become  more  serious, especially when 
the  Community  is enlarged. 
The  Community  system  of  organization of agricultural  markets  has 
a  threefold  purpose:  to  stabilize markets;  to ensure  that the  standard  of living 
of  agricultural  workers  is fair;  to  encourage  the  improvement  of agricultural 
structures  and  conditions  of production.  The  achievement  of this  threefold  purpose 
will  continue  to give  rise to  a  number  of difficulties. 
First, monetary compensatory amounts  (MCAs)  are inconsistent with the 
principle of a single price. It is proposed to phase MCAs  out gradually in the framework 
of  the  EMS,  which  has  already  proved  that it can  effectively cushion  sudden  and 
unforeseen  monetary  fluctuations;  the  trend  of exchange  rates since  the  EMS  was 
set up  has  already  reduced  the  problem  of  MCAs,  so  that when  remaining  MCAs  are 
phased  out,  the  upward  pressure  on  prices  in  national  currencies  should  not  be 
too  strong.  However,  agricultural  prices will  be  subject to  pressure  when  Greek, 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  agricultural  prices  adjust to  the  Community  level. 
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The  discontinuation of  MCAs,  with  the  various  changes  it will 
lead  to  in  prices  expressed  in  national  currencies,  should  stimulate structural 
reform  in  strong-currency  Member  States, where  MCAs  are  positive,  and  particularly 
in  their less-favoured  regions.  In  States  where  MCAs  are  negative,  prices  might 
rise,  thus  enabling  less-favoured  regions  to  improve  their situation. 
However,  regional  imbalances  may  well  be  aggravated,  particularly 
after enlargement,  by  the  erosion  of agricultural  profit margins  due  to  increased 
costs  combined  with  a restrictive prices  policy.  This  is a major  dilemma  for  the 
CAP.  Mountainous  regions  and  other  less-favoured  areas  will  be  hardest hit; in 
the  Community  of  Nine  they  account  for  34  million  hectares,  or  one-third of  the 
utilized agricultural  area,  and  contain  one-sixth  of  the  Community  stock  of dairy 
cows.  Any  efforts to  improveagric~ltur~l structures may  conflict with  the  desire 
to  maintain  population  density and  adequate  infrastructures  in  the  less-favoured 
regions.  These  regions  may  be  helped  by  incomes  transfers  and  special  structural 
measures  to  improve  conditions  of  production;  but  other  Community  regions  will 
obviously  have  to  bear  the  burden  of  the  increased  costs  such  measures  would 
involve,  as  well  as  those  due  to  the persistent imbalances  on  certain markets 
(particularly the  milk  market). 
The  effort to  be  made  to  assist the  less-favoured  regions  and, 
if it is  not  controlled,  the  continuous  tendency  for  Community  agricultural 
production  to  outstrip demand  might  well  lead  in  the  1980s  to  a growth  of 
public  expenditure  on  agriculture, at a  time  when  we  are  faced  with  the 
question  of  how  the  Community•s  own  resources  will  develop.  It may  be  necessary 
to  require  producers  to  shoulder  a greater share  of the  growing  financial  cost 
of  managing  the  markets  with  structural  surpluses,  in  the  form  of  a co-
responsibility  levy  which  would  be  tailored to  the  problems  of  the  less-favoured 
farms  and  regions. 
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8.2.  Sectoral  adjustment  in  the  Community•s  industry 
8.2.1.  The  two  lessons  to  be  learned  from  recent developments 
The  two  major  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from  a study  of  the  problems 
of  manufacturing  industry  in  the  Community  are first,  that this sector is  less able 
than  before  to  create  new  jobs  and  stand  up  to  international  competition,  and 
secondly,  that disparities  between  the  Member  States  are  growing  in  terms  of  the 
adjustment  of  their industrial  apparatus17. 
Until  1974,  the  persistent large  structural  disparities between  the 
Member  States were  to  some  extent concealed  by  vigorous  growth  in the  Community 
(except  in  the  United  Kingdom),  and  the  gradual  tendency  of  the  structures of 
consumption,  foreign  trade  and  production  to  grow  closer  together.  The  disparities 
are  deeply  rooted  in  the  economic  and  social  histories of  the  countries  concerned, 
and  they  affect in  particular the  maturity of  the  productive  apparatus,  the 
adaptability of  employment  and  production  structures,  the  extent of openness  to 
the  outside world  and  the  choice  of  specialization,  the  extent,  purpose  and 
efficiency of  industrial  investment,  the  economic  and  social  distribution of 
income,  and  so  on.  They  have  become  more  apparent  and  wider  since  the  early 1970s, 
as  a result of  inflationary disturbance,  the  higher  cost of  energy,  the  collapse 
of the  international  monetary  system,  and  the  growing  differences  in  economic 
behaviour  and  in  econon1ic  policies during  this  troubled  period. 
All  the  Member  States suffered  from  slower  growth,  slack  investment 
and  rising unemployment  at first, but differences  between  them  grew  wider  at the level 
of nominal  and  monetary  trends  (wage  costs,  prices,  exchange  rates,  and  so  on).  These 
differences  were  caused  and  maintained  by  differences  in  adjustment  policies 
and  adaptation  processes.  They  are  now  reflected  in  economic  results,  and  in 
the  capacity  of  the  different countries  to  deal  with  the  structural  trends  of  the 
next  ten  years. 
In  particular, manufacturing  industry throughout  the  Community 
has  been  deeply  affected  by  theslowdown  in  growth,  and  by  the  increasing  pressure 
of foreign  competition. 
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The  hardest hit branches  have  been  those  most  heavily  dependent  on  domestic 
demand,  and  in  particular most  of  the  activities producing  intermediate  goods 
and  current consumption  goods,  as  well  as  building.  However,  the  industries 
that managed  to  turn  increasingly  towards  foreign  markets  (chemicals  and  especially 
investment  goods)  obtained  better results, although  still  not  as  good  as  in 
earlier years. 
The  general  description of  the  development  of  industrial  activity 
in  the  Community  over  the  past few  years  should  take  into account  not  only  these 
broad  general  features,  but  also  the  disparities  between  Member  States.  In  the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  and  to  a  lesser extent in  France  and  Italy, several 
industrial  branches  succeeded  in  recovering  fairly well  and  fairly rapidly after 
the  first shock  of  the  recession.  In  Great  Britain, however,  industrial  production 
generally declined  from  1973  to  1977  in  all  the  main  branches  of activity except 
chemicals,  office machinery,  data  processing  and  precision machinery. 
These  differences c o:n b  i ne  with  those  described  in Chapter  2, 
concerning  the  adjustment  of  the  productive  apparatus  in  the  Member  States  to 
the  new  conditions  of  international  competition.  Some  of  the  Member  States  lost 
no  time  in obeying  the  joint demands  of  monetary  discipline, a  thorough  reform 
of  their economy,  and  an  adaptation  to  the  changes  affecting  international 
competition.  Thus,  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany  gained  a  lead  over  all  its 
partners  by  adjusting its production  structures more  quickly  and  improving 
the  general  efficiency of  its productive  system;  its economic  performance  since 
1977  shows  that it managed  better than  its partners  to  counter  and  overcome  the 
effects of  the  crisis. The  smaller  European  countries  that tried to  take  similar 
action were  less  successful;  although  obviously  their capacity to  react and  to 
adjust autonomously  is  limited  by  their size.  Other  Member  States  allowed  their 
currencies  to  depreciate steadily, and  thus  managed  to  avoid  the  most  pressing 
constraints of  international  competition  for  a certain time,  and  to  delay  the 
required  macro-economic  and  sectoral  adjustments;  but  these  adjustments  are 
consequently  all  the  more  difficult and  costly  now.  Countries  like France 
fo 11 owed  the  mid d 1 e  path, and  the  trend  there  is less well-defined; 
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not  insignificant results  in  certain advanced  technology  sectors  (the  nuclear, 
aeronautics  and  electronics  branches)  are  combined  with  some  delay  in  adapting 
other  hi9hly  threatened  activities  (steel,  textiles, etc.). 
The  Community  Member  States  are  entering  the  new  decade  with  an 
industrial  apparatus  that combines  strengths with  weaknesses  in  varying  degrees; 
the  growing  inconsistencies  and  disparities  between  them  raise a major  problem  of 
Community  cohesion. 
8.2.2.  Industrial  adjustment  in  Europe  in  the  1980s18 
The  next  ten  years  will  certainly be  dtfficult for  European 
industry. 
Some  sectors,  such  as  steel, textiles  and  clothing,  are  already 
experiencing  serious  problems  because  domestic  and  international  demand  has 
slackened  as  a result of slow  growth,  inadequate  to ensure  the  full  employment 
of  available  capacity,  and  because  the  comparative  advantage  of Europe  for  some 
activities  has  narrowed  or  even  disappeared.  But  the  problems  are  not  always 
the  same  for  all  these  sectors;  they  depend  on  the  life of equipment,  the 
capital  intensity of  production,  the  regional  or  economic  concentration of the 
activity,  the  extent to  which  output  is diversified,  the  employment  structure, 
and  so  on.  Other  sectors,  such  as  motor  vehicles  and  chemicals,  may  come  under 
pressure  in  the  next  few  years  to  reorganize  production  structures  because  of 
the  development  of the  world  market  and  the  new  conditions  of international 
competition. 
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But  although  it is often difficult, for social,  regional  ot· 
economic  reasons,  for  the  traditional  sectors  to  respond  to  pressure  to  adjust 
created  by  changes  in  the  economic  environment,  these  changes  do  supply  enormous 
development  potential  to  a  large  fraction  of European  industry  if only  the 
branches  concerned  manage  to  take  advantage  of  the  opportunities.  The  equipment 
goods  industry  is an  example,  as  are  chemicals  and  pharmaceutical  products, 
the  agro-food  industry,  some  building materials,  and  precision  instruments  for 
households,  among  others. 
Three  main  factors  will  determine  the  sectoral  adjustments  in 
European  industry over  the  next  ten years. 
(a)  Changes  in  the  structure of  demand 
Many  studies  have  shown  that domestic  and  international  demand 
has  changed  considerably  in  Europe  since  1974  for  reasons  that are  not  basically 
connected  with  the  recession,  but  rather with  permanent  factors. 
The  most  important  change  for  the  next  ten  years  will  probably 
be  the  increase  in  the  relative price of energy,  which  should  lead  to a  radical 
modification  in  the  structure of demand.  It will  lead  to  a  change  in  the  size 
and  nature  of  investment  in  the  energy  sector,  increase  the  demand  for  energy-
saving  equipment  that allows  more  rational  use  of energy  and  of  fuel  as  a 
raw  material,  and  will  affect consumption  structures. 
Other  factors  too  may  or  will  significantly affect the  structure 
of  demand:  the  development  of  new  foreign  outlets; the  recovery  of  investment 
required  to  restore sustained growth  and  carry  out  the  conversion  operations 
which  are  essential;  the  introduction  of  new  technologies,  and  so  on . 
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{b)  The  pressure of foreign  competition 
One  of the  causes,  and  one  of  the  symptoms,  of  European  industry•s 
weaker  international  position  is the  deterioration of  competitivity in a  number 
of sectors  relative to  the  United  States  and  Japan  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  the 
newly  industrialized countries  on  the  other. 
It is usual  in  this context to  distinguish  between  the  products 
that are  relatively standardized,  which  compete  principally in  terms  of price, 
and  the  products  for  which  factors  such  as  technology,  specific qualities, 
reliability and  after-sales service  play as  important  a role as  the  price in 
competitive  relations.  The  first category  comprises  a wide  range  of  European 
industrial  output:  mass-produced  inputs  such  as  steel, basic  chemicals,  cement, 
paper  pulp  and  so  on;  much  of  the  textiles and  clothing  industry;  the  down-
market  range  of  the  car  industry  and  ccmooercial  vehicles,  part of  the  ship-
building industry,  and  so  on. 
The  deterioration in  competitivity of  European  industry for  all 
these  products  is a threat, but  the  threat is more  serious  in  some  sectors  and 
some  Member  States  than  in others,  as  we  have  already  shown.  Europe•s  competitive 
position will  be  mainly  affected  in  the  next  few  years  by: 
(i)  The  trend  of the  relative exchange  rate of  the  dollar 
against the  European  currencies :  this may  affect price-
competitivity in  many  industrial  sectors  in  the  Community, 
particularly in  Italy, Great  Britain and  Ireland,  but  also 
in  France  and  in  Belgium. 
(ii) The  level  of wages:  several  Member  States  have  wage  levels 
among  the  highest  in  the  world.  This  situation can  be 
maintained  in  the  long  term  only  if productivity in  the 
economies  concerned  is also  higher  than  that in  their 
main  competitors.  Often,  it is not;  the  consequences  of  this 
are  already  making  themselves  felt in  sectors where  countries 
with  low  wage  levels  are  in~easing their output. 
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(iii) The  development  of on-the-spot  processing  in  countries 
producing  oil  and  raw  materials, which  can  help  their 
own  processing  industry by  applying  double  pricing.  This 
factor will  probably  affect the  output  of oil  products  over 
the  next  few  years  (fertilizers, basic chemicals,  and  even 
synthetic fibres), which  should  develop  in  the  oil-producing 
areas.  European  output of standard  quality steel  will  also 
be  under  increasing  pressure  from  the  establishment of  new 
plants  near  the  richest mines  or  near  gas  fields which  make 
it possible  to  carry out  preliminary  processing  immediately. 
It may  seem  surprising at first sight that the  European  industries 
are  potentially so  vulnerable  to  international  price competition  when  they  have 
concentrated  on  developing  products  with  a high  technology  input.  But  the  distinction 
between  price  competition  and  competition  based  on  a technological  lead  is neither 
absolute  nor  immutable;  technologies  travel  fast,  and  a  technological  lead  is 
always  temporary.  Moreover,  it may  be  that European  finms  are  offering  products 
of  a quality and  price higher  than  their customers  want. 
~)  Technological  competition 
This report  has  already  referred several  times  to  the  problems 
posed  to  Europe  by  technological  competition:  the  lead  of the  USA  (in computers, 
telecommunications,  aerospace,.micro-electronics  and  so  on),  and  that of Japan 
(in applied  electronics,  particularly industrial machine-tools  and  domestic 
equipment)  in  some  key  sectors;  their occupation  of new  markets  for  products  in 
these  sectors  where  European  industry  is  lagging  behind;  the  significant disparities 
between  Member  States'  technological  capacities, with  German  industry generally 
in  the  lead,  and  one  or  two  promising  sectors  in  France  and  Great  Britain;  the 
importance  of  diffusing  new  technologies  throughout  the  entire productive  system 
so  as  to  improve  the  performance  of  the  mass ... production  sectors, which  are,  or 
soon  will  be,  threatened  by  increasing  international  competition. 
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The  priority aim  over  the  next  ten years  must  be  to  respond  to 
the  requirements  of modern  technology  so  that European  industry  can  compete 
with  the  other  main  industrialized producers  and  catch  up  with  them  in  the 
advanced  technology  branches;  this would  boost  European  equipment  goods 
industries.  But,  as  the  example  of  the  machine-tool  sector shows,  a special 
effort will  be  required  in  the  telematics  sector, where  progress  is required 
simultaneously  in  the  three  industrial  activities  (telecommunications,  data-
processing  and  components)  and  the  services  (data  banks)  that this sector 
comprises. 
Europe•s  aim  for  1990  should  be  to  conquer  about  one-third of 
the  world  market;  this means  that Europe  should  not  only  cover  its own  needs, 
but  also gain  appreciable  shares  on  non-Community  markets. 
This  is an  ambitious  aim,  particularly where  data-processing 
(computers,  peripherals  and  mini-processors)  and  advanced  components  (micro-
processors)  are  concerned.  European  industry•s  share  in world  output  is  now  only 
16 % and  10%  respectively for  these  two  branches. 
In  the  field of  components,  Europe's  backwardness  is worrying; 
the  Community  represents  25%  of  booming  world  demand  for  products  with  varied 
and  widespread  uses  in  the  car  industry, machine  tools, electrical  household 
equipment,  precision  instruments  and  so  on. 
If the  Community  allows  Japan  and  the  United  States virtually 
to  monopolize  production,  many  industrial  sectors  vital  to  its future will 
become  technologically dependent.  It is therefore essential  to create conditions 
to  encourage  European  industrialists to  produce  high-technology  components 
(highly  integrated circuits, rapid  circuits, etc.), as  well  as  standard 
components  so  that the  cost of  research  into extremely  efficient circuits may 
be  borne. 
Wheretelecommunications  are  concerned,  the  challenge  is easier to 
take  up,  for  European  industry already  supplies  30%  of world  output,  and 
European  demand  represents  about  the  same  percentage  of a world  market  that should 
double  in  the  next  ten years.  Here  again,  however,  European  firms  are  up  against 
strong  competition  from  the  United  States; 
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the  three  1 ar g e s t  US  firms  control  between  them  42%  of  the  wo~"ld 
telecommunications_~arket, while  the  five  largest European  producers  account 
for  only  21%.  Moreover,  the  introduction of  a  new  technology  in  which  data-
processing  plays  an  essential  role will  certainly raise financing  problems 
because  of  the  volume  of investment  required,  as  well  as  serious  employment 
problems  due  to  the  lack  of  suitably qualified  labour  to  produce  and  use  the 
new  generation  of  equipment. 
If European  telematics  are  to  catch  up  with  their main  competitors19 , 
and,  indeed,  if promising  sectors  are  to  expand  and  declining  sectors  to  be 
reorganized,  all  the  potential  forces  of  the  European  structure must  be  mobilized. 
8.2.3.  The  need  for  better coordinated  approaches  within  the  Community 
The  first potential  force  lies  in  the  existence  of  a market  as 
large as  that of  the  United  States.  Unfortunately,  the  Community  market  is  too 
often  broken  up  by  rules  or  technical  provisions  and  national  monopolies;  the 
resulting  barriers are  not  conducive  to  the  development  of major  projects. 
The  unification of  the  European  market  does  not,  however,  mean 
the  creation of  a  closed market,  but  rather a  concerted  market  in which  the 
member  countries  adopt  a  joint attitude to  the  setting up  of  international  norms 
or  standards,  and  to  trade  negotiations~with the  rest of  the  world.  But  an  open 
policy  on  international  cooperation  should  not  prevent  the  Community-from 
protecting  infant industries when  necessary. 
Another  means  of action  can  be  provided  by  agreements  about 
national  government  orders  for  large  infrastructure projects  or  new  products 
and  services.  Public  contracts  are  extremely  important,  their repercussions 
may  determine  the  development  of a  given  sector,  and  public  intervention is 
generally made  in  the  same  fields;  there  is  thus  ample  justification for 
en 1  argi ng  government  i nvi ta  ti  ons  to  tender  to  the  enti  r·e  Community,  so  that their 
potential  spill-over effects  can  be  amplified,  and  economies  of  scale obtained . 
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The  Community  coordination  of  public  orders,  national  development 
programmes  and  applied  research  projects must,  above  all,  be  extremely  flexible. 
There  is  no  need  for  all  programmes  of  purely  local  interest to  be  discussed 
at Community  level,  nor  for  systematic  negotiations  between  the  Nine  (and  later 
the  Twelve);  but  agreements  between  groups  of  Member  States  should  be  supported 
if they  are  intended  to  improve  Europe's  industrial  competitivity.  The  Airbus 
industry experiment,  in which  four  Member  States  cooperated,  is a  good  example 
of what  can  be  achieved. 
'More  fundamentally, the sea  1  e of the problems facing Europeali industry at 
tne moment  calls for  greater coordination  and  solidarity between  the  Member  States, 
so  that disparities  in  the  scope  and  rapidity of adjustment  processes,  which  have 
appeared  in  recent years,  do  not  grow  wider  and  endanger  the  entire Community 
structure.  The  introduction of  the  EMS  is a  step  in the  right direction:  it 
involves  monetary  discipline,  and  should  therefore  contribute to  the  structural 
adjustments  that are  essential  to  improving  competitivity;  it involves  financial 
solidarity with  the  less  prosperous  Member  States,  and  should  therefore contribute 
to  reducing  the  widest  structural  disparities.  But  it cannot  work  smoothly  unless 
economic  policies  and  performances  converge,  and  this  is still  a  problem. 
At  all  events,  "some  countries will  have  to  make  large  industrial 
adjustments;  the  present  international  division  of  labour  is a  source  of 
pressures;  some  sectors  are  in  difficulty in  all  the  Europea-n  economies.  Much 
thought will  therefore  be  needed  at European  level  to  find  a  consistent line 
for  European  a-nd  nation  a  1 sector  a  1 industria  1 po 1  i c  i es. 
11  20 
Moreover,  the  Community  must  have  coherent  aims  and  arrangements  for  industrial 
policies  and  external  trade  policies.  This  raises  the  problem  of  an  acceptable 
international  division of  labour,  compatible  with  the  interests of  both  the 
industrialized and  the  developing  countries. 
. ..  I ... 
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CHAPTER  9 
IN  SEARCH  OF  RENEWED  SOCIAL  COHESION 
It is clear from  the  study  of  the major  structural  trends  of the  1980s 
that our  societies will  have  to  face  up  to  important  challenges  in  the  areas  of 
energy,  industry,  technology  and  population.  Changes  in  social  values,  needs 
and  behaviour  patterns  over  the  last twenty-five years  have  added  new  social 
demands  to  the  challenges,  although  these  demands  may  sometimes  have  become 
less  pressing  since  the  crisis.  The  restoration of a more  favourable  employment 
situation will  be  a  crucial  problem  both  because  of the  extent of unemployment 
and  because  of its serious economic  and  human  aspects. 
The  adjustments  that will  be  required  both  in  our  economies  and  in  our 
societies if we  are  to react adequately  to  these  challenges  are  so  vast that 
we  cannot  be  sure  that our  societies will  show  a  sufficiently united  front. 
It is  true  that important adjustments  were  required  during  the  period 
of sustained  and  steady  growth;  but  this  growth  itself, and  the  general  rise in 
living standards,  meant  that everyone  agreed  to accept  the  constraints  and  the 
costs  of  change. 
At  the  beginning  of a  low  growth  period,  the  situation is different; 
some  of  the  adjustments  required  are more  like transformations  than  adaptations, 
for example  in  the  field of energy;  a  new  international  division of  labour  is 
eme~ging rapidly,  population  trends  are  creating  unprecedented  problems;  more 
and  more  people  are  adopting  a  critical  attitude towards  attempts  to  restore 
growth  in  its earlier form,  etc. 
9.1.  The  new  conditions  of social  dialogue 
Structural  trends  expected  over  the  next  ten years  illustrate the  need 
for  greater flexibility in  essential  areas  such  as  the  use  of national  resources 
and  the  distribution of  income,  the  structure and  mechanisms  of markets  for 
both  products  and  factors  of  production,  the  allocation of responsibilities 
between  the  private sectors  and  the  public sector.  If the  obstacles  and 
constraints  to  the  restoration of more  favourable  growth  in  these  three areas 
are  to  be  removed,  a  new,  less rigid and  better adapted  approach  to the  various 
relations  and  links  within  these  areas  will  be  required. 
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But  is such  an  approach  possible,  and  under  what  conditions?  The  changes  involved 
will  affect basic  aspects  of life in  our  societies; their economic  and  social 
implications  are  multifarious,  and  they  may  call  into question  equilibria that 
have  been  established after a  long  period  of development. 
In  the  area  of  the  use  of  resources,  the  greater burden  of  imported 
energy  costs  combined  with  the  impossibility of  cutting down  an  essential 
investment,  particularly in  the productive sector, will  require  quite  substantial 
changes  in  the  allocation of  output  at the  expense  of  consumption,  at least at 
first. 
The  new  international  division  of  labour  will  sometimes  require very 
rapid  adjustment  of  production  structures  and  markets,  the  replacement  of 
certain activities  by  others,  and  in  general  rapid  movement  of factors  of 
production  from  sector  to  sector and  from  place  to  place. 
The  general  problem  of modernizing  and  adapting  the  productive 
apparatus  will  raise a similar problem,  although  in  different national  contexts: 
that of  adjusting  more  precisely  the  relation  between  p.~blic sector and  private 
sector functions  and  interventions. 
The  requirement for flexibility is most  sharply felt at the  moment  in 
the  Member  States•  adjustment  policies, which  are  mostly  based  on  similar notions. 
They  aim  at greater concertation  and  coordination  of  economic  regulation and 
recovery.  They  accept  the  new  international  division  of  labour  and  wait  patiently 
for a  return  to  expanding  world  trade, while  resistirg  the  temptations  of 
protectionism.  They  count  on  inflation control  and  a  reduction  in the  relative 
cost of  labour  to  ensure  a recovery of  private  irnestment and  thus  eventually 
improve  the  employment  situation. 
It is accepted  that unemployment  cannot  be  eliminated  overnight,  but  the 
delays  are regarded  as  the  price  that has  to  be  paid for permanent  stabilization 
and  lasting adjustment.  From  this point of  view,  although  the  reduction  of 
inequality is a desirable aim,  the  distribution of  incomes  should  not  be 
modified  in  such  a  way  as  to decrease  efficiency. Moreover,  modernization  and 
increased  competitivity are  more  than  ever  essential  to  firms,  so  that progress 
towards  economic  democracy  must  not  be  allowed  to  go  so  fast,  or  to  go  along 
such  lines,  that modernization  and  competitivity are  threatened. 
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Once  it has  been  decided  to  allow  market  mechanisms  to  function  fully,  the 
State must  make  a determined  effort to  rationalize its interventions  as  much 
as  possible.  New  social  aspirations must  be  assessed  in  the  light of  the 
criteria mentioned  above. 
The  apparent  coherence  of  this  approach,  like  the  convergence  observed 
within  the  Community,  should  not  conceal  the  fact that the  economic,  political 
and  social  system  in  which  anti-crisis  policies are  implemented  is subject to 
instability and  uncertainty,  to  varying  degrees  in  the  different countries. 
The  most  uncertain  factor  is  how  far  the  constraints  of  these  policies will  be 
accepted,  and  whether  there  is sufficient social  cohesion  to  carry  them  out. 
The  longer  they  take  to  produce  the  expected  favourable  effects, particularly 
on  unemployment,  the  greater is  the  risk of  conflicting aims  and  aspirations 
among  groups  and  individuals,  and  of even  more  fundamental  contestation. 
Against  this  background,  where  the  field  of  application  of  adjustment  policy 
is  subject to  very  real  constraints, it seems  vital  to  reinforce  social  cohesion. 
9.2.  The  reinforcement  of  social  cohesion 
There  are  no  doubt  a multitude  of  ways  in  which  social  cohesion  may  be 
reinforced,  and  all  should  be  fully  considered.  More  suitable  training  and 
information  policies  are  probably  among  the  most  necessary:  new  forms  of  social 
cohesion  must  be  based  on  an  appeal  to  the  citizen's sense  of  responsibi,lity  and 
on  the  assumption  that everyone  will  play  a  role.  They  will  be  successful  only 
if they  are  properly  backed  up  by  education  and  information  so  that behaviour 
patterns  can  be  changed. 
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Any  noticeable  progress  towards  greater social  cohesion  will  depend 
mainly  on  how  we  resolve  the  main  conflicts in  our  societies  between  schools 
of  thought  and  socio-economic  forces  in  the  face  of  the  constraints  and  the 
sacrifices that must  be  shared  out if the  crisis is to be  ended.  This  will  be 
a  basic  requirement  for  lasting social  cohesion.  In  other words,  the  question 
is whether  conflict can  be  permanently  eliminated,  and  what  concessions  the  various 
economic  and  social  groups  will  be  prepared  to make. 
Obviously,  the  situation is too  unstable,  national  backgrounds  too 
specific and  complex,  and  purely  political  or  ideological  factors  too  numerous 
for  any  normative  definition of  desirable  trade-offs  to  be  possible.  However, 
we  may  recall  the  main  issues  of the  debate,  and  suggest  some  kinds  of trade-off 
that could  be  acceptable. 
The  first issue of  institutionalized debate  between  the  two  sides  of 
industry  in  most  of  the  member  countries  is the  reduction  of  inequality. 
The  crux  of  inequality is the  distribution of  income  and  wealth,  but  the 
matter  covers  a more  general  field  including  equality of opportunity  in education, 
professional  life, culture  and  so  on. 
Some  argue  that inequality has  often been  reduced  too  far and  too  fast for 
present economic  possibilities, and  that we  should  wait until  after satisfactory 
growth  rates  have  been  restored  before  considering  further measures  to change 
the  distribution of  incomes.  The  opponents  of  this view,  if we  except  the 
minority  movements  which  consider  that the  only  suitable response  to the  problem 
of  inequality  is to  overthrow  the  entire system,  point out  that the  effort to 
reduce  inequality should  be  pursued  and  intensified,  not  only  for  social  reasons, 
but  also  because  these  efforts are  expected  to  lead  to an  immediate  recovery 
and  to  new  prospects  for  a different type  of  growth. 
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I'he seconel rna'in'issue of clebate betweenthe  two sides of industry is
the application of demc,;i'"at'ic rules in an economic context, not enly to
industrial relations br.rt also, to varying degrees in the different countries,
toa]laspectsofeconomic]ife.Thisdiscussionhasbeenfue]ledinrecent
years by criticisrn of representative institutions, demands for decentralization
and regionalization, and by growing concenn about the pou{er of certain national
or transnational  groups" 0n one s'ide of the discussion are those who consider
the development of clenro*'at,ie pr'ocesses with'in the firm or the nation less
important than adjustnient of the productive apparatus and the acceptance of
domestic and intennational i"u'les of competition. 0n the other side are those who
refuse to allow tlrese r',,qrrir"ement,s to delay further pnogress towards industrial
democracy, and mone generally  toruarcls a redistribution  of econornic pov{er; they
hope that not oniy decis'ions within firms but also the macro-economic, social
and sectoral aspects of economic regulation can be the subject of wide concert-
ation. But thene are a certain number of factors that must be considered, for
they change the terrlrs of uhe probiem of relations within firms. They include the
fact that workers are cha,tg'irrg as a result of education and the mass mediai the
effects of new techno'logies, particularly telematics and micro-processors,  on
production methneis;  grotrring demands f,or better organized work in healthy
conditions, and for job security"
The foundatir:ns pf the required social agreement must be constructed upon
these issues, w'ith tlrs spee{Fic emphasis required in each tvlember State. The
dialogue is oft"en (f;1 ltern*ly d"!fficult when cne side denounces the intentions of
the other; if  opposit,'ion js to be overcome, sorne arrangement must be made
combining the varisus poss"i[:r'le tl"ade-offs.
One trade-of'f is cerrtrai to such an arrangement: that of finding nays of
improving growth na.tes and re Juc'irrg structural  unemployment  without compromising
the control of inf'la.L'i*n and the balance of external trade. This means r'econciling
the gradual reduci;t*n r:{'worktnE time with productivity gains that outstrip the
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increase  in  real  wages21.  Wage  discipline must  be  matched  by  price discipline 
and  renewed  efforts  to  reduce  inequality,  not  only  inequality.of wages  and  other 
incomes,  but  also inequality of wealth  (this raises,  among  other questions, that 
of employee  participation in  company  profits)  and  inequality of  access  to  public 
services. 
Although  this approach  is not  new,  it should  be  considered more  broadly 
and  on  a much  longer  time-scale  than  it has  been  up  to  now  in most  of  the 
Member  States,  in  view  of  the  vast adjustments  required  in  the  European  economies. 
A lasting  and  solid social  pact requires  agreement  on  long-term  aims  and 
willingness  to  compromise  so  as  to  strike a fair balance  between  the  respective 
rights  and  obligations  of  all  those  involved  in  economic  and  social  life.  For 
example,  experience  in  some  of  the  Member  States,  and  the  discussion  of more 
democratic  management  at all  levels  of economic  life, show  that opposition  could 
be  partially attenuated  if the  unions  would  accept a  return  to  more  economic 
flexibility and  greater factor mobility.  But  this  kind  of  trade-off is possible 
only  if the  authorities  and  both  sides  of  industry  cooperate  in  broad  concert-
ation  about  all  the  consequences  of flexibility,  and  the  means  to achieve  it  . 
. . . I ... 
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9.3.  Social  cohesion  in  the  Community 
The  concrete  problems  of the  social  cohesion  of  the  Community  are  a very 
important  aspect of social  cohesion;  it is increasingly evident that financial 
transfers,  joint discipline  and  Community  powers  of control  are  not  adequate 
to ensure  cohesion  in  a politically, culturally and  socially heterogeneous  unit 
like  the  Community.  What  is required  is  a  better relationship  between  both  sides 
of  industry at Community  level,  and  better comprehension  between  the  citizens 
of the  Member  States. 
Although  representatives of  the  various  professional  groups  are  consulted 
in  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  and  other  advisory  bodies,  their actual 
participation in  the  decision-making  process  is not  clear-cut or  well  organized. 
The  Community  has  set up  a  number  of  tripartite managing  bodies,  e.g.  for 
vocational  training or  living  and  working  conditions.  Moreover,  since  1970  the 
trade unions  have  been  trying  to  introduce  efficient bipartite or  tripartite 
negotiations,  through  such  experiments  as  the  fairly recent  introduction of 
Tripartite Conferences. 
Although  all  concerned  agree  that social  dialogue  is  necessary at Community 
level,  it is not  certain ·that such  a dialogue  can  continue  for  any  length  of 
time  in  a  period  of  slow  growth  and  rapid  technological  change  unless  the  parties 
concerned  enter  into definite mutual  commitments.  The  trade  unions  aspire  to 
the  reconstitution,  at Community  level,  of the  capacity  for  joint action,  by  both 
sides  of  industry,  without  loss  of autonomy;  this would  increase  the  scope  of 
negotiations  which  are  limited  at national  level  because  of  the  growing  integration 
and  mutual  dependence  of  the  European  economies.  It may  be  that the  requirements 
of  collective discipline and  coherent  economic  behaviour  (particularly where  wages 
are  concerned)  created  by  integration,  the  wropean  monetary  system  and  an 
innovation  policy  cannot.  be  met  unless  the  present embryonic  system  of  industrial 
relations at  wropean  level  can  develop  into a system  that offers  a more  coherent 
framework  for  collective negotiations_ at the  level  of  nations  and  industries.  At 
· the  moment,  it is difficult to  reply to  these  questions.  But  it is  also difficult 
to  see  how  the  Community  can  take  up  the  challenge  facing  it without  offering  both 
... / ... 
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sides  of  industry more  than  just general  recommendations:  genuine  opportunities 
for negotiation  so  that they  can  apply  active forms  of  solidarity.  The  questions 
of  the  reorganization  of  working  time  and  the  social  implications  of  technological 
development  could  be  suitable fields. 
But  it is also important  for  awareness  of  the  Community  to  develop  elsewhere, 
as  well  as  in  industrial  relations. A start has  already  been  made  in  consumer 
protection  and  environmental  improvement.  Other  fields  could  be  explored, and 
there  are  many  ways  of  helping  mutual  comprehension  between  individuals.  For 
example,  more  systematic efforts might  be  made  in  language  teaching,  which  is 
certainly a  subject of  interest to  the  Community.  mdividual  exchanges  could  also 
be  considered.  There  have  been  isolated experiments  such  as  the  exchange  of 
young  workers;  these  could  be  broadened  and  reinforced, for example  through 
exchanges  of  businessmen  or  trade  union  officials.  The  Qarriers  to  the 
spontaneous  development  of  such  experiments  should  be  carefully considered  so 
that they can  be  more  easily overcame. - 129  -
CHAPTER  10 
THE  COMMUNITY'S  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
In  Part  I  of  this  report,  the  main  changes  taking  place  in  the  system 
of  international  economic  and  financial  relations  were  summarized,  with  the 
changes  in  relations  between  major  countries  or  economit  areas,  the  appearance 
of  new  partners,  the  growing  diversity of  situations,  choices  and  ou;Looks  in 
the  main  groups  of  countries  that  used  to  seem  relatively  cohesive  and 
homogeneous. 
These  changes  throw  a  new  Light  on  the  problem  of  the  Community's  external 
relations,  and  call  for  a  special  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Member  States  to 
reinforce  the  Community 1s  cohesion  and  capacity  for  initiative. 
10.1.  The  Community's  relations  with  the  other  industrialized  countries 
The  deose  and  ever-changing  network  of  relations"between  countries  or 
groups  of  countries  in  the  industrialized  world  involves  both  antagonism  and 
solidarity.  The  oil  problem  has  accentuated  the  complexity  of  relations  between 
western  countries, particularly  between  the  Community,  the  United  States  and 
Japan.  For  the oil  problem  is  a  new  factor  of  instability  and  uncertainty;  it 
affects  the  whole  ra~g~ of  international  economic  and  monetary  relations,  and 
creates  new  strains  within  the  industrialized  world. 
Most  of  the  European  countries  and  Japan  share  th~ same  worries  because 
of  their  relative  Lack  of  natural  energy  resources  - which  puts  them  in  a 
rather  ditferent  position  from  the  United  States - and  because  of  the  consequences 
of  the  very  sharp  increase  in  US  oil  imports  :  over  the  past ~n jears, this  has 
helped  increase  the oil  market  and  international  payments  disequilibria  which 
have  hit  these  countries  particularly  hard. 
More  generally,  Europe  and  Japan  are  equally  concerned  by  the  malfunctioning 
of  the  international  monetary  system,  the  uncontrolled  development  of  Euro-markets, 
and  the  fluctuations  of  the  dollar.  These  factors  are  Largely  the  result  of  the 
interplay of  US  strengthsand  weaknesses  :  although  t'he  position of  the  dollar 
is questioned,  it  cannot  be  replaced  in  the  short  term  as  a  means  of  international 
.•.  I . •. settlement;  the political  role of  the United  States  in  the  world  is growing 
weaker,  but  US  firms  and  the  US  banking  system  are playing  an  increasingly 
active  international  role and  spreading  their  influence over  the  whole  world. 
However,  the  problems  common  to Europe  and  Japan  also  help  to  sharpen 
competition  between  them,  mainly  so  that  they  can  export  enough  to pay  for  the 
increasingly  hig~tcost of  their energy  and  raw  materials  supplies,  and  ensure 
some  degree of  control  over  the  sources of  these  supplies.  Similarly,  the 
depreciation of  the dollar  has  had  a  rather different effect  for  the yen  and 
the  various  European  currencies,  and  this  has  helped  to alter appreciably  the 
relative competitive positions of  European  and  Japanese  firms;  moreover  it 
has  prompted  Japanese  firms  to  step  up  their efforts on  European  markets,  where 
their sales  have  risen  sharply  in  recent  years  (see  A 56). Japan's  very  rapid 
commercial  expansion  throughout  the  world,  as  well  as  the difficulties of 
penetrating  the Japanese  market  - both  these  features  are essentially connected 
with  the  Japanese  mode  ofdevelopment  and  with  the  high  level  of  integration 
and  the  dynamism  of  the Japanese  industrial  and  commercial  complex  22  -, 
pose  a  trade adjustment  problem  which,  for  the  Community  and  for  the other 
industrialized countries,  does  not  only  concern  bilateral  relations  with 
Japan. 
22 
For  example,  according  to  US  estimates  for  1974,  US  subsidiaries of 
Japanese  firms  were  responsible  for  approximately 90  % of bilateral 
US-JAPAN  trade,  whereas  US  subsidiaries of  European  firms  were  in  the 
same  year  responsible  for  23  % of  US  exports  and  45  % of  US  imports 
to  or  from  the  EEC. 
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In general,  moreover,.the  problems  of  the  Community's  relations  with 
the other  industrialized countries  must  always  be  seen  in  both  a  bilateral 
and  a  global  perspective. 
Thus  the  changes  in  the  conditions of  competition  between  industrialized 
countries,  mentioned  in Part  I  of  this  report,  affect  not  only  the mutual 
relationships  of  the  Member  States and  of  the  Community  with  each  of  their 
industrialized competitors,  but  also  the  respective position of  each  of 
them  on  world  markets  as  a  whole.  For  example,  the total  or partial  gaps 
Left  by  European  industry,  mainly  in  the  advanced  technology  sectors,  are 
filled on  European  markets  but  also  on  external  markets  by  US  and  above 
all Japanese  firms  which  are  thus  consolidating  their worldwide  economic  and 
commercial  power. 
In this  connection  we  must  not  forget  the  advantage  enjoyed  by  the 
us  banking  and  productive  systems  because of  their network  of  subsidiaries 
throughout  the  world,  and  that  the  external  dynamism  of  Japanese  firms  has 
found  fresh  support  in  the  recent  but  rapid  expansion of  their  investment 
abroad.  Not  only  does  this  mean  that  the  Community  must  face  the  implications 
of  the presence  in  Europe  of,a  large  number  of  transnational  firms  under  foreign 
control  :  it also  underlines  the  need  to  expand  direct  European  investment 
abroad  in  conjunction  with  the adaptation  of  the  industrial  apparatus  of  the 
Member  States. 
It  is  true that  firms  in  most  of  the  Member  States  have  in  recent 
years  Launched  a  substantial  drive  to  develop  and  strengthen their positions 
in  the  United  States  so  as  to  benefit  from  the  advantages  afforded by  that 
country - its technological  Lead,  the  size of  its market,  and  even  the 
opportunity  for  a  firm  to test  its  competitive  capability;  furthermore,  the 
weakening  of  the dollar against  most  of  the  European  currencies  has  helped 
to  stimulate and  assist  this drive.  But  although  its  recent  increase  has 
been  considerable,  direct  investment  by  EEC  countries  in  the United States 
is  nevertheless still appreciably  below  that  of  US  firms  in  Europe  (see A 57) 
These  firms  are  very  strongly established  in  the  Community  both  commercially 
••• 1  ••• and  through  an  extensive  network  of  subsidiaries  (US  firms  in manufacturing 
industry  make  50  % of  their direct  investment  abroad  in  the  EEC)  which 
they  seem  to  have  continued  to expand  while  engaging  in both  geographical 
and  sectoral  restructuring. 
The  most  worrying  factor  is  the  lack  of  increase  in  recent  years 
in  the  volume  of  the  Community's  direct  investment  in  the Third World. 
This  is  liable to  pose  problems  for  Europe,  not  only as  regards  its  raw 
materials  supplies,  as  we  have  already  stressed,  but  also as  regards  its 
trade as  a  whole  with  the  developing  countries. 
It is true  that  the  industrialized countries maintain  close traditional 
links  with  particular parts of  the world  (see  A 58). 
Two-thirds  of  Japan•s sales  to non-oil  developing  countries are exported 
to  Asia,  and  Japanese  exports  account  for  40  % of total  OECD  sales to these 
countries.  US  trade  relations are particularly close with  Latin America 
and,  to  a  slightly  lesser extent,  with  Asia. 
Community  exports,  and  those of  the other  European  countries,  are more 
evenly  spread  Cleaving  aside  sales  to  OPEC  countries which  are  important 
markets  for all  these  countries>,  but  the  Community  does  have  closer export 
relations with  the  European  developing  countries of  the Mediterranean 
seaboard and  with Africa  :  between  60  % and  70  % of total  OECD  exports  to 
these  countries  come  from  the  Community,  which  as  yet  does  not  seem  to  have 
much  competition  from  the other  major  industrialized countries  in this  area 
(see A 59). 
Nevertheless,  these traditional  trade  flows  are  relatively precarious, 
and  both  Europe  and  the other  industrialized countries  are already  facing 
the  increasingly pronounced  dynamism  of  Japanese  firms,  for exampL_._  in 
expanding  their trade with  and  locating  in  the  OPEC  countries,  Latin America, 
and  even,  for  certain products,  in  Africa  and  the Mediterranean  seaboard. 
Hence  the  danger  is  that  the  lack  of  dynamism  in  investment  by  the  EEC, 
or  at  least  by  certain Member  States,  in the  developing  countries,  may  thus 
deprive  the  Community  of  an  important  aid to  commercial  penetration on  these 
markets,  without,  however,  sparing  it the  sectoral difficulties  caused 
by  the  increase  in  the  number  of  more  active  firms  from  other  industrialized 
countries  setting  themselves  up  in  these  developing  countries  • 
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Then  again,  it would  be  sensible for  the  Community  in  the  next  decade 
to  seek  closer  relations  with  industrialized countries  such  as  Canada  and 
Australia  which  are  important  producers  and  exporters  of  certain  commodities 
which  Europe  Lacks.  An  expansion  of  Europe's  purchases  of  unprocessed  raw 
materials  or  products  of  first-stage processing  should,  moreover,  help  to  iron 
out  certain difficulties  which  exist at  present  concerning,  for  example,  in 
relations  with  Australia,agricultural  trade  and  the access  of  European 
industrial  products  to  this  market.  In  any  case,  it will  also  be  necessary 
for  the  Community  to  be  energetic  in  developing  its productive  investment 
and  its commercial  penetration  in  these  countries  with  which  the  relations 
of  the  United  States  and  also - in  Australia's  case- Japan  are already 
close. 
The  above  remarks  and  the  analysis  in  Part  I  of  this  report  on  the 
future  international  environment  of  the  Community  basically  confirm  how 
much  the  behaviour  of  the  United States  and  Japan  in  international  economic, 
trade and  monetary  ~elations wiLL,  over  the  next  decade,  remain  of  prime 
importance  for  the  Community,  its place  in  the  world  and  the  development 
of  its external  rel~tions strategy. 
10.2.  The  Community  and  the Third  World 
(a)  The  importance  of  relations  between  the  Community  and  the Third  World 
is  apparent  in  a  number  of  very  different  fields  (see A 60) 
First,  the  Community  is  the  major  trading partner of  the  developing 
countries,  both  oil-exporting  countries  and  others.  The  network  of  trade 
relations  with  non-OPEC  developing  countries  is  very  widespread geographically, 
and  trade  is  generaLLy  balanced;  the  Community's  growing  surplus on  manufac-
tures  covers  its deficit  on  raw  materials  other  than  energy  (see A 61). 
Moreover,  the  Community  is  the  major  contributor of  public  aid  to 
the  Third  World,  even  though  its  contribution  is  short  of  the target  set; 
it also  helps  considerably  with  food  ;lid  to  the poorest  countries. 
In  recent  years,  the  Communi·;y  has  stepped  up  its attempts  to 
establish better  balanced  and  fairer  ;elations  between  the  industrialized 
countries  and  the  Third  World.  It  ha~  been,  and  still is, an  important 
source of  dynamism,  proposals  and  con.~ertation  in  the North-South  dialogue. 
It pioneered  the Generalized  Preferen~ e  Scheme  for  imports  of  manufactures 
from  developing  countries.  It set  up  important  bilateral association agreements, 
••• I ••• in  the  form  of  comprehensive  contracts,  with  the  countries  of  the Southern 
Mediterranean,  and  it will  have  to  take  care  that  these agreements  are not 
threatened by  the accession of  three  new  Member  States.  With  the  Lome  and 
Yaounde  Conventbns,  it introduced  new  types  of  cooperation with  most  of the 
African  developing  countries and  with  some  Caribbean  and  Pacific  countries; 
both  the extent  of  this  cooperation  and  the  instruments  used  (e.g.  STABEX) 
are  new.  The  Lome  agreement,  which  has  just been  renewed,  is  in many  ways 
exemplary.  A long  term,  comprehensive  agreement  covering  raw  materials, 
manufactures,  financial  aid,  technological  transfers and  so  on,  the  Lome 
Convention  is a  framework  in  which  the  means  and  en~s of  cooperation 
are defined  jointly by  the  Community  and  the  developing  countries  concerned 
(the  ACP  countries>,  and  in which  regional  cooperation and  development 
within  the Third  World  are  encouraged.  The  EEC  has  also set  up,  or  is  in 
the  process  of  setting up  trade agreements  and  aid and  cooperation programmes 
with  a  number  of other developing  countries. 
(b)  The  Community  and  the new,  multifarious needs  of  the developing 
countries 
In  its strategy of  relations  with  the Third World,  the  Comm~nity 
must  take  into  account  two  new  and  very  important  features  of  the needs 
of  the  developing  countries over  the  next  few  years.  The  first  is the 
growing  heterogeneity of  situations, needs  and  prospects  in the Third World. 
The  rise of  the  OPEC  countries  is  the clearest  illustration of this hetero-
geneity,  and  it calls for  a  specific policy of  Community  relations with  the 
OPEC  with  a  view  to  : 
Ci)  ensuring  the  security of oil  supplies,  and  stabilizing supply  conditions; 
Cii)  reinforcing  the  Community's  position on  OPEC  markets,  and  particularly 
the position of  the Member  States  that  have  lost ground; 
(iii)  interesting  the  surplus  OPEC  countries  in  co-financing  investment 
projects  in other  developing  countries; 
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(iv)  promoting  the  coordination of  heavy  industrial  investment  by  the  OPEC 
countries  in certain industries with  investment  planned  in western 
countries. 
The  growing  heterogeneity of  the  Third  World  is further  illustrated 
by  the  emergence  of  rapidly  industrializing countries, whose  development  contrasts 
sharply with  the  aggravation  of  abject  poverty  in  other parts  of  the  Third  World. 
All  the  long-term  projections of  economic  growth  in  the  developing  ~ountrtes 
show  that the  gap  will  probably  widen.  At  the  level  of  the  continents, it is 
already  apparent  that the  outlook·for  South-East  Asia  and  latin America  is relatively 
favourable,  while  that for  Africa  and  Southern  Asia  (the  Indian  sub-continent)  ts 
much  gloomier.What  is more,  needs  differ between,  and  even  within,  these  groups 
of  countries.  For  example,  latin America  has  a serious  problem  of  external  debt, 
while  for  South-East  Asia  the  problem  is that of  finding  outlets for  its rapidly• 
expanding  output  of manufactures.  The  problems  in  the  poorer  countries  are also 
varied,  and  depen~ on  such; factors  as  raw  material  resources,  agricultural 
potential  and  so  on. 
The  Community  must  therefore  adapt  and  adjust its cooperation  to 
the  country  involved,  while  respecting  the  political  solidarity which  the  countries 
of  the  Third  World  are  trying  to  maintain.  It must  also see  to it that, as  in 
the  lo~ agreement,  cooperation covers  all possible fields of action  in a coherent 
and  coordinated  way. 
But,  beyond  this heterogeneity,  the  second  feature  common  to  all 
the. non-oil  developing  countries  is that of  their increasingly serious  financing 
difficulty, which  has  been  aggravated  by  the  rise in oil  prices.  These  countries 
have  long-standing  trade deficits but  can  be  covered  only  at high  risk and  high 
co~t by  international  financing;  the  rising price of  oil  has  accentuated  this 
problem  dramatically.  The  demand  for energy  in  the  non-oil  developing  countries 
increases with  the  industrialization process,  but  there  is little scope  for 
energy-saving;  moreover,  with  a few  exceptions,  these  countries  are  not  in  a, 
pos,t1on  to  take  advantage  of  new  outlets in the  OPEC  countries•  and  they· suffer 
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from  the decline  in  trade and  the  adverse  effects on  aid resulting  from 
the  reaction of  the  industrialized countries  to  slow  growth  and  sectoral 
difficulties. 
There  is no  doubt  that  trade between  developing  countries  must 
be  encouraged,  and  the disparities  from  which  they  suffer  reduced;  however, 
this alone  is not  enough.  Europe  must  realize that  a  decline  in exports 
to  the developing  countries - which  represent  a  significant share of its 
foreign  trade and  domestic  production - will  be  inevitable unless  it increases 
its financial  aid to the non-oil  developing  countries,  and  its  imports  from 
these countries,  especially  imports  of manufactured  products. 
(c)  Increasing  financial  flows  to the  developing  countries 
• 
A special  effort  will  be  required  in  the field of official 
development  assistance  CODA),  which  has  expanded  much  more  slowly  over  the 
past  few  years  than private sector contributions  to development  finance. 
The  real  value  of official aid  increased  very  little between  1970  and  1978, 
and  aid declined  as  a  percentage of  the  GNP  of  the  contributor countries. 
Although  the  Community's  ODA  effort  is greater  than  that of  the  USA  or Japan, 
the aggregate  is still  less  than  the aim  of 0.7%  of  GNP  adopted  in agreement 
with  the  DAC  countries.  Moreover,  some  Community  countries make  a  much 
greater  contrjbution  than  others  :  Italy contributes 0.06 % of its GNP,  and 
Germany  0.38  %,  while  the  Netherlands  contributes0.82 % and  the Community 
average  was  0.45  % in 1978  (compared  with  0.27 % for  the  USA  and  0.23·%  for 
Japan). 
More  ODA  from  the Nine,  in  collaboration with  the other  industria-
Lized  countries and  the  OPEC  countries,  is essential  if the existing 
considerable difficulties are  not  to  become  worse  in  the  large  regions 
of  the Third World  suffering  from  extreme  poverty;  these  regions  cannot 
do  without  official assistance,  for  they  have  little chance  of attracting 
private capital or  developing  industrial  exports. 
The  problems  involved  in  priva~e development  aid,  which  has 
increased  so  rapidly over  the past  few  years,  although  to only  a  very  small 
number  of  countries,  have  already  been  referred  to  several  times.  In  this 
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context  we  concentrate on  the  specific  problem  of  bank  financing.  The 
European  banks,  with  those  of  the  USA,  are  heavily  committed  to  huge  financing 
operations  which  involve  them  in  an  uncoordinated process  which  they  do  not 
control.  To  ensure  that these  financing  operations,  which  are  so  essential 
to  the  Third  World,  develop  satisfactorily, and  to  make  them  more  easily 
accessible to  a  greater number  of  Third  World  countries  while  reducing 
the  risks  and  costs  they  involve,  the  Community  should  contribute as 
actively as  possible  to  finding  new  roles  for  national  and  international 
monetary  inst~tutions  in  the  supervision and  perhaps  even  the  refinancing 
of  these banking  transactions. 
W)  Opening  the  Community  to  manufactures  from  the  developing  countries 
The  most  decisive  contribution  the  Community  can  make  to  development 
in  the Third  World  is  to  provide  developing  countries  with  more  outlets  for 
their products. 
The  Community's  commercial  .policy must  therefore  be  geared  to ensuring 
that  a  Larger  number  of  these  countries  have  access  to  Community  markets. 
Although  some  of  the  present  provisions of commercial  policy,  in particular 
the Generalized  Preference  Scheme,  do  seem  to  have  led  to  an  increase  in 
purchases  by  the  Nine,  this  increase  has  been  concentrated on  a  few  mass 
consumption  products  imported  cheaply  from  a  small  number  of  developing 
countries,  mainly  newly  industrializing  countries.  This  concentration 
was  certainly a  factor  in  the  growing  public  awareness  of  the problem 
of  imports  from  developing  countries,  which  seems  to  be  accorded  much  more 
importance  than  is  warranted  by  the  relative  share  in  trade of  these  imports, 
or  their  volume  in  relation  to  Community  ou~put. 
The  scheme  could  perhaps  fulfil  its purpose  better  if it were  modified  next 
time  it  comes  up  for  renewal,  in  such  a  way  as  to give preference to the 
Less  industrialized developing  countries  and  the  less  developed  sectors  in 
the  newly  industrializing  countries.  At  the  same  time,  the newly  industria-
Lizing  countries  might  reasonably  be  expected  to give preferential  treatment 
to  the Third World  countries  which  are  less  developed  than  they are  • 
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The  Community  must  persuade  t·  ese  newly  industrializing  countries,. 
whose  economic  development  is bringing  them  out  of  the developing  countries 
group  and  closer  to the development  le el  of  the  industrialized countries 
group,  gradually  to  aecept  the·same  du  ies  and  obligations  as  the  latter, 
especially as  regards  the  rec.ip'roc i ty  f  trade  concessions. 
But  arrangements  of  this  type  will  not  be  sufficient to eliminate 
the growing  difficulties which  some  Me  ber States put  forward  at sectoral  or 
regional  level  as  an  excuse to try  to~ limit  the opening  of  the  Community 
market  to  imports  from  the  developing .!ountries.  Sectoral adjustment  is 
occurring  at different  rates,, and  even~ in different  directions  in  the  various 
·Member  States,  and  this  makes  it  diffi~ult to define and  implement  a  Community 
commercial  policy,  particularly  in  the!sensitive sectors.  The·complexity 
II 
and  urgency  of  this problem  a~e amply  emonstrated  by  the  increase  in  the 
number  of  cases,  in  recent  years,  in  w ich  certain Member  States  have  taken 
protective measures  (pursuant':to  Artie:  e  115  of  the Treaty of  Rome)  in  the 
area  of  textile products,  eve~  though~ ccess  for  these products  to  European  .  ~·· 
markets  ~s  the  subject of  agreements  ·,  voluntary  restraint  by  non-member 
· coun~ri~s.  :  :: 
.  In  general,  apart  from  defens;  v~ reactions  t~ obvious  forms  of unfair· 
compet~t·ion, temporary  protecti:.ve  mea  .re$. can  -be  cons'idered· only  in very 
narrowly-defined situations  :::' 
they  may  be  justified  to protect  t  industries;  to prevent  the  disappearance 
of  industrial  co~plexes:tbat are viabl  in  the  long  run,  but  threatened  by 
disorganized  competition  in  a.  market  S isis  situat~on;  to protect  branches 
although  threatened  by  :th~e  chan  ·ng  international  division of  labour,  may, 
after structural  reorganization,  stay,  nor return to  a  system  of  trade obeying 
the  requirements  of  internatibnal  com~ tition.- In  all  these situations,  the 
solidarity of  the  Member  States must  as  strong  as  possible,  so  that  the 
measures,  which  should  always  be  excep  ional,  may  be-~isc~ntinued as  soon  as 
possible,  and  so  that  the  necessary  s •·  uctural  reorganization  may  be  carried out. 
~ 
The  Community  must  alsp  ende ·'our  to  use  the  means  at  its  d~sposal 
in  such  a  way  as  to  take  a~yantage of  , he  international  division of  la~our,  and 
to  influence  its  development~  It must  therefore exploit  its cOmparative  advan-
tages  to the full,  and  acquir~  comparative  advantages,  for  example· 
by  developing  technology  and ,integrati  g  its  internal  market.  But  it must 
also1 through  its external  policy  and  e  action of  its firms,  encourage  a  better 
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spread of  income  and  know-how  in  the  world,  and  sectoral  diversification 
and  social  progress  in  the  developing  countries,  so  as  to  enlarge effective 
world  demand,  and  reduce  strains on  trade between  developing  and  industria-
Lized  countries  23· 
10.3.  Relations  between  the  Community  and  the  State-trading countries 
Since  the  mid-1960s,  the  share of  the State-trading  countries  in 
the  Community's  external  trade  (not  counting  trade between -.mber States)  has 
gradually  increased,  latterly reaching  7%  to 8%  of  imports  and  8  % to 9  % 
of  exports  (see  A·  6~)  for  tracte:."·in  chemica.l  products  and  comtnuni:ty exp-orts  of 
machinery  this  share  is  over  11  X. 
Within  the State-trading  countries,  a  distinction  should  be  drawn 
between  China,  on  the one  hand,  and  Eastern  Europe  (including  the Soviet 
Union)  on  the other.  China  accounts  for  about  1  % of  the  Community's  total 
external  trade,  and  can  be  considered  a  developing  economy  from  all points 
of  view,  as  is  shown,  for  example,  by  the  structure of  its trade with  the 
Community.  This  trade  has  been  held back  for  political  reasons  in  the  past, 
but  the  medium-term  outlook  now  seems  favourable. 
The  State-trading countries of  ~aste~n Europe  are already  highly 
industrialized,  but  the general  level  of  modernization  in  the agricultural 
and  services  sectors  is  well  below  that  in  Western  industrialized countries. 
About  30%  of  the  European  State-trading  countries'  volume  of  external  trade 
is  with  OECD  countries,  and  about  half  his  share  is  with  the  Community. 
The  Community  which  has  the  advantage  of geographical  proximity,  is  therefore 
their main  trading  partner,  far  ahead  of  either the  USA  or Japan  (although 
Japan  has  greatly  increased  its trade  with  these  countries  in  recent  years 
(see A 58).  In  trade with  the  European  State-trading countries,  Community 
exports  of  machinery  and  chemical  products,  and  Community  imports  of  fuel 
and  chemical  products  have  partricularly expanded  (see A 62). 
23 
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For  a  fuller analysis  of  these matters,  see  the  Report  by  the Group  of 
Ea:perts  under  the  chairmanship  of  Mr  Paul-Mard  HENRY  entitled  :"The  European 
Economic  Community  and  Changes  in  the  International  Division  of  Labour", 
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Trade  between  the  Community  and  the  European  State-trading countries 
benefits  from  the  fact  that  the  two  trading partners  are  complementary  in  some 
ways.  The  economic  difficulties  experienced both  by  the  Community  and 
by  the  East  European  countries  in  the past  few  years  have  not  affected 
complementarity,which  could  ~e the  basis  for  developing  mutual  economic 
relations. 
The  USSR  and,  to  some  extent,  Poland  possess  large  reserves  of  fuels  and 
other  raw  materials;  output  and  exports  of gas,  coal,  copper,  timber  and  some 
other  commodities  could be  increased,  and  this  would  enable  the  Community 
to diversify its sources  of  supply  for  raw  materials  and  fuel.  Then  again, 
the  technological  superiority of  the  Community,  as  of  the other Western 
industrialized countries1over  the  East  European  countries  is evident  in  most 
industrial  branches  :  this  enables  the  Community  to sell  high-technology 
plant  and  equipment  to the European  State-trading countries,  which  need  them  to 
carry out  their  long-term  programmes  for  modernizing  the economy.  Moreover, 
the  structural  backwardness  of  the agricultural  sector  in  Eastern  Europe, 
its slow  growth  rate and  its  inadequacy  to  cover  domestic  demand  could  also 
be  factors  in  the  development  of  Community  exports  to  those countries. 
Apart  from  complementarity  between  sectors,  which  is at present 
the main  feature  of  Community  relations  with  the European  State-trading 
countries,  there  may  be  complementarity  within  sectors  too, particularly such 
branches  of  manufacturing  as  chemicals,  engineering  and  metallurgy.  It would 
obviously  take a  long  time  to exploit all  the possibilities here,  and  the 
best  approach  might  be  through  a  series of  bilateral  agreements  between  the 
Community  and  the different  countries  involved.  In all  cases,  the  Community 
must  take  care that  the  development  of  relations  with  the !ast is not  the 
direct  or  indirect  cause  of  disturbances  on  the-Community  market.  There  is 
a  danger  of  such  disturbances  for  certain capital-intensive and  labour-
intensive products. 
In  considering  its prospective  relations  with  East  European  cou~tries, 
the  Community  should  bear  in  mind  the  considerable differences  between  their 
economic  situations  Cin  terms  of growth,  employment,  standards of  living, 
productivity  and  "inflation">,  their natural  resources,  and  their ability 
to  react  to  world  economic  trends,  in  particular  rising  energy  costs  (even 
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These  differences  make  a  bilateral  approach  even  more  advisable,  since such 
an  approach  to  relations  between  the  Community  and  the  European  State-trading 
countries  can  be  more  efficiently organized  and  adjusted to  individual 
countries'  needs  and  capacities,  although  agreements  between  the  Community 
and  COMECON  as  a  whole  may  be  more  suitable for  certain products. 
The  East· European  countries  tie more  and  more  trade and  cooperation 
deals  with  the  Community  and  the  West  in  general  to  "compensation"  or  "buy-back" 
agreements.  These  practices  may  be  acceptable  in  principle for  fuels  and  other 
raw  materials,  but  the  Community  should oppose  any  tendency  towards  their 
generalization.  Compensation  makes  East-West  economic  relations  Less 
flexible  by  discouraging  new  Western  operators  (particularly small  and  medium-
sized  firms)  from  entering  the  East-European  market,  and  by  transferring 
the  burden  of  marketing  East  European  goods  in  the  West  to Western  f~rms. 
The  external  debt  of  the  East  European  countries  was  about 
160  000  to  g65  000  million  (including  a  Large  amount  owed  to  the Community) 
in  1978;  it might  increase  further  over  the  next  few  years.  The  Community 
will  therefore  have  to  follow  short-term  economic  trends  in  Eastern  Europe 
very  attentively,  particularly  in  Poland  and  Bulgaria,  where  the present 
level  of  aggregate  debt  is  several  times  as  high  as  the  annual  value of 
exports  in  convertible  currencies. 
The  Community's  strategy  towards  State-trading  countries must 
be  harmonized  with  its strategy  towards  developing  countries.  In  certain 
areas,  such  as  the  supply  of  fuels  and  raw  materials,  the  Community  might 
be  faced  with  the  choice  between  investing  in  one  group  of  countries or  the 
other.  Moreover,  competition  on  Community  markets  between  the products  of  the 
two  groups  of  countries  could  undermine  the  Community's  generalized prefe-
rence  policy  towards  the  developing  countries. 
X  X 
X 
••• I ••• - 142  -
The  Community's  main  task,  in  the  face of the uncertainty  resulting 
from  the development  of  international  relations  over  the  next  ten years, 
will  be  to  reinforce  its  internal  cohesion  and  reinvigorate  its development 
as  a  zone  of growth  and  stability. 
First,  the  Community  must.  lbexercise  to  the full  its  . 
specific  powers  in  external  relations;  further  vigorous  efforts are  required 
here.  At  present,  the  Community  is mainly  exercising  its powers ,only  in  the 
field of  traditional  commercial  policy,  i.e.  customs  tariffs and  barriers 
to trade.  The  Community  plays  an  important  role  in  this field,  as  the 
Tokyo  Round  negotiations,  for  example,  have  shown.  But  t~is role  is 
limited by  the  fact  that  export  credits, export  drives  and  direct  investment 
abroad  are  under  the  individual  control  of  the Member  States, as  are most 
of  the  financial  aspects  of  relations  with  the Third World.  Furthermore, 
some  of  the  Member  States are still taking  the  initiative  in: matters  that 
are  theoretically the  responsibility of  Community  bodies.  All  this  weakens 
the  Community's  position  in  international  negotiations  and  deprives  the 
Member  States of  the  advantage  to be  gained  from  joint bargaining-power. 
The  Community  affords  the  Member  States  an  opportunity  to attenuate 
the  effects of external  disturbances  by  strengthening  the  links  that  bind 
them  together,  and  to  lay solid foundations  for  the development  of their 
ex~ernal relations  and  the  strengthening  of  their negotiating power  in  the 
world;  the Member  States must  take advantage  of  this opportunity. 
Thus,  the  Community  market  absorbs  about  50  % of  exports  by  the 
Nine,  and  constitutes a  vast  market  with  opportunities  for  economies  of 
scale;  until  recently,  trade within  the  Community  was  expanding  much  faster 
than  sales  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  This  enormous  market  is  a  considerable 
advantage  for  the  Member  States.  And  yet  they  do  not  exploit  it to the full, 
for  it  is  not  yet  completely  and  genuinely  integrated  • 
••• 1  ••• - 143  -
The  numerous  distortions  and  obstacles  to  trade that  have  reappeared 
over  the past  few  years  must  therefore be  removed,  and  the  integration 
process  must  be  encouraged.  In  the  advanced  technology  industries  in 
particular,  the  Community  will  not  be  able to  compete  satisfactorily with 
its  main  competitors,  Japan  and  the  USA,  in  relation to  which  it  is  at 
present  in  a  position of  inferiority and  even  to  some  extent  of  dependence, 
unless  the barriers  to  integr~on- national  preferential  treatment, 
technical  and  statutory barriers,  even  national  monopolies  - are  removed, 
and  unless  R & D .Policies are more  closely  coordinated.  These  two  develop-
ments  must  be  combined  if the  Community  industries  are  to  enjoy all  the 
advantages  of  a  unified market,  and  if this  market  is  not  to  serve  mainly 
the  interests  of  Japanese  and  US  firms,  already often  well-established  in 
Europe. 
The  EMS,  and  the  consequent  stabilization of  exchange  rates  within 
the  Community,  should attenuate the adverse  effects  on  the  Member  States· 
of  malfunctions  in  the  international  monetary  system,  and  enable  the  Com-
munity  to  make  an  effective contribution  to  sett~ng up  a  new'and  better-
balanced  system.  This  will  be  even  more  true  when  all  the  Member  States 
participate  in  the  EMS,  and  when  it  has  been  extended  and  supplemented 
according  to  the  programme  initially agreed. 
ALL  in  all, the  Community's  economic  weight  and  the  importance 
of  its  relations  with  the  rest  of  the  world  give  it greater  influence 
than  any  individual  Member  State  in  international  relations.  But  the 
Community's  influence  depends  to  a  Large  extent  on  its cohesion  and  its 
internal  and  international  dynamism,  and  on  how  far  it can  implement  an 
external  relations  strategy,  the overall  coherence  of  which  is  fully 
assured. 
. ..  ! •• II/532/3/79 - EN 
STRUCTURAL  CHANGE  IN  THE  COMMUNITY 
OUTLOOK  FOR  THE  1980s 
Statistical Annex 
of,the Technical  Report Table Al  Dependence  on imported enerst (a) 
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1973 
1978 
(a) 
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Source:  Eurostat 
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88,0  99,6  53,1 
87,3  99,2  25,7 
Ire- Den-
land  ..  mark 
74,8  96,8 
82,6  99,9 
84,4  99,6 
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~  ·.~,.b~e  A ~2.  World  energy consumption  and production 
World sross  energy  consumptiou 
•·  ~  ! 
.  ,.  r; 
'i i 
.  '  t  I 
I 
(in 
{ 
EEC 
USA 
...  ..  . 
. 
million 
Japan· 
toe) 
.. 
Other industrialized 
l"t'\11'1'l.fo'r'-4' A. 
OPEC, 
Other developing 
Jl.~untriellll 
USSR 
Other countries with 
centrally planne4  ' 
e  ".es 
World  trade 
1976 
(Sour'ce:  UN) 
955 
1830 
330 
610  --
150 
540  --
970 
165 
6250 
1990  (•). 
·- L~v hYDoth-.  HiJrh  hYnoth. 
1460  1200 
2510  2230 
650  .  570 
1000  840  --
400  300 
1100  950  --
1920  1130 
1560  1330  ..  .  . 
' 10600  .  9250 
- --- --
(*)  Commission  estimated baaed on various studies. 
-~  .  - . . 
H:potheses of world cross  energy production 
(in million toe) 
~  - - ..  1976  (actual)  1990  (forecasts)*  Source  UN 
I  , 
A. Non-oil  sources  High  ·'  Low 
. 
Solid fuels 
~  1890  3450  2950 
~ 
Nuclear  energy  90  900  500 
Natural  gas  1160  1800  1800 
: 
Renewable 
' 
energy  335  500  400 
Total  3475  6650  5650 
, 
~ 
t3.  Demand  h;tpotheses  6250  10.600 - 9·250  10.600 - 9-250 
c.~heoretical balance 
to  be  covered bl oil  2775  3.950 - 2.6uo 
(80  - somb/4 
(•).Commission estimates baaed on various •tudiee. 
l 
4.950 - 3.6op 
(100  - 10  mb/~ ) 
.,,  ,.  -
I  t  ~  , 
I  ,'  ' ·.:.  I  .  ·; 
I  :r, 
i  J 
I  ,  '.:  1-
~;  ~ 
11 
I 
.  .. 
'  '. 
i 
r 
J 
'  f 
~  :· 
~·  . Table  A  3  Necessary  maximum  level of  world oil production 
l (in millions 
Actual  ~othec~:J (u) 
of  tonnes)  1972  II  1977  I 
1990  Source  1  UN  Source  1  UN 
1 
Western  Europe  20  70  175- 200 
USA  550  480  450  - 500  i  Other  industrialized countrJ es  115  100  100 - 110 
I 
Developing countries  (exclu- 115  215  365  - 615 
din&r  OPEC  countries) 
USSR  415  565  750- eoo 
Other  countries with  cen-
trally planned  economies  65  120  360  - 625 
Total  1.320  1.550  12.~- 2.85() 
Probable  demand  (2725)  (3.150)  4.950  I 
Balance:  OPEC  countries  1.405  1.600  2.750- 2.1CO  ,J 
55  II bfl  ( .;2  a b/ 
I 
** Commission  estimates based  on  various  ~tudi~s. T
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Table  A 5  Energy  consumption per head  (kg oe  per year) 
1978  (est  1mat es)  1990  ( forecastsr)· 
EUR  - 9  3,6  4,9 
Greece  1,6  3,3 
Spain_.  2,0  3,7 
Portugal  1,2  1,5 
Energy  forecasts  of the applicant  countries for 1990 
I  S 
Solid fuels 
Oil 
Natural  ~as 
Nuclear 
Hydro 
Total  (million·toe) 
SoliH fuels 
Oil 
Natural  p:as 
Nuclear 
Hydro 
Total  (million toe) 
Gross  internal 
coneumntion 
Degree  of dependence 
Production 
Greece(l)  Spain  (l)  1 • 
9  15 
1  9 
0,2  -
3  23 
1  9 
14,2  56 
!  Net  imports 
1  3 
18  52 
- 11 
- - . - -
19  66 
33,2  122 
57,2 X  54X 
• 
Portugal 
.  0,1 
-
N  -
1,4 
1,5 
3,0 
0,5 
11 
- -
-
11,5 
14,5 
79,31 
,, '! 
.  I 
I  I 
I  ' 
I  . 
,  I 
l 
I  I 
I 
I. 
'  I 
Table  A 6 
1990  Energy  balance  for  the  Community  of  9,  10  and  12 
EUR-9  EUR-10  (*)  EUR-12  (**) 
million toe  million  toe  million toe  -
Production 
Solid fuels  193  Z02  217 
Oil  87/147  88/-148  97/157 
Natural  Gas  116/131  116/131  116/131 
Nuclear  208  211  235 
Hydro  39  40  51 
Total  643/718  657/732  716/791 
Net  imports 
Solid fuels  55  . 56  60 
: 
Oil  580/505·  598/523  661/586 
Natural  122  122  133  qas 
Nuclear  -
~  -
Hydro  4  4  4 
Total  761/686  180/70(  858/783 
EUR-9  EUR-10  EUR-12 
T 0  T A l  1ni  l!~2n  (%)  mi~~lon  (%)  mlllion  n,.  (%) 
1Solid  fuels  248  (18)  258  (18)  277  (18) 
Oil  ~67/652  (48/46)  687/672  (48/47)  I  758/743  [  (48/47) 
Natural  gas  238/252  (16/18)  238/232  (16/17):  249  /263  (16/17) 
Nuclear  208  (15)  211  (15>  .  235  (15) 
Hydro  43  (  3)  44  .  (  3)  55  (3) 
Total  1404  ·.  (100)  1437  100  1574  100 
*)  EUR-9  plus  Greece 
**)  EU~-9 plus  Greece,  Spain  and  Portugal 
Source:  "Energy  objectives of  the· Commun.i ty for  1990  and  co!ive ~ge.nce of 
policies of  Member  States",  Commission  communication  to the  Council, 
COMC79)316  final. 'l'A!LE  A 7 
Life of  reserves  and  ratio  reserves  to  cumulative  demand  in  the period 1976-2000 
I 
Iron  Copper  Lead 
Ratio of  reserves  to  --
':urrent  demand  194  54  . 29 
·(in years) 
Ratio  of  reserves  to 
·11976-2000  cumulative  5,1  1,4  1,2 
demand 
~  .  ~ 
Chromium  Cobalt  Columbium 
Ratio  of  reserves  tc· 
current  demand  320  44  800 
I 
(in  vear~) 
Ratio  of  reserves_to 
-1976-2000  cumulative  10,)  ), 2  17 
dema"ld 
lungste  ~)  Vanadiun  Bismut~) 
Ratio  of  reserves  to 
current  demand  57  340  30 
(in  years)  -
Ratio  of  reserves  to 
l976-2000  cumulative  1,4  8,2  0,8 
demand 
1)  figures  for  1974  and  the period 1974-2000. 
2>  figures  for-1975  and  the period 1975-2000. 
Tin  Zinc  Al  .  .  •  um1n1um 
- . , 
Titanium  1) 
42  27  284  16,) 
. 
1,5.  0,9  6,2  ) 
Manganese  Molybdeii~icfcel Tantalum 
185.  1.08  125  8> 
4,6.  2,2  ),)  1,8 
1)  Mercury  Silver 
11 
Platinum  Asbest~~l 
lO 
~ 
20  110  22 
I 
0,9.  0,6  l  0,5 
' Raw 
material 
Iron 
Copper 
Lead 
Tin 
Zinc 
Aluminium 
Titanium 
Chromium 
Cobalt 
Columbium 
Manganese 
Molybdenum 
Nickel 
Tungsten 
Vanadium 
Bismuth 
Mercury 
Silver 
Platinum 
Asbestos 
TABLE  A-8  II/532/79-EN 
Regional  distribution of  known  and  reported  reserves  in  1977 
Share  of first 
three 
countries 
59.4 
44.9 
47.8 
50.2 
45.8 
62.8 
58.2 
96.9 
49.6 
88.5 
90.5 
74.3 
48.8 
69.6 
94.9 
47.9 
65.2 
54.9 
99.5 
81.3 
Share  of first 
five 
countries 
76.7 
58.7 
61.4 
68.1 
58.6 
74.8 
81.8 
97.9 
71.9 
95.3 
97.7 
86.9 
70.6 
80.6 
97.2 
60.9 
78.3 
76.5 
99.9 
91.8 
Percentage  share of 
certain  countries 
USSR  30.2,  Brazil  17.5,  Canada  11.7, 
Australia 11.5,  India  5.8 
USA  18m5,  Chile 18.5,  USSR  7.9,  Peru  7.0, 
Canada  6.8,  Zambia  6.4 
USA  20.8,  Australia 13.8,  USSR  13.2, 
Canada  9.5,  South  Africa  4.1 
Indonesia  23.6,  China  14.8,Thailand 11.8, 
Bolivia 9.7, Malaysia  8.2,  USSR  6.1, 
Brazil  5.9 
Canada  18.7,  USA  14.5,  Australia  12.6# 
USSR  7.3,  Ireland  5.5 
Guinea  33.9,  Australia 18.6, Brazil  10.3, 
Jamaica  6.2,  India  5.8,  Guyana  4.1, 
Cameroon  4.2 
Brazil  23.2,  Canada  18.7,  India  16.3, 
Norway  15.2,  Australia 8.4,  USA  7.4, 
South  Africa  4.3 
South  Africa  74.1,Rhodesia  22.2,  USSR  0.6, 
Finland 0.6,  India  0.4, Brazil  0.3, 
Madagascar  0.3 
Zaire  12.3,New  Caledonia  10.6, 
Philippines 11.9,  Zambia  8.2,  Cuba  21.8, 
Indonesia  15.5 
Brazil  76.6,USSR  6.4,Canada  5.5,Zaire 3.8, 
Uganda  3.0,  Niger  3.0 
South  Africa  45.0,USSR  37.5,Australia  BoO~ 
Gabon  5.0,  Brazil  2.2 
USA  38.4,Chile 27.8,Canada  8.1, 
USSR  6.6,  China  6.0 
New  Caledonia  18.8,  Cuba  17.8,  Canada  12.8, 
USSR  11.0,Indonesia 10.8,Philippines  10~0 
China  46.9,Canada  12.1,  USSR  10.6, 
North  Korea  5.6, Australia 2.7 
USSR  74.8,South  Africa  18.7,  Chile 1.4, 
Australia  1.4,Venezuela 0.9,India 0.9 
Australia  20.7,Bolivia 16.3,  USA  10.9 
Canada  6.5, Mexico  6.5,  Peru  5.4 
Spain  38.4,  USSR  18.2,Yugoslavia 8.6, 
USA  8.6,  China  4.5,  Mexico  4.5, 
Turkey  4.5,  Italy 4.1 
USSR  26.2,  USA  24.8,  Mexico  13.9, 
Canada  11.6,  Peru  10.0 
South  Africa  82.3,USSR  15.6,  Canada  1e6 
Colombia  0.3,  USA  0.1 
Canada  42.7,  USSR  32~3, South  Africa 6.3, 
Rhodesia  6.3,  USA  4~2 ·
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AluminiuM 
Copper 
L~ad 
Nickel 
,.. 
Tin 
'  Zinc 
Iron ore 
Manganese 
Antimony 
I 
Cadmium 
Chromium 
Cobalt 
Niobium 
Germanium 
Mercury 
Molybdenum 
Platinum 
Selenium 
Tahtalum 
Titanium 
Tungsten 
Vanadium 
Z-irconium 
Uranium 
Phosphate 
Potassium 
Sulphur 
Asbestos 
-·· 
TABLE  A-11 
t;,  II/532/79-EN 
Community,  United  States  and  Japanese  import  dependence 
- imports  as  percentage of  consumption  -
) 
I 
EEC  USA 
I 
.. JAPAN  I·  1•1•'''~  I 
61b  '  asb  • 
;,~ il r .• 
100b 
' 
81  - 90 
53  4  76 
1oo
1  71  100 
87  75  97 
68 
-7  64  . 80 
--9  29  94 
100  99  90 
95
1 
36  + 
C1lmost  100  including tht ore) 
100  '  91  100 
1oo•  ·98 
100  100 
100  35  ...  : 
33 
I  73  ) 
I 
100  !  -
100
11 
I 
80 
1oo~  42
1 
100.i  95 
100,1 
I 
99\  54 
I 
99  I 
\  36 
' 
100  \\ 
59c 
99  - 100 
20 
~ 
43 
I 
I 
l  - ~ 
100  83  100  .  \ 
'I 
;{~· 
"J  •  '•',• 
1,' 
The  figures  for  the  EEC  are  1974-76  aver·t.es;  those  for  the  USA  and  Japan  relate to 
1974  and  1972  respectively.  Consumption  r·fers  to  second  melt. 
a  excluding  scrap.  / 
b  including bauxite,  alumina  and  import H metal;  the  figures  for  the  USA  are  taken 
from  "Mineral  Development  of  the  Eigh  t:es.  Prospects  and  Problems  BMAC  1976"; 
Japanese  1972  figures  are  taken  from  \~port of  United  States  Council  on 
International  Economic  Policy- "Critipl  Imported Materials" - December  1974. 
c  The  proportion  will  increase  rapidly 1ten  Community  consumption  grows  and  French 
production  supplies  a  smaller  proport·~n. 
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- Whole-milk powder 
- Skimmed-milk 
powder(•) 
- Concentrated milk 
- n .... 
- Buller c•t 
Al•lpriM(I) 
E,p 
M~••f'J 
- TOIII ,., 
- Total heel and veel 
- lftr 
-Veal 
•  PiJmCII 
- Pnultr)'IMII 
- \hnrmell •n4 
llll•lml'al 
{)i/, 1md f111 
- lut;dC~I 
- Vear~•ble C'l 
- Slauahterhouw lilts C'l 
•  ()( m11rine animals (I) 
Si.Jur« · Eum~lat. 
(') lnc:ludlftg buneroil. 
(I) Including ~lauahterhou.e lll'-
(1)  hdud1ng olral. 
2 
•1961• 
•&977• 
•l96lc 
··977· 
•L961• 
•1977· 
··968·  •1977· 
•l968• 
•J977· 
•t961• 
•1977• 
··961c  •l977c 
·•968· 
•1977· 
•t961c 
•J.977c 
•L968• 
•1977· 
•1961• 
•1977· 
•l961· 
•1977• 
•1961· 
ol977o 
•19611• 
•l977o 
•1968· 
•1977· 
•&968• 
•1977· 
•1968o 
•1977· 
•1968· 
•1977· 
(•)  lnc:lude\ whole-malk powder ror haly. 
EUR9 
3 
169 
)10 
140 
110 
142 
155 
91 
103 
91 
Ill 
: 
102 
99 
100 
93 
96 
90 
97 
89 
96 
94 
106 
100 
100 
101 
104 
56 
64 
: 
42 
: 
22 
: 
84 
: 
25 
('l l'wo yean ( 1976-77) 0, UK. Dlland EUR 9 (1975-76). 
Table  A 15 
Devtoch-
..  n4  Frwncc  lllllia 
4  5  6 
84  169  0 
Ill  409  0 
146  183  0 
161  112  0 
9)  116  93 
Ill  165  62 
84  109  90 
90  Ill  80 
104  119  67 
135  110  61 
:  :  : 
99  91  19 
86  100  94 
71  99  97 
81  97  77 
86  94  75 
87  101  62 
96  101  61 
87'  Ill  65 
98  l09  60 
84  101  51 
70  106  61 
95  17  II 
II  .,  7S 
49  102  99 
56  112  98 
95  12  74 
42  74  56 
].4  41  52 
37  so  53 
:  :  : 
7  25  48 
:  :  : 
109  100  IS 
:  :  : 
10  10  I 
(continued) 
Nftler- UEBLI  Un11ed  Dan-
lend  llf.U  K1111·  l.wl.iln4  merk  dom 
7  I  9  10  II 
347  219  66  543  386 
506  423  290  •  • 
48  117  91  426  128 
52  115  160  us  132 
3-45  115  101  0  1243 
310  25  ll9  0  575 
225  52  44  456  23-4 
23-4  43  " 
425  332 
298  110  10  191  332 
493  105  30  320  301 
:  :  :  :  : 
109  120  102  ..  103 
135  m  99  100  141 
205  159  100  96  104 
160  109  62  270  387 
.190  120  73  258  305 
108  90  61  590  252 
128  92  75  570  300 
ll  88  61  596  251 
93  91  74  571  308 
561  104  97  ISO  400 
141  99  168  367  100 
171  uo  58  162  495 
219  173  64  144  354 
350  132  99  104  351 
311  96  103  104  2l5 
219  42  42  139  100 
442  IS  " 
120  0 
25  26  :  :  : 
33  33  II  6S  93 
:  :  :  :  : 
3  I  S'  0  7 
:  :  :  :  •  : 
64  82  41  429  100 
:  :  :  :  : 
0  0  I  57  287 
_ .. --~----·- ~---- ---
I  •, 
TABLE  A 16 
Worlrl  exoorts  and  EC  foreign  trade  in all products,  agricultural  pr.oducts(1) 
and  other products 
(MrcJ'  USD) 
;  .1'969  1973  19,74  1975  :  1976  :  1977  197R 
~-------------·--------·-----------:--------:--------:-··---·-:--------:---~---:-~-----:--------· 
2  •.  3  4  ~  ·6  7  .B  .  . 
~-·-~:.:_~~:-......:..-.-:_~~-.~~~-~~-~~~ ~~  ~.: --------: ---.-·  .. ---:-·--- ~--:- ------~:-------: -----.-- : --~--.. --
'  . 
World  t':~ports  ~  ;: 
:  929,0' :1  - all  rroductli  ·  .  ,•  334,7  468,0  7o4;o·  720,0  820,0  073,4 
of which: aariculcural produces  !:  64,7  ·99,0  126,0  ..  129,0  :  140,0  ; . 157 ,o  ;  172,5 
othtr products  .·  ,  ..  .  ,.-~.'  J:  279,0  369,0  578,0  591,0  680,0  77~,0  905,9 
: 
·- ~:.~~~:~~-;,/i.:c;-iradir- · 
·"·~  .. 
Exrnrts  ...  ..  \  :· 
- all  rroducts  '  73,1  99,5'  13'2,'0  143,0  .1'58,0  :  189,8  :  221,6 
of whrch:  a~ricultural rrod&KtS  ._.  6,3  9,4  11,7  11,6  11,8  14,0  16,9 
': 
Jmrorts  :  : 
197,6 ',;  - all products  ·  .  72,9  103,8  156,0  155,0  176,2  :  227,6 
of which:  a~ricultural products  21,1  30,0  ·~3,3  32;3  3~,9  42,7  :  46,1 
:--------:--------:-------·:-----·--;----~--:·---~--:--·----~ 
%  l~F  <.~· t.·xrorrs  of a~rkultural produa~  ~-;-1 : 
pcn:c:nrage of total EEC exports  ,.  . !.  .  ; 
• 
8,5 
21,2 
': 
9,4 
.17 ,9 
., 
8,5  : 
'. 
17,9  -17 ,t  16,9  16,0 
8,1  7,5 :'  7,4  7,6 
.. 
·% F.FC  imrorts of agricultural produai-i'Sl  ~ · 
rt-·r~l·nt~lle of total EEC impons  .  1:  28,5  28,9  21,3  20,8  21,0  21,6  ~  20,3  .  .. 
:--------:-~~-----:----~---~:~-------:--~~-~·:·~~~---:------~- .  '  :  .. 
-~--""t------
Jndn ch1m11.~S (1969 :-.  100) 
WoriJ e)(rorts; 
100.  139,8  210,3  215,1 '  245,0  :  .277,6  322,.2  - all  rrodm;ts 
'I:'T  a(tricultura~ ptoducts  100  ..  153;0  194,7  199,4  216,4, :  242,6  ·2.66,6. 
_,;_  other prodUCts ·  100  136,7  214,1 ..  2'18,9  25'1 ,8  285,9  335,5 
!.  .,  :I· 
1-:xtt>rnall:f:C-trad;:  .. 
Expurts  : 
..  - all  rroJucts  100  .136, 1  187,4  195,6  216,1  259,6  :  303,1' 
- a~ricultural products  100  149,2  185,7  184,1  117,3  222,2 ':  268,3 
~- --~~----·-
1m pons 
•  I  ' 
- all  products  100  :  '142,4  214,0  .212,6  241,7  ·271 ,0  312,2 
- a~ricultural products  100  142,2  157,8  153.,,  • 
1.74,'9  •·  202,4  213,5 Table  A 17  _  .. ____ _ 
'  :.  '•  ~. 
~  ... 
·' 
' .. 
:  .  ·  Hio .uc£  ·  ·  :  ·  .  .  l  change  ·  :------ ... --: -·----·---:  -~.--·----:  .... ,... ............  :.·---------.-. 
1977  :'  1978  . •  !?]_~  : . .!9?.1  . :  .  }97.~ 
'  :  :.  ·:  .  : .. 1973  : ,''  1916  :  1977 
... ··----------:  --------------~---------~-----:  ____ :_ __ .,.,: ~--.-------:·-a..----·--.-:·-·--.-----·'i:  ~-----~--·- -:..! 
2  :  .  '  3  4  5  6  .:~  7 
'  ',- I 
-------------:------------------------------:--------~:-~-------:--------~:--~------:-----~------" 
0 
04 
05 
011:-1 
1 
21 
22 
232 
24 
261  - 265 
29 
4 
592.11  )' 
592.12  ) 
er::c  ·fmports 
Food  products 
of  which  :  ~  cer~als 
- fruit  and  vegetables 
- be~f and  veal 
Beverases  and  ~obacco 
Skins  a.,d  furs 
Oilseeds 
Nutural  rubber 
T·i mber  and  cork 
Natural  textile fibres 
~~gricultural  raw  mater.: 
OiLs  and  fats  · 
Starches, gluten 
:  .. 
.. 
22  352  : 
2  931  ': 
. 5  336 
246 
1  481  .. 
. 1  186 
. 3  023 
581  . 
4  102 
·2  344 
852 
~ 
1  514 
9· 
.· .  .,., 
'•' 
20  979 
J.llt  I{ ·•  · 
9,2  ~  i5,S·  :  - 6,1~ 
0,3  : .·-. 25,!"  :,  - 20,0 
s·  ~98 .:  ·10,1_  10,1  ..  11,6 . 
Z61.  : .  ;..  23,7  :  '  4,2  s  .1'  6,o 
3,9  ·:  31,8  1 952  .::  11,3': 
'  ·  ..  1-,1Zo  4,4  1,,8' ·.: .- S,.6 
~  '  ~  .. 
21,9 i  :  ..  ·1,6  .2  .97~  ..  11,6  : .. 
548  ·:  8,6.  10,9  . - 5,7 
l 
1 3' ... - ·0,9. 
.  '.  '  4066  5,0 
2  194  0,7  .  4,4  1 - 6,4 
868 
~  .  11,7  :  15,1  1.,8 
1·  421  8,0  37,1  : - 6,1 
'. 
.5 ..  '! 36,4  - 10,0·  ~~ -.44,4 
,  .,.  I, 
/· 
'•  : 
: 
I 
.  '  .  . 
: ~--.-----·-: ................ ,: ------·---:  -~~~~-~-~~  ............  .:...:.;~---:-... 
Total  :  37 453  :  36127  :  .8,2  :  13,~; ,i  -.  3-15· 
""'. ------·-~-·:  .................  .;, ......................  ~-·---·--:  _______ .. ;..: ~-------~:  ----~--:-:..-:  -;,. ...  ~~-:-.;~-:-~----:----:-.. \. 
:,  EEC  ·:  ':' ' 
,., 
exports  ..  '  . 
:  .  •.  ..  '  ; 
''  0  Food  products  7 941  8  515  11,9 ' ..  16,3  -.  72  .  .  .  . 
..  '.  "' ..  ,. 785. 
I 
04  of  whi·ch  :  -cereals  1  257  ' ,0,4  - 1,7 ,a.  .  . 42,0 
05  - fruit  and  vegetables  942  888  . :  9,5  15,,7  ·: 
. '  .,  5,1  .. 
011.1  - beef  and  veal  115  ·.  · .U2  10,8  - 27,~  :- I  2·,6 
beveraf'es  and  tobacco  .2'348  2"811  15,5  :" 
>  16,_8  19,J'' 
'I 
I, 
21  .  S~ins and  furs  310  '·327  '  1113  .  20,6  ·s  4  '·  22  Oilseedi  25  22  :  - 1 ,a  :  - 34,2  - 12,0 
232  ~'atura  L rubber  7  6  • - 3.,7  -·  12  5  - 14~_3  ,  ~ 
24  Timber  and  cork  215. :  203  : .  10,4 .  - 0,5  - 5~6 
261  - 268  hlatural  textiLe  fibres  . 288  204  - 7,2  ..  6,3  - 29  2 
...  .  f 
29  : A3ricultural  raw  mat ..  576  567  10,5.  16,4  - 1,6 
4  Oils  and  fats·  563·  601  19,1  .  34',!  6,7 
!{ 
592.11  )  Starches,  gluten  34  31  2,8  : '  25;,·  :  - . g,8 
592. 12  )  ' . ·  .... 
'  .  '  '  .  :  _,.. _______ :  ---·-·-·'111!1': ----------:.--------· :------··--....... ' ' 
I  . 
Total  ~  1i 308  : ..  ~3 287  ·•  12,  1.  ! 
,_:  '  ·,16;,5 
Sour~~:  ECROSTAT  - CTCI 
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1ABLE  A 19 
'l"rade  in manufactured products by t'e USA,  Japan  [Uld  the  EE."C 
with non-oil  developing countries 
USA  JAPAil  EIC 
. - .  ~ 
1973  I  1978  1973  I  1978  1973 
I 
1978 
I 
I  '  IMPOR'IS  '  I 
from  developing countries 
I  I 
I  I  I 
I 
I 
I 
'l'ota.l  in ¢ 100 million  8,01:  22,17  2,25;  4,38  '  7,49  22,10 
'  I  I 
'l'otal  in ¢ per capita  38  : 101  21  ~  38  29 
I  85 
'  ' 
' 
I 
I  I 
I 
I 
as  ~  o'f total  imports  ot 
I 
I 
~&l'lufactured produ~ta by  18,8 
I 
22,9  22,8 : 24,8 
I 
I  6,2  8,3 
I 
each country  I 
I  I 
I 
I 
' 
as  %of total 
I  I  I 
exports ot  I 
manufactures .products by  29,0  30,7  10,7.  6,7  24,4 
I  23,8  ' 
non-oil  developing coun- I  ' 
tries 
I 
I 
I 
I  I 
I 
' 
I 
I 
EXPOR'lS 
I 
t·o  de.veloping .countries  11,28:  25,18  10,52• 27,13  24,18 
I  52,37 
\ 
in i  1000 mill  inn 
I  ' 
I 
I  I 
&lance  +3,27: 
I  I 
+3,01  +8,27: +22,75  +16,69 '  +30,27 
.  '  I 
C  1 > Including European  developing countries of the Medi terranea seaboard 
C2>  EXcluding EUropean  countries 
Sources  GA'Pl' a
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 '!'ABLE  A  22 
][atribution of total  exports by major areas 
¢ 1000 million,  fob,  %  of world  exports 
Destination  (a) 
Industrial  OPJX:  other developinK 
regions  countries 
Origin  Year  Value  %  Value  %  Value  % 
Industrial  1963  69,3  44,8  3,8  2,5  18,1  11,7 
regions  1968  116,6  49,0  6,1  2,6  24,8  10,4 
1973  289,0  50,3  16,0  2,8  52,8  9,2 
1978  579,5  44,5  78,9  6,1  120,6  9,3 
1963  6,7  4,3  0,1  - 1,9  1,3 
1968  10,7  4,5  0,1  - 2,2  1,0 
OPBC  1973  31,8  5,5  0,3  - 8,0  1,4 
1978  105,7  8,1  1,5  0,1  28,5  2,2 
1963  15,5  10,0  0,4  0,3  4,3  2,7 
other de- 1968  20,5  8,7  0,7  0,3  5,8  2,3 
vel  oping  1973  47,2  8,2  2,3  0,4  12,5  2,2 
countries  1978  107,5  8,3  10,7  0,8  30,7  2,4 
1963  3,5  2,3  0,2  0,1  2,3  1,5 
Eastern bloc  1968  6,1  2,6 .  0,4  0,2  3,1  1,3 
1973  15,4  2,7  1,3  0,2  5p3  0,9 
1978  33,9  2,6  5,0  0,4  11,6  0,9 
1963  98,6  63,7  4,5  2,9  27,2  17,6 
1968  158,5  66,6  7,4  3,1  37,1  15,6· 
·World  total  1973  39'4,3  68,7  20,2  3,5  80,9  14,1 
1978  844,2  64,8  97,3  7,5  196,1  15,0 
<a> 
(b) 
defined as  in '.Pa.ble  A 18 
including Austria,  New  Zealand aad South Atrioa 
Sourcez  GA'Pl 
fb) 
.j 
Bast  era  World  total 
bloc 
Value  %  ·'Value  % 
i 
I 
.  I 
3,5  2,3  99,0  tl4,o  I 
6,3  2,6  160,7  (,7 ,6 
18,1  3,2  391,3  68,1 
41,7  3,2  846,8  65,0 
0,2  0,1  :9,2  5.,9 
0,2  0,1  13,9  5,9 
1,0  0,2  42,1  7,3 
2,7  0,2  142,3  10,Cf 
·-
1,6  1,0  22,7  ~: 4,6 
2,0  0,8  29,8  ~,'2,5 
4,3  0,8  68,3  •  "
11  ,9 
9,5  7,3  163,3  12,5 
12,4  8,0  18,7  12,1 
16,6  7,0  27,0  11,3 
32,4  5,6  -51,2  ·1o,o 
69,2  5,3  124,5  9,6 
17,9  11,6  154',7  100,0 
25,4  10,7  237,8  100,0 
56,3  9,8  574,3  1CJO,O 
124,2  9,5  . 1303,0  1HO,O '!HE  SHARE  OF  !Hm  BID IR WORLD  1RA.DE 
- ... 
WORLD  DIPOR.  WORLD  EIPOR'!B  .. 
.. 
• 1963  ' • 1970  • 1973  • 1974  • 1978  • 1963  • 1970  • 1973  • !1974  • :tS78 
io. 
'lO'l'AL  'mADE  37;,8  38,0  39,0  36,8  37,6  33,·6  35,7  36,6  I  33,0  35,~ 
by the Nine 
inol  udiag trade  1 
within the BBX:  15,6  18,6  . 20,2  17.,3  19,1  15,2  18,0  19,3  16,7  18.~ 
-··  ... 
with noa  ...  ember  22,2  19,4  18,8.  19,5  18,5  18;4  17 •. 7  1-7,3  16,3  17,2 
oountriee ·...; 
!ABLE A 24 
. Geographical structure of. EEC  of lline imports 
-as"'-
/ 
1'  OECD  COUJJ.tri es  :lon-OECD  OOUlltri es 
- other  jf!tem  ·ott  ~4!- Year  Total  DC  "  nli.Y!n  Total  oo  ountll  .. OPEC  ve ,iag 
ooun ries 
Agricultural  65  52,8  29,0  23,8  47,2  4,0  4,6  38,6 
aad  73  66,1  42~6  23,5  33,9  3,9  2,3  27,7  f'ood  products  7-t 
' 
64,1  44,4  19,7  . 35,9  2,4  2,5  31,0 
l 
&lengy  65  25,9  19,7  6,2  74,1  4,1  63,6  6,4 
products  73  23,8  19,7  4,1  76,2  5,0  62,5  8,7 
77  21,8  18,1  3,7  78,2  6,6  . 63,7  7,9 
-·· .. 
In  t ermedi  a.t e  65  76,1  49,3  26,8  23,9  3,2  1,3  19,  4. 
products  73  80,3  57,7  22,6  19',7  3,2  ·o,5  -.  16',') 
77  82,8  59,4  23,4  17,2  3,5  0,7  13,') 
ltJuipment  65  96,9  66,9  30,0  3,1  0,8  0  1. 
'· 
2,2 
products  73  96,3  '  67,4  28,9  3,7  1,2  0,2  2,3 
'  .. 
77  95,8  ()5 ,6  30~2  4,2  1,2  0,2  ~  2,8 
-
Current  65  68,0  40,1  27,9  32,0  4,·8·  1-,1  26,1 
I  "'  consumption 
produota 
73  79,0  48,9·  30,1  21,0  4,3  0,9  15,8 
77 
'.  77,2  49,6  27,6  22,8  4,5  . 
0,7  17, s 
, 
All  products  65  66,8  42,4  24,4  33,2  3,3'  9,0  20,9 
73  74,9  51,2  23,7  25,1  3,2  8,2  J  3,  7_ 
77  70,6  49,0 
...  21,6  29,4  •  3,5  12,7  13.1'2 
- - . 'lABLE  A 25 
Geographical struoture of EEC  of Nine export& 
-as~-
.. 
Year  OECD  oountri  e1r  Non-OECD  oouatriea · 
) 
Total  EEC  Otb_. -·_ 
Total 
::.sa:stern  Uliher. ere-
omnn.:  m  00  OOUil'tl •  OPEC  velopiag 
countries 
Agricultural  65  81,5  61,6  ,19,9  18,5  3,1  3,.8  11,6 
a.nd  73  84,5  67,4  17,1  15,5  3,0  2,7  9,8 
food produo11!!  77  82,4  68,3·  14,1  17,6  1,9  5,9  9,8 
-
Energy  65  83,7  59,9  23,8  16,3  0,2  1,6  11.,5 
products  73  87,2  63,7  23,5  12,8  1,2  1., 1  10,5 
77  82,2  61,2  21,0  17,8  1,4  2,2  14,2 
Intermediate  65  71,0  44,8  26,2  29,0  4,0  4,0  21,0 
products  73  77,7  51,9  25_,8  22,3  5,3  3.,J.  13,6 
77  74,2  5o,a  24,1  25,8  5,9  5,9  14,0 
Equipment  65  . 65,1  37,3  27,8  34,9  2,6  4,8,  27,5 
products  73  .75,2  45,1  30,1  24,8  3,9  ·5,1  I 15,8 
77  65,5  41,6  23,9  34,5  . 4,3  13,7  16,5 
eurr.at  65  78;.0  50,2  '  27,8  22,0  1,6  4,1  16,3 
o o:nslllq)t i oa  73  85,6  58,8  26,8  14,4  2,7  2,1  l 
~,6 
products  77  82,3  58,5  23,8  17,7  2,4 
~  6,3  9,0  1 
All  products  65  71,6  45,5  26,1  28,4  2,8  4,2  21,4 
73  79,2  52,6  26,6  20,6  3,8  3,7  13,1 
77  73,0  50,5  22,5  27,0  4,0  9,1  13,9 
- -'
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'.PABLE  A  30 
Energy imports required tor various ·materials 
I&J/an1 
100 
100 
100 
0, 
Copper  eWIMINIUM 
lo  ' 
I  I  I  • 
·. 
POLYACmTI  POLYAMIDI 
Souroet  Premiers  eleme:ate. pour  U1t  progra:Dllle aatioaal d 'iao-
vation 
Ministere de 1 1industrie,  France,  1979 'PA&E  A 31 
!he maia applications ot biotechaologr over the aext 15-20 zears 
AGRICUL'PORE  Aim  IIOOD  CDIIIOALS 
- biological pesticides  - oh•ioal  )!ro~cta from  tementatiOll 
- plaat-growth regulators  - ch•ical products  extracted from 
- bio-oheaioal fertilisers  liviag orgaaia  .. 
- genetic aelectio• ot aew  varieties  -- ••111••  u  oatal78t• 
- "in vitro" reproduction  - carbohydrate oheaiatry 
- biomass  tor huan  aad animal  tood 
.. 
:amRCIY 
- natural  drugs  - bi81188a  tor eaergr 
- biologically active products  - biogaa tr• orgaaio waate 
- genetic engineeriag  - photobiological production ot hych'ogea 
- treatment ot hereditary diaeaae  - ~ocarbou aad r•i• trom plaata 
- artificial organa  - microbiological exploitation ot poor 
aiaerala 
- liguid et:fluent 
- fertilizer trom solid urban waste D 
F 
I 
NL 
B 
UK 
IRL 
OK 
EUR 
USA 
'!'ABLE  A  32 
Im>LU'liOif  DE DEPENS!S  IN"ll!RIEO'RIS  DE  R &  D 
!REID OJ'  DOMBS'fi 0  R.  &  D SPEIDIN'G 
Dr!WICKLUR'G  DER  IBLAllDISCHDf  -, &  B - AtB<J.ABitl 
en  tf?  du PIB 
as  %  ot GJP 
in ~ des  BIP 
'lotal publio alld private  including!  EXpenditure 
expeDdi ture {a)  tiaaaoed trom the budget  (b) 
1967  1971  1975  1977 *  1971  1975  1977  * 
1,8  2,2  2,2  2,2  1,1  1,2  1,1 
2,2  1,9  1,8  1,8  1,3  1,2  1,1 
0,8  1,0  1,0  1,0  0,5  0,4  0,4 
2,2  2,2  2,1  n.d.  0,9  1,0  1,0 
1,3  1,4  1,3  1,4  0,8  0,7  0,8 
2,4  2,11)  2,1  n.d.  1,3  1,3  1,2 
0,6  0,8  0,9  0,8  0,3  0,5  0,5 
0,8  1,02)  1,1  1,0  0,6  0,6  0,6 
(9)  1,8  1,9  1,9  n.d.  1,1  1,0  1,0 
2,9  2,5  2,3  2,4  1,5  1,2  1,3 
JAPAN  1,5  1,9  2,0  2,0 
Source:  (a)  Analysis  of  the  ~.~:;  Potential  of  Member  States  of  ·the  EEC 
E.C.  ~russels 1979 
{b)  Public  expenditure  on  R&D  1970  - 1978 
Eurostat.  Decefflber  1978 
* provisoire 1 estimate I  geschatzt 
1)  1972 
2)  1970 tnUL.L.  1'\JJ 
Changes  in  Consumption  Structures,  in  Volume(1)  by  major  functions 
Food  .Housing,  Furni-
products~  Clothing,  heating, . ture  and 
drink  footwear  light  Equip-
tobacco  ment 
FR  1960  37,.'3  12.5  10.2  13.6 
Germany  1970  31.8  13.0  11.7  13.7 
. 
1970  23.9  9.9  15.0  10.9 
1977  21.7  8.9  15.2  11.0 
France  1960  42.0  11.0  10.1  8  .. 9 
1970  34.3  10 .. 5  10.6  9.9 
1970  27. 1  8.6  14.5  10 .o 
1977  22.6  7.2  15.3  10.6 
Italy  1960  47.3  9.5  13.2  5.8 
1970  42.5  9.6  12 .o  6.8 
1970  39  •. 9  9.3  12.9  5. 7 
1977  37~4  8,.6  13.2  5.9 
U  .. K.  1960  n.d.  n.d.  n.d.  n.d.  1970 
1970  33.0  8.9  17.7  7.4 
1977  31.9  9.5  17.8  7,2 
Nether- 1960  38.1  12,.8  12.8  15.0 
lands  1970  32.6  10.7  15.7  18.4 
1970  28.3  10.6  12.4  12.7 
1977  26.3  8.5  12.4  10.8 
1960  35.0  9.1  16.8  11 .• 1  Belgium 
1970  31.1  8  .. 8  15.2  13.3 
1970  28.1  8.8  15.6  11.8 
1977  23.6  8  .. 8  15.1  13.2 
.  Source  •  Nat1onal  accounts  ESA 
(1).The  comparison  1960-70  is for  constant  1960  prices; 
the  comparison  1970-77  is  for  constant  1970  prices. 
Transport  Educa-
Health  and  · t ion, 
Communi- Leisure 
cations 
3 .9  8.6  6. 9 
3.7  12.7  7.0 
9.7  12.8  7.,4 
12.2  13.5  7.8 
6.9  8.7  6.6 
10 .. 3  10.3  8.2 
9.9  11.6  6. 1 
12.0  12.2  7.2 
5.9  7.2  6!"3 
7.0  11.4  5.5 
6.9  10.7  6.1 
8.9  11.0  6.4 
n.d.  n.d.  n.d. 
( 2)  12.2  9. 9  o. 9  ( 2) 
1.0  12.7  11.0 
5.6  4.2  3.8 
4.5  6. 0  4.0 
8.3  9,4  7,8 
8.6  12.0  10,4 
6.1  9.0  4.7 
6.7  11..4  4.5 
6.9  10.4  4.7 
8.9  11.1  6.7 
(2)  N.B.  Health  expenditure  in  the  UK  is mainly  part  of  public  expenditure. 
'l 
t 
: 
( 
,i 
\  ! 
k 
' 
Other 
goods 
and 
I 
services 
~ 
4.5 
5. 5 
: 
~ .. 
10  .. 2  ! 
9.6 
I 
' 
5. 7 
sa 9 
12. 2 
12 .. 9 
5  .. 0 
5  .. 2 
l 
8  .. 6 
8  .. 6 
n.d. 
9.9  1  8.9 
7~ 
7  '7  ~ 
- .  ' 
10 .. 7 
10.8 
\ . 
t 
8.4 
i  ,. 
9.0 
13  .. 7  L 
12.6 
i  .: 
-j Table  A  34 
General govet"'IIMnnexpendtture ancln. COIIIPoellloft •  a,.,......... ol GDP,1110,117111ftd 1171-71 
Towt  Coneumptlon  Other  Cllpital 
expenditure  current  ~·lUre 
expenditure '  (net) 2 
1te0  1175  1877  1878  1179  ,.,  1175  1177  1171  1111  1180  1175  1977  1178  1979  ,.,  1175  1177  1171  111'1 
OK  25,0  44,9  46,8  45,8  47,7  12,7  23,3  24,0  24,3  25,0  9,0  17,3  18,3  17,4  18,4  3,3  4,3  4,5  4,1  4,2 
D.  32,5  46,4  46,6  46,7  46,4  13,6  20,9  20,0  20,0  19,8  14,6  20,0  21,3  21,3  21,0  4,3  5,5  5,3  5,4  5,6 
F  35,5  43,5  44,5  45,6  46,4  13,0  14,4  14,9  15,1  15,3  18,8  24,8  26,0  27,0  27,7  3,7  4,3  3,6  3,5  3,5 
IRL  27,6  48,5  47,0  47,6  49,3 4  12,1  19,0  18,4  18,7  19,9  12,4  23,7  22,2  22,8  22,5  3,1  5,8  6,3  6,2  6.9 
Is  32,1  48,9  42,7  47,0  46,3  12,2  13,8  15,1  15,9  16,3  15,8  28,0  23,2  26,0  24,9  4,1  7,1  4,4  5,1  5.1 
Nl  35,3  54,5  55,4  56,1  58,3  13,4  18,2  18,3  18,3  18,7  16,7  30,7  32,6  33,4  34,4  5,1  5,6  4,5  4,4  5,3 
B  30,5  45,5  49,2  50,9  52,0  12,8  17,1  17,3  18,0  18,1  15,6  24,9  27,8  28,8  29,5  2,1  3,5  4,1  4,2  4,4. 
l  30,5  49,1  54,9  54,3  54,4  10,1  14,4  15,8  15,8  15,9  15,4  26,9  30,1  30,3  30,1  5,0  7,8  8,9  8,2  8,4 
UK  31,7  47,7  43,3  42,6  42,8  16,4  22,4  20,7  20,2  20,6  12,5  19,0  18,6  18,9  19,2  2,7  5,9  4,0  3,5  3,0 
EC  ~~.7  46,6  45,9  46,7  46,9  14,0  18,3  18,1  18,3  18,4  15,1  22,9  23,3  24,0  24,1  3,8  5,4  4,5  4,5  4,5 
----- ,  Current tranafera and property and entrepreneurial Income ~ld  (mainly lntereet). 
I  c.pttal !ormation. purch  ...  a of land and Intangible UMta, C.pltal tranat.rt (net of c.pttal tr.,.,. recetwd). 
• 
From 1171. percentag" are calculated !rom the new GOP eeri•. revleed upwardt  . 
•  See footnote II, Table 6 1 
Sout'QN  1177-71· Economic budgett. 
1~75·  ESA and OECD nauonal acc:ountt. 
Table  A  35 
-------
General govemment cu..,.... revenue and Ita compoaltlon •• a percenl8ge ol GOP, 1110, 117111ftd 1177·71 
Total current  ol WhiCh 
revenue' 
lndtrect  direct  =~~ilb~~,:'l  taxes  taxes 
1180  1975  1977  1978  1979  1960  1175  1977  1978  191'8  1te0  1975  1977  1178  1979  1880  1975  1977  1978  1971 
OK  20,1  43,3  46,6  45,3  46,6  12,2  15,2  17,3  18,1  18,9  11,6  24,6  24,6  24,5  25,4  1,5  0,7  0,7  0,6  0,7 
0  35,8  40,7  44,0  43,9  43,3  14,3  12,3  12,4  12,8  12,9  9,3  12,0  13,7  13,0  12,6  9,7  14,9  15,5  15,5  15,3 
F  36,4  41,2  43,2  43,3  44,8  16,3  14,0  13,8  14,1  14,5  6,2  7,2  8,4  7,9  7,9  11,1  17,1  18,4  18,5  19,5 
IRL  25,4  37,2  38.0  36,8  38.9 4  16,4  16,9  17,3  16,5  16,7  4,7  10,3  11,6  11,2  12,0  1,1  6,7  4,8  4,5  4,8 
I 3  31,2  34,4  34,6  36,4  34,7  13,0  9.5  10,3  10,1  9,3  5,7  7,3  8,6  10,3  9,7  10,5  15,2  13,8  14,1  14,2 
Nl  36,0  51,8  53,7  54,1  56,0  10,8  11,5  12,4  12,8  12,5  12,5  18,5  16,4  16,5  17,9  8,9  19,7  18,0  18,2  18,5 
B  27,6  41,6  43,6  44,6  44,8  11,3  11,5  11,8  12,0  11,9  7,8  18,6  17,0  18,2  18,5  7,1  12,8  12,7  12,4  12,4 
l  33,6  50,2  55,3  57,1  56.2  9,5  12,8  13,1  13,2  12,8  11,9  17,4  20,5  22,0  21,5  9,0  15,1  17,0  16,5  18,4 
UK  30,7  42,6  40,0  38,8  39,6  13,1  13,4  14,5  14,8  16,0  10,9  17,0  14,4  13,9  13,5  3,8  8,3  6,7  6,2  1,2 
EC  33,4  41,0  42,6  42,7  43,0  14,0  12,5  12,9  13,2  13,4  8,7  11,8  12,5  12,4  12,2  8,1  14,1  14,2  14,1  14,2 
1  The dltfere~  betWeen 1M total and the aum of taxee and IOCiel MCUrity conlrtbUiona Ia eooouneed tor  111r ...._,laneoue...,.,.. ,_.,..(property  eM  etlll  ...,....,.leii11001N, 
:P 
currer~l tnternel•onel cooperation, grou operating eurplua). 
Including Imputed aoctal security contrlbutiona. 
From 1971, percentagee baaed on new GOP flgu,..., reviMd upwardl. 
S.. footnote li. Table 8.1. 
Soun:liN ·  1177·71: Economtc Buc:tgeta: 
,.,_75: E8A and OECO national eccount8. -
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 Table  A- 3? 
POPULATION  BETWEEN  0  AND  14  YEARS  '000 000 
1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2015  2050 
.~.----~--------~-----~------~~------~------~------~------~ 
I  ~ 
I 
NL 
B 
L 
UK 
IRL 
DK 
EEC 
13,5 
12,7 
13,5 
3,5 
2,2 
0,07 
13,1 
1,0 
1,1 
60,6 
11,3 
1?,1 
12,9 
3,2 
2,0 
0,07 
12,0 
1,0 
1,1 
55,7 
9,7 
12,0 
12,2 
2,9 
2,0 
0,0~ 
11,3 
1,1 
1,1 
52,3 
9,9 
11,8 
11,9 
2,9 
2,0 
0,06 
11,3 
1,2 
1,1 
52,2 
10,3 
1?.2 
12,0 
3,0 
2,0 
0,06 
11,9 
1,2 
1,1 
54,0 
7,7 
11,6 
11,6 
2,6 
1,8 
0,05 
10,8 
1,3 
1,0 
48,5 
5,7 
11 ,·1 
11,i0 
2,2 
1;6 
0,04 
10,"3 
1,5 
1 ,,o 
44,5 
~----~-------~------~------~------~--------~------._  ______ __ 
ANNUAL  GROWTH  RATE  OF  POPULATION  0-14  YEARS 
1980/1975  1985/1980  1990/1985  1995/1990  2015/1995 
D  -3,47  -2,94  0,39  0,79  -1,45 
F  -0,92  -0,25  -0,23  0,65  -0,28 
I  -0,81  -11"11  -0,51  0,21  -0,17 
NL  -1,87  -1,43  -0,18  0,78  -0,81 
B  -1,70  -0,45  0,40  0,61  -0,67 
L  -1,38  -0,85  o, i6  -0,55  -0,96 
UK  -1,65  -1,30  0,06  1,09  -0,49 
IRL  0,4~  I  ,, 17  1,44  1,28  0,20 
Dt<  -0,63  -0,63  0,15  0,23  -0,25 
EEC  _,  65  :T  :-;- 26  -0,05  0,68  -0,54  I'  , 
POPuLATION  AGED  0+14  YEARS  AS  PROPORTION  OF  TOTAL 
·-...-
8L  1985  1990  1995 
,5 
I  16,1  16,5  17,3 
I 
-~ 19g-;-; 
..__..D-·~8  I  -:;-8 
F  l  24, 1  I  22 
I  I  24 ~ 2  i  ?2 
t  f  -.r  "  I  ??  ·,L  t  ._..;,v  ·'  ,_._ 
s  1  z  2  ,  '~  :  t. o 
I
!  20J'?  t8  L 
IJK 
IPL 
""17  '?.  '")1 
t  .,;i v) 
,  .. 6  21,9  21,3  21,6 
I' 7 
I  21,2  20,3  20,3  I 
,8  201'7  20,0  20,3 
,6  20,0  20,2  20,8 
,9  '18,  1  18,4  18,1  I 
'(..  ;:~o,o  19,8  20,7  i  I 
t'w  30,!14  30,4  30,3  ;•''  I  ,.  f  ~~ 1  ~o  ·  ,o  6  •~L· •  1  .:,  ,6  r  ...  " 
·••·  -., .. l.  "'~va  ••  :,.  __  ,.~  ·~·;,,~~·~·---····-.-.--......l-
I  ,  ' 
,,.  ~  'i ~; /)  l  19  !' l  ~  01 2  ~  '  ...  ~.1 .... ,  ..  ,.,_,., __ .  ..,,,l.,&---~-~  ·-·~ 
2015 
14,4 
19,6 
19,2 
17,0 
18l5 
16,3 
18,6 
25,3 
19,2 
18,2 
2050/2015 
-0,88 
-0,12 
-o, 15 · 
-0,41 
-0,33 
-0,80 
-o, 14. 
0,38') 
-o, 12: 
-0,25 
2050 
14,7 
19,3 
19,0 
16,8 
l.  18,4 
16,1 
18,7 
22,5 
19,2 
18,3 
1'T'''l<  : ~  ·:;··  ·  ··  :·  irn.··,-~.·l:....~  ;t:.:  ~.-,t·,s  of  demogranhic  changP.  in  thft 
.:..."'.: .. ';-·e·:'!3  _'.';;·  :'~·  ~·1:  j_'  -:·  ~  .:  .  .,,: .. -.  ~  :t.ECt  Jun.e  1Y78 Table  A  38 
POPULATION  OF  WORKING  AGE,  15  - 64  YRS.  •ooo·ooo 
I  '  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2015  2050 
D  39,.6  40,4  42,3  41,5  40,4  35,9  24,8 
F  32,9  34,1  .  36,0  36,7  36,9  38,6  36,4 
I  35,5  36,5  38,2  38,7  38,9  39,4  37,1 
i 
NL  8,7  9,2  9,7  9,9  10,0  10,2  8,5 
9  6,2  6,4  6,6  6,6  6,6  6,6  5,7 
L·  0,2  0,2  0,3  0,2  0,2  0,2  0,2 
UK  35,1  35,9  37,0  37,3  37,3  38,7  35,5 
IRL  1,8  2,0  2,1  2,3  2,5  3,.1+  4,2 
DK  3,2  3,3  3,~  3,4'  3,5  3,5  3,3 
EEC  163,4  167,9  175,7  176,7  176,3  176,6  155,7 
ANNUAL  GROWTH  RATE  OF  WORKING  POPULATION  '000 000 
1980/1975  1985/1980  1990/1985  1995/1990  2015/1995  2050/2015 
0  0,39  0,92'  -0,37  -0,56  -0,58  -1,05 
F  0,67  1,13  0,39  0,10  0,23  -0,17 
I  0,55  0,98  0,24  o, 10  0,07  -0,17 
NL  1,16  1,06  0,50  0,23  0,08  -0,53 
B  0,55  0,73  -0,07  -0,18  0,04  -0,42 
L  o, 19  0,41  -0,25  -0,43  -0,51  -0,84 
UK  0,42  0,64  0,13  0,02  0,18  .-0,25 
IRL  1,27  1,55  1,53  1,60  1,61  0,62 
DK  0,33  0,51  0,21  0,31  0,07  -0,16  , 
EEC  0,54  0,91  0,12  · -o,os  0,01  -0,36 
WORKING  AGE  POPULATION  AS  PROPORTION  OF  TOTAL 
1975  1980  1985  1990  199$  2015  2050 
D  64,0  II 66,1  69,8  69,0'  67,8  67,2  64,6 
F  62,6  63,7  66,0  66,0  65,2  65,5  63,4 
I  63,8  64,1  66,3  66,1  65,6  65,2  63,7 
NL  ,  63,7  65,8  67,7  67,7  67,1  66,9  63,3 
B  63,7  65,4  67,4  66,7  65,8  67,5  65,3 
L  66,8  67,6  69,1  68,7.  68,1  67,1  65,3 
UK  62,7  63,9  65,6  65,4  64,7  66,4  64,3 
IRL  57,8  58,7  59,3  59,7  60,5  66,6  64,.6 
DK  64,1  64,2  64,9  64,8  65,1'  64,7  63,7 
EEC  63,3  64,5  66,9  66,6  65,9  66,1  64,0 
Source:  see  Table  A 37 
,,  II Table  A  39 
RETIREMENT  AGE  POPULATION  65  YEARS  AND  OVER 
'OOU  OOw 
1975  1980  1985  '1990  1995  2015  2050 
D  8,9  9,4  8,6  9,7  8,9  9,8  8,0 
I 
F  7,0  7,3  6,6  7,1  7,5  8,8  19,0 
I  6,7  7,5  7,3  7,9  8,4  9,5  10,1 
i  NL  1,5  1,6  1,7  1,8  1,9  2,5  2,7 
B  1,4  1,4  1,2  1,3  1,3  1,4  1,4  I  l  0,05  0,05  0,05  0,05  0,05  0,05  0,05  l 
UK  7,8  8,2  8,2  8,5  8,4  8,8  9,4  I  IRL  0,3  0,4  0,4  0,4  0,4  0,4  0,8  .  I 
DK  0,7  0,7  0,8  0,8  0,8  0,9  0,9 
J 
EEC  34,3  36,6  34,7  36,5.  37,6  42,0  43,3 
ANNUAL  GROWTH  RATE  OF  RETIREMENT  AGE  POPULATION. 
'OOO  000 
1980/1975  1985/1980  1990/1985  1995/1990  2015/1995  2050/2015 
D  1,  21  -1,85  0,39  0,30  0,52  -0,60 
F  0,88  -2,05  1,37  1,12  0,78  0,·37 
I  2,28  -0,65  1,  77  1,21  0,59  0,18 
NL  1,73  0,97  1,55  0,92  1,32  0,22 
B  0,21  -2,01  0,87  0,57  0,15  0,10 
l  0,84  -1,24  0,10  1,22  0,46  -0,46 
UK  0,98  -0,14  a, 11  -0,16  0,22  0,20 
IRL  0,78  0,4(t  0,52  -0,00  0,47  2,05 
DK  1,69  0,63  0,60  -0,25  0,66  0,08 
EEC  1,29  -1,05  1,02  0,58  0,56 .  0,09  . 
RETIREMENT  AGE  POPULATlON  AS  PROPORTION  OF  TOTAL 
1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2015  2050· 
D  14,3  15,4  14,2  14,5  14,9  18,4  20,7 
F  13,3  13,7  12,1  12,7  13,2  14,9  17,4 
I  12,0  13,2  12,6  '  13,5  14,2  15,6  17,3 
NL  10,7  11,4  11,7  12,3  12,6  16,1  19,9 
B  13,9  14,0  12,6  13,1  13,4  14,0  16,3 
L 
,/  13,0  13,6  12,8  ! 12,9  13,9  16,7  18,6 
i 
UK  14,0  1'~,6  14,5  . 14,8  14,6  15,1  17,0 
IRL  10,9  10,8  10,3  9,9  9,2  8,1  12,9 
DK  13,3  14p2  14,4  '14 7  14,4  16,1  17,1  '  ,  -
EEC  13,3  14,1  13,2  .·  13,8  14,0  15,7  17,8 
' 
Source:  see  Table  A  37 M
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 TABLE  A 42 
Total  world  and  major  region  population trends 
' 
Population  - Millions  % change  l  r  % share  ~  I 
t 
i  REGION 
~  z 
I  1950  1975  2000  1950  1975  2000 
1950  1975 
World  total  2513  4032  6196  60  54  100  100  100 
Most  developed  reqions  855  1137  1348  33  19  34,0  28,2  21,8 
Least  developed  regions  1658  2894  4848  75  68  66,0  71,8  78,2 
EuroRe _*  415  518  596  25  15  16,5  12,9  9,6  f 
F.ECc.a9  215  258  270  20 
~ 
5  8,6  6,4  4,3  ~ 
Other  Western  European  95  133  179  40  35  3,8  3,3  2,9 
countries 
Eastern  Countries *  105  127  147  21  16  4,1  3,2  2,4 
North  America*  166  236  289  42  22  6,6  5,9  '•, 7 
of  which  United  States  152  214  260  41  21  6,0  5,3  4,2 
Latin  America  164  323  608  97  88  6,5  8,0  9,8 
Central  America  54  108  215  100  99  2,1  2,7  3,5 
I  TP.moer~tP.  South  America  25  38  51  52  34  1,0  0,9  0,8  l 
Tronic~l South  America  85  177  342  108  93  3,4  4,4  5,5 
Eastern  Asia  673  1063  1406  58  32  26,8  26,4  22,7 
China  557  895  1190  61  33  22,2  22,2  19,2 
I  Jaoon  *  84  112  129  33  15  3,3  2,8  2,1 
Other  East  Asian  countries  33  56  87  70  55  1,3  1,4  1,4 
South·  Asia  683  1211  2129  77  76  27,2  30,0  34,4 
of  which  India  363  619  1037  71  68  14,4  15,4  16,7 
Africa  219  405  826  85  104  8,7  10,0  13,3 
Australia  13  21  29  62  38  5,2  5,2  4,7 
New  Zealand *  ..  10  17  22  70  29  4,0  4,2  3,6 
Other  countries  3  4  7  33  75  1,2  1,0  1,1 
Russia  *  180  254  312  41  23  7,2  6,3  5,0 
* Most  devloped  regions 
Source  U.N.  Statistics 1979 .
~
.
,
,
 
·
·
'
T
?
·
·
r
w
.
.
¥
 
.
.
 
i
i
i
>
 
u
·
 
e
n
 
e
-
-
m
·
 
s
 
n
 
n
s
·
 
t
 
e
 
·
a
 
a
 
a
 
e
 
-
-
d
e
?
 
,
.
 
>
a
s
¥
 
r
t
 
S
 
•
 
'
 
•
 
2
 
•
 
•
 
"
'
 
M
J
 
T
a
b
 
1
 
e
 
A
 
4
3
 
E
M
P
L
O
I
 
(
1
)
 
E
T
 
C
H
O
M
A
G
E
 
(
2
)
 
D
A
N
S
 
L
A
 
C
O
M
M
U
N
A
U
T
E
,
 
A
U
X
 
E
T
A
T
S
-
U
N
I
S
 
_
E
T
 
A
U
 
J
A
P
O
N
 
E
R
W
E
R
B
S
T
~
T
I
G
K
E
I
T
 
(
1
)
 
U
N
D
~
A
R
B
E
I
T
S
L
G
S
I
G
K
E
I
T
 
(
2
)
 
I
N
 
D
E
R
 
G
E
M
E
I
N
S
C
H
A
F
T
,
 
D
E
N
 
V
E
R
E
I
N
I
G
T
E
N
 
S
T
A
A
T
E
N
 
U
N
O
 
I
N
 
J
A
P
A
N
 
~
M
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
 
(
1
)
 
A
N
D
 
U
N
E
M
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
 
(
2
)
 
I
N
 
T
H
E
·
f
U
R
O
P
E
A
N
 
C
O
M
M
U
N
I
T
Y
,
 
T
H
E
 
U
N
I
T
E
D
 
S
T
A
T
E
S
 
A
N
D
 
J
A
P
A
N
 
-
~
 
-
·
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
-
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
T
 
0
 
T
 
1
\
 
L
 
E
 
M
 
P
 
L
 
0
 
Y
 
M
 
E
 
N
 
T
 
U
N
E
M
P
L
O
Y
M
E
N
T
 
R
A
T
E
 
J
 
V
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
e
n
 
1
0
0
0
 
"
 
V
e
r
l
n
d
e
r
u
n
g
e
n
 
i
n
 
1
0
0
0
 
~
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
S
'
 
i
n
 
1
0
0
0
 
~
 
T
a
u
x
 
a
n
n
u
e
l
s
 
m
o
y
e
n
$
 
e
n
 
I
 
J
l
h
r
l
i
c
h
e
 
d
u
r
c
h
s
c
h
n
i
t
t
l
.
 
V
e
r
l
n
d
e
-
r
u
n
g
s
r
a
t
e
n
 
-
i
n
 
I
 
(
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
a
c
t
i
v
e
 
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
)
 
~
 
,
-
~
:
~
6
3
-
6
8
 
1
9
6
8
-
7
3
 
1
9
7
3
-
7
8
 
t
:
 
+
~
-
:
:
~
 
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
i
n
 
I
 
1
9
6
1
-
6
8
 
1
9
6
4
-
6
8
 
1
9
6
9
-
7
3
 
1
9
7
4
-
7
8
 
1
9
6
3
 
1
9
6
8
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
 
I
 
-
5
5
4
 
N
L
 
1
7
8
 
8
 
L
 
I
R
L
 
D
I
C
 
E
G
 
U
S
A
 
1
)
 
J
A
P
A
N
 
s
a
 
1
 
·
1
2
7
 
3
 
9
7
 
-
3
7
2
 
1
1
2
9
8
 
4
0
7
0
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
/
Q
u
e
l
l
e
/
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
-
-
8
0
9
 
-
1
6
3
7
 
1
0
7
5
 
-
1
2
0
 
7
1
 
6
8
2
 
1
2
0
 
2
7
 
1
2
4
 
-
4
6
 
,
,
 
1
5
 
-
1
1
0
 
6
 
1
0
0
 
3
4
 
1
0
 
3
9
 
2
4
1
8
 
-
1
1
7
0
 
7
1
9
1
 
9
4
3
3
 
2
5
7
0
 
1
6
3
1
 
-
0
.
1
 
0
.
5
 
-
0
.
6
 
1
.
1
 
0
.
6
 
-
o
.
o
 
0
.
3
 
0
.
1
 
1
.
1
 
0
.
1
 
2
.
2
 
1
.
5
 
-
0
.
6
 
0
.
5
 
-
0
.
6
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
3
 
o
.
o
 
0
.
1
 
-
o
.
o
 
0
.
9
 
-
0
.
2
 
2
.
9
 
1
.
 
7
 
0
.
6
 
0
.
1
 
0
.
1
 
'
o
.
s
 
0
.
7
 
3
.
5
 
0
.
1
 
-
o
.
 
1
 
0
.
9
 
0
.
5
 
1
.
6
 
1
.
0
 
<
1
>
 
C
o
m
p
t
e
s
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
u
x
 
S
E
C
 
1
9
6
3
-
1
9
7
7
 
E
u
r
o
s
t
a
t
 
-
1
.
3
 
-
0
.
1
 
0
.
7
 
-
0
.
1
 
-
0
.
2
 
-
0
.
1
 
-
0
.
2
 
-
0
.
2
 
0
.
3
 
-
0
.
2
 
2
.
0
 
0
.
6
 
0
.
7
 
0
.
7
 
5
.
2
 
0
.
6
 
1
 
.
·
5
 
0
.
-
2
 
2
.
3
 
4
.
5
 
1
 
•
.
 
5
 
2
.
1
 
5
.
7
 
1
.
3
 
1
.
3
 
.
.
 
1
.
0
 
1
.
3
 
1
-
.
8
 
4
.
7
 
4
.
9
 
1
.
5
 
2
.
3
 
3
.
1
 
2
.
9
 
0
.
1
 
0
 
2
.
3
 
5
.
2
 
1
.
 
7
 
2
.
3
 
3
.
6
 
1
.
2
 
2
.
5
 
6
.
0
 
0
.
7
 
2
;
.
5
 
4
.
9
 
1
.
 
3
 
e
t
 
p
o
u
r
 
1
9
7
8
:
 
B
u
d
g
e
t
s
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
q
u
e
s
 
(
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
d
e
 
l
a
 
C
o
m
m
i
~
s
i
o
n
)
 
e
t
 
O
C
D
E
 
W
i
r
t
s
c
h
a
f
t
s
b
u
d
g
e
t
s
 
(
E
G
-
D
i
e
n
s
t
s
t
e
l
l
e
o
)
 
u
n
d
 
O
E
C
D
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
s
 
(
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
)
 
a
n
d
 
O
C
D
E
 
(
2
)
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
e
n
n
e
 
N
o
v
e
m
b
r
e
 
1
9
7
8
 
e
t
 
E
u
r
o
s
t
a
t
 
2
.
2
 
2
.
3
 
4
.
9
 
2
"
;
.
9
 
3
.
2
 
0
 
2
.
4
 
6
.
3
 
2
.
0
 
2
.
9
 
5
.
6
 
1
.
4
 
1
9
7
5
 
4
.
2
 
3
.
9
 
5
.
3
 
4
.
0
 
5
.
3
 
0
.
2
 
3
.
8
 
8
.
7
 
4
.
6
 
4
.
4
 
8
.
5
 
1
.
 
9
 
1
9
7
8
 
3
 
.
.
 
9
 
5
.
3
 
7
.
1
 
4
.
1
 
8
.
4
 
0
.
8
 
5
.
7
 
8
.
9
 
.
6
-
"
!
6
 
'
"
·
 
5
 
6
 
.
.
 
0
 
2
.
2
 TOTAL  U~E~PLCYMENT RATE 
LABOUR  FORCE  SURVEY  1977 
D 
~  5,00X  ... ,(- ,(  7,49X 
Maps  A 44 
0  EUR  9 =  4,2  X ) 
TAI..IX  DE  CHCMAGE 
£NQU£TE  FOQCES  DE  TRAVAIL  1977 
0 
-c-) .
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
Y
e
a
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
h
i
g
h
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
 
-
-
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
1
9
7
0
 
A
u
r
i
c
h
 
1
9
7
5
 
A
u
r
i
c
h
 
-
1
9
7
6
 
A
u
r
i
c
h
 
-
1
9
7
7
 
A
u
r
i
c
h
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
 
-
1
9
7
0
 
P
r
o
v
e
n
c
e
-
A
l
p
e
s
 
~
·
.
 
-
C
c
5
t
e
 
d
'
A
z
u
r
 
1
9
7
5
 
P
r
o
v
e
n
c
e
-
A
l
p
e
s
 
L
a
n
g
u
e
d
o
c
,
 
C
o
r
s
e
 
1
9
7
6
 
P
~
~
v
e
n
c
e
-
A
l
p
e
s
 
C
6
t
e
 
d
'
A
z
u
r
 
1
9
7
7
 
L
a
n
g
u
e
d
o
c
-
R
o
u
s
s
i
l
l
o
n
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
-
-
I
t
a
l
y
·
 
1
9
7
0
 
P
u
g
l
i
a
 
1
9
7
5
 
C
a
f
t
1
)
a
n
i
a
 
1
9
7
6
 
C
a
m
p
a
n
i
a
 
1
9
7
7
 
C
a
m
p
a
n
i
a
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
A
 
4
5
 
U
n
e
m
o
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
E
u
r
-
9
 
r
a
t
e
 
=
1
0
0
 
R
e
s
 
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
-
-
-
2
,
7
 
1
3
6
 
S
t
u
t
t
g
a
r
t
 
7
,
7
 
1
8
1
 
T
u
b
i
n
g
 
e
n
 
8
,
1
 
1
6
8
 
T
u
b
i
n
§
e
n
 
8
,
3
 
1
5
7
 
T
u
b
i
n
g
 
e
n
 
2
,
7
 
1
3
7
 
A
l
s
a
c
e
 
5
,
5
 
1
2
9
 
B
o
u
r
g
o
g
n
e
 
6
,
3
 
1
3
0
 
B
o
u
r
g
o
g
n
e
 
7
,
0
 
1
3
3
 
B
o
u
r
g
o
g
n
e
 
L
o
w
e
s
t
 
F
r
a
n
c
h
e
-
C
o
m
t
t
 
-
-
-
a
,
a
 
.
.
 
4
1
0
 
P
i
e
m
o
n
t
e
 
1
3
,
3
 
3
1
2
 
L
o
m
b
a
r
d
i
 
a
 
1
3
,
9
 
2
8
8
 
~
 
L
o
m
b
a
r
d
i
 
a
 
1
6
,
8
 
3
1
9
 
L
o
m
b
a
r
d
i
e
 
E
u
r
-
9
 
r
a
t
e
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
r
a
t
i
o
 
o
f
 
e
x
t
r
e
m
e
s
 
-
-
-
0
,
1
 
7
 
2
7
 
2
,
9
 
6
8
 
2
,
7
 
2
,
5
 
5
2
 
3
,
2
 
2
,
1
 
•
 
4
1
 
4
,
0
 
0
,
3
 
1
6
 
9
,
0
 
-
-
2
,
7
 
6
3
 
2
,
0
 
2
,
1
 
5
9
 
;
 
2
,
3
 
3
,
3
 
-
.
 
6
2
 
2
,
1
 
~
 
-
-
-
·
-
1
,
5
 
7
4
 
5
,
9
 
2
,
0
 
4
6
 
6
,
7
 
2
,
1
 
4
4
 
6
,
6
 
2
,
6
 
5
0
 
6
,
5
 U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
'
 
E
u
r
-
9
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
 
a
y
a
n
t
 
l
e
 
t
a
u
x
 
E
u
r
-
9
 
R
a
p
p
o
r
t
 
d
e
s
 
v
a
l
e
u
r
s
 
P
a
y
s
 
A
n
 
n
e
e
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
 
a
y
a
n
t
 
l
 
e
 
t
a
u
x
 
T
a
u
x
 
T
a
u
x
 
l
e
 
p
l
u
s
 
e
l
e
v
e
 
=
 
1
0
0
 
l
e
 
p
l
u
s
 
b
a
s
 
-
1
0
0
 
e
x
t
r
e
m
e
s
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
1
9
7
0
 
D
r
e
n
t
e
 
2
,
0
 
9
8
 
U
t
r
e
c
h
t
 
0
,
6
 
2
8
 
3
,
3
 
1
9
7
5
 
L
i
m
b
u
r
g
 
7
,
0
 
1
6
4
 
U
t
r
e
c
h
t
 
.
 
2
,
0
 
4
7
 
8
,
2
 
1
9
7
6
 
L
i
m
b
u
r
g
 
7
,
3
 
1
5
0
 
t
 
U
t
r
e
c
h
t
 
2
,
3
 
4
8
 
3
,
2
 
1
9
7
7
 
L
i
m
b
u
r
g
 
7
,
5
 
1
4
3
 
U
t
r
e
c
h
t
 
2
,
3
 
4
3
 
3
,
3
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
1
9
7
0
 
L
i
e
g
e
 
4
,
5
 
2
2
3
 
B
r
a
b
a
n
t
 
1
,
1
 
5
5
 
4
,
1
 
-
1
9
7
S
 
L
i
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
&
,
.
2
 
1
9
3
 
B
r
a
b
a
n
t
 
3
,
5
 
8
3
 
·
2
,
3
 
1
9
7
6
 
L
i
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
1
0
,
.
1
 
2
0
8
 
B
r
a
b
a
n
t
 
4
,
-
1
0
0
 
2
,
1
 
1
9
7
7
 
L
i
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
1
1
,
8
 
2
2
5
 
B
r
a
b
a
n
t
 
5
,
4
 
1
0
3
 
2
,
2
 
.
 
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
'
 
-
.
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
 
1
9
7
1
 
N
o
r
t
h
e
r
n
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
6
,
-
Q
.
.
 
3
0
1
 
S
o
u
t
h
.
 
E
a
s
t
 
1
,
5
 
7
6
 
4
,
0
 
1
9
7
5
 
N
o
r
t
h
e
r
n
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
6
~
9
 
1
6
1
 
S
o
u
t
h
.
 
E
a
s
t
 
2
,
5
 
5
9
 
2
,
8
 
1
9
7
6
 
N
o
r
t
h
e
r
n
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
8
,
8
 
1
8
2
 
S
o
u
t
h
.
 
E
a
s
t
 
3
,
8
 
7
9
 
2
,
3
 
1
9
7
7
 
N
o
r
t
h
e
r
n
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
9
,
7
 
1
8
4
 
S
o
u
t
h
.
 
E
a
s
t
 
4
,
1
 
7
9
 
2
,
4
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
E
u
r
o
s
t
a
t
 YOUTH  UNEMPLOYMENT 
Cune~ptoy~d of  Le~s  than  25  years  old 
~ X of  total  un~moloyed in  the  regionl 
LABOUR  FORCE  SURVEY  197, 
D 
(  30X 
~ 
30X~- (  40X 
• 
4rjj..{...- (sox 
1m 
5~~- (60% 
\ 
I  tj;; 
.·..-
Maps·  A 46 
r£)  EUR  9  =  41,4Xj  I 
CHO~AGE  DE  JEUNES 
rJeunes  de  moins  d~  25  ans  en  chomage  e~ 
.•  du  total  de!.  c:r.omE'urs  de  la  r~gio!'\) 
E~GUETE  FOR~ES  DE  TRAVAIL  19~7 
0 
,. 
•. Table  A47 
Annual  Growth  Rate  of the  Labour Force  f%) 
1995/75  1980/75  1985/80  1990/85  1995/90 
Total  0.37  0.65  0.78  0.35  -0.28 
Germany  Male  0.08  0.25  0.51  0.02  -0.46 
Female  0.8)  1.34  1.22  0.86  -0.01 
Total  0.72  0.98  0.84  o. 59  0.41 
France  Male  0.49  0.69  0.64  0.35  0.26 
Female  1.09  1·47  1.16  0.96  0.75 
Total  1.06  1.03  1.11  1.11  0.99 
Italy  Male  0.39  o. 2  .  0.57  0.44  0.35 
Fem!tle  2.6  3. 24  2.38  2.55  2.23 
Total  1.6  1.60  1.90  1.67  1. 21 
NL  Male  0.75  0.68  0.99  0.84  0.5 
Female  3·57  4.22  4.08  3.41  2.55 
Total  0.80  1.13  0.78  0.78  0.51 
Belgium  Male  0.29  0.48  0.39  0.22  0.06 
Female  1. 72  2.43  1.5  1.74  1.23 
Total  0.3  0.79  0.63  0.08  -0.29 
Luxembourg  Male  -0.09  0.27  0.21  -0.27  -0.56 
Female  1.19  2.07  1.59  0.83  0.26 
Total  0.5  0.65  0.74  0.42  0.17 
U.K.  Male  0.23  0.11  0.48  0.24  0.1 
Female  0.9  1.5  1.14  0.67  0.27 
Total  1. 79  1.24  1.9  2.0  2.0 
Ireland  Male  1.14  0.53  1.14  1.36  1.53 
F'emale  3.23  3.08  3.64  3.31  2.89 
Total  0.42  0.43  0.52  0.39  0.32 
Denmark  Male  0.1  -0.25  0.16  0.22  0.27 
Female  0.87  1.47  1.01  0.61  0.4 
Total  0.69  o.as  0.9  0.66  0.37  Community  Male  0.32  0.32  o.s6  0.3  0.1 
Female  1.06  1.82  1.49  1.26  0.81 
Source: 
11The  economic  implications  of demographic  change  in  the  European 
Conununity:  1975- 1995
11
,  Report  EEC,  June  1978,  p. 48. 
l 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
f 
f 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
~ 
I 
l 
I Age  group  1975 
15-19  3,5 
20-24  7,6 
25-29  9,0 
30-34  8,4 
35-39  8,5 
40-44  7,9 
45-49  7,5 
50-54  6,9 
55-59  4,3 
60-64  4,0 
65-100  1,7 
Total  70,0 
Age  group  1975 
1S-19  2,8 
20-24  5,7 
25-29  4,7 
30-34  3,7 
35-39  3,8 
40-44  3,7 
45-49  3,8 
S0-54  3,8 
55-59  2,1 
60-64  1,S 
6S-100  0,8 
Total  36,6 
Age  group  1975 
15-19  6,3 
20-24  13,3 
25-29  13,7 
30-34  12,2 
3S-39  12,3 
40-44  11,S 
4S-49  11,3 
S0-54  10,7 
55-59  6,S 
60-64  5,6 
65-100  2,6 
Total  106,1 
Table  A 48 
POTENTIAL  LABOUR  FORCE 
COMMUNITY.MALES 
··1980  1985 
3,5  3,3 
7,6  8,2 
8,8  8,9 
9,5  9,4 
8,4  9,4 
8,3  8,2 
7,6  8,0 
7,0  7,1 
6,0  5,9 
2,6  3,1 
1,S  1,3 
70,7  72,7 
POTENTIAL  LABOUR  FORCE 
COMMUNITY.FEMALES 
1980  1985 
3,1  2,9 
6,0  6,7 
5,3  S,8 
4,8  5,2 
4,2  S,1 
4,0  4,2 
3,9  4,3 
3,8  3,8 
3,2  3,1 
1,1  1,5 
0,7  0,6 
40,0  43,1 
POTENTIAL  LABOUR  FORCE 
COMMUNITY.TOTAL 
1980  198S 
6,6  6,3 
13,6  14,9 
14,1  14,7 
14,3  14,6 
12,5  14,S 
12,3  12,3 
11,4  12,3 
10,8  10,9 
9,2  9,0 
3,7  4,6 
2,2  1,8 
110,7  115,8 
1990 
2,9 
8,0 
9,6 
9,5 
9,3 
9,2 
7,9 
7,5 
5,9 
2,8 
1,2 
73,8 
1990 
2,5 
6,8 
6,5 
5,5 
S,3 
5,1 
4,6 
4,4 
3,2 
1,4 
o,s 
4SI9 
1990 
5,3 
14,9 
16,1 
1S,O 
14,6 
14,3 
12,S 
11,9 
9,2 
4,1 
1,7 
119,7 
I  QQQ  QQQ 
1995 
2,5 
7,0 
9,5 
10,4 
9,5 
9,1 
8,9 
7,4 
6,2 
2,5 
1,2 
74,1 
'  000  000 
1995 
2,2 
6,1 
6,S 
6,0 
5,5 
5,5 
5,7 
4,8 
3,7 
1,3 
0,5 
47  8 
'  000  000 
1995 
4,7 
13,1 
16,0 
16,4 
14,9 
14,6 
14,5 
12,1 
10,0 
3,9 
1,6 
121,9 
. 
~ 
u 
.. 
Q) 
u 
~ 
::J 
0 
(/) Table  A 49 
Investments  respecting  Member  State  energy  production objectives 
- percentage of  GNP  - · 
I 
1  I 
I  I 
1976-1980  I 1981-1985  ·I  1986-1990  I 
I 
I 
I 
I  I 
I 
!·· 
Germany  *  1,20  1,48  I  n.d. 
I  -I  I  I  ! 
I 
I 
France  '1 ,42  1,27  1,11  I 
Italy  1,43  2,14  n.d. 
Netherlands  1,61  1,48  1,07 
Belgium  ~  1,27  1,21  1,07 
Luxembourg  0,82  0,53  0,47  I 
United  Kingdom  2,77  2,36  2,45 
Ireland  1,89  n.d.  n.d. 
Danmark  1,03  1,41  0,91 
Community  . 
~  1,57  1,63  n.d. 
•  •  •  .  est1mates 
Source:  document  COM/78/613,  mid-February  1979. D
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 Tab 1 e  A  52 
EMPLOI,  VALEUR  AJOUTEE  BRUTE,  HEURES  DU  TRAVAIL,  PRODUCTIVITE 
BESCH~FTIGUNG,  BRUTTOWERTSCH~PFUNG, ARBEITSZEIT  UND  PRODUKTIVIT~T  1954-~ 
EMPLOYMENT,  OUTPUT,  WORKING  HOURS,  PRODUCTIVITY 
Industries manufacturieres 
Verarbeitendes  Gewerbe 
Manufacturing  industry 
CTaux  annuels  moyens  en  X I  jahrliche durchschnittliche Verlnderungsrate  in X I 
average  annual  change  in  X) 
l  p  H/L  P/H 
B.R.  Deutschland 
1953-1958  5.3  9.0  - 1.8  5.4 
1958-1963  2.0  '6.9  - 1.4  6.2 
1963-1968  - 0.5  5.2  - 0.4  6.2 
1968-1973  1.4  5.6  - 0.8  5.0 
1973-1978  - 2.6  1.1  - 1.2  5.1 
France 
1953·1958  o.s  5.8  1.3  3.9 
195 a·1963  1.4  6.7  - 0.2  5.5 
1963-1968  0.2  6.1  - 1.0  6.9 
196s-1973  2.1  7.0  - 0.2  5.0 
197:s-1978  - 0.9  2.7  - 1.1  4.8 
Italia 
1953-1958  2.6  7.1  - 0.2  4.6 
195 a-1963  3.2  10.3  - 0.2  7.1 
1963-1968  0.4  6.9  - 0.9  7.5 
1968-1973  1.  9  5.9  - 3.0  7.1 
1973-1978  0.3  2.5  - 0.4  2.6 
Nederland 
1953-1958  1.8  6.0  - 0.1  4.2 
195 B-1963  2.5  6.7  - o. 7  4.7 
1963-1968  - 0.1  7.1  - 0.9  8.3 
1968-1973  - 0.9  6.1  - 1.5  8.7 
1973-1977  - 2.5  0.9  - 1.4  4.9 
Belgigue/Belgie 
1960-1963  2.2  5.8  0.5  4.8 
1963-1968  - 0.4  5.4  - 0.8  6.7 
1968-1973  1.3  8.6  - 1.7  9.1 
1973-1977  - 3.3  - 1.2  - 1.8  6.5 
I 
United  Kingdom 
1953-1958  0.6  2.5  - 0.2  2.1 
1958-1963  0.3  3.5  - 0.5  3.7 
1963-1968  - 0.4  4.3  - 0.4  5.1 
1968-1973  - 0.3  2.9  - 0  .. 3  3.6 
1973-1978  - 0.5  - 0.9  - 0.6  0.2 
i 
l 
j 
I 
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'  L  p  H/L 
Ireland 
1953-1963  1.6  4.2  - 0.1 
1963-1973  1.9  6.3  - 0.4 
1973-1977  - 1.0  3.4  0.4 
Denmark 
1953·1958  1.2  ..  4.3  - 0.3 
1958-1963  4.1  7.5  - 1.5 
1963-1968  - 0.4  6.1  - 0.9 
1968-1973  1.5  6.7  - 2.5 
1973-1978  - 2.6  1.6  - 0.3 
CE/EG/EC 
1953-1958  2.5  6.3  - 0.9 
1958-1963  1.6  6.5  - 0.7 
1963-1968  - 0.2  5.5  - 0.6 
1968-1973  1.2  5.7  - 1.0 
1973-1977/78  - 1.2  1.2  - 0.9 
Source/Quelle/Source:  US-Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics 
Ireland:  Kennedy 
L  = Emploi/Beschlftigung/Employment 
P/H 
2.7 
4.8 
4.1 
3.4 
4.8 
7.5 
7.8 
4.7 
4.1 
5.5 
6.4 
5.5 
4.0 
,  .. 
P  - Valeur  ajoutfe brute en  volume/Bruttowertsch6pfung  zu  konstanten  Preisen/ 
Gross  value  added  at  constant  prices 
H/L  •  Durie  du  travail par  employf/Arbeitszeit  je Arbeitnehmer/Man-hour  per 
eq:,loyee 
P/H  =  Productivitf  horaire  apparente  du  travail/Arbeitsproduktivitit  je 
Erwerbstltigenstunde/Output  per  hour 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i Tab 1 e  A 53 
EMPLOI,  HEURES  DU  TRAVAIL,  PRODUCTIVITE  HORAIRE  DU  TRAVAIL 
ET  CROISSANCE  DANS  L'ECONOMIE  TOTALE 
BESCHAFTIGUNG,  ARBEITSZEIT,  STUNDENPRODUKTIVITAT  UND 
REALES  WACHSTUM  IN  DER  GESAMTWIRTSCHAFT 
EMPLOYMENT,  WORKING  HOURS,  PRODUCTIVITY  PER  MAN-HOUR  AND 
REAL  GROWTH  IN  WHOLE  ECONOMY 
1955-1978 
CTaux  annuels  moyens  en  X I  durchschnittliche  jahrlich~ V~rlnderungsraten 
average  annual  change  in  X> 
L 1)  H/L  2)  p  3)  P/H  4) 
Bundesreeublik 
Deutschland 
1955-1960  3.8  - 1.6  6.5  4.3 
1960-1965  1.5  - 1.0  5.0  4.5 
1965-1973  0.5  - 1.0  4.3  4.8 
1973-1978  - 1.1  - 1.1  2.0  4.3 
France  (5) 
1955-1960  1.4  0.2  5.0  3.3 
1960-1965  1.6  0  5.8  4.1 
1965-1973  1.8  - 0.7  5.5  4.4 
1973-1978  1.0  - 1.0  2.9  2.9 
I tali  a 
I 
1955-1960  1.8  5.5 
1960-1965  0.8  - 2.3  5.1  6.7 
1965-1973  1.1  - 0.9  5.2  5.0 
1973-197?  0.7  - 0.4  2.0  1.7 
Nederland  (6) 
1955-1960  1.6  - 0.1  4.0  2.5 
1960-1965  2.2  - 1.1  4.8  3.7 
1965-1973  0.9  - 1.1  5.3  5.5 
1973-1978  0.2  - 1.0  2.5  3.3 
Belgigue/Belgie 
1955-1960  0.6  - 0.8  2.5  2.7 
1960-1965  2.0  - 0.6  5.0  3.6 
1965-1973  1.2  - 1.3  5.1  5.2 
1973-1978  - 0.1  - 1.3  2.3  3.8 
Unite~ Kingdom 
1955-1960  0.4  - 0.5  2.5  2.6 
1960-1965  0.9  - 0.6  3.2  2.9 
1965-1973  - 0.3  - 0.5  3.1  3.9 
19?3-1978  - 0.1  - 0.4  1.8  2.3 
CE/EG/EC 
1955-1960  1.5  - 5.0  -
1960-1965  1.4  - 0.7  4.7  4.0 
1965-1973  0.7  - 0.9  4.5  4.7 
L 
1973-1978  - 0.2  - 0.8  2.1  3.1 
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I 
SourcesiQuellen:  OSCE  I  SAEG  I  SOEC  CTableauiTabelleiTabel 
1>:  L  Salaries  I  Arbeitnehmer  I  Salary worker 
2)  HIL  Duree  du  travail  par  employe  I 
Arbeitszeit  je Arbeitnehmer  I 
Man-hour  per  salary worker 
3)  p  .  PIB  reel  I  reales BIP  I  real  GDP  . 
4)  PIH  .  Productivite  horaire apparente  du  travail  I  . 
Arbeitsproduktivitat  je Arbeitnehmerstunde  I 
Labour  productivity per  salary working  hour 
5)  Branches  marchandes  non-agricoles 
6)  Secteurs  prives  I  Unternehmerbereich  I  Private sectors 
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 GRAPHICS  A 56 
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OECD,  industrialized zones  and  Major  Country  Export  trends 
to  LDCs  and  Eastern  Countries 
-~~--
(1)  (2)  Latin  (3)  (4)  Eastern 
I 
European  Africa  Asia  OPEC  Countries  America  Countries 
~otal  OECD  1970  9.1  6. 5  12.4  12.1  8. 3  7. 9 
i LL·i on  i  1978  30.6  25.2  40.3  51.2  81~9  40.2 
~  increase  +236.3  +287,.7  +  225.0  + 323,1  + 886,7  +  408,9 
U!1ited  1970  1.5  o.·7  5.8  3.7  2.0  0.4 
States 
~i l.l ion  s  1978  4.1  2.9  18.3  12.8  i6.6  4.5 
% increase  +173 .. 3  +314.3  +  215 .• 5  +  245.9  + 730.0  r+-1025,0 
~apan  1970  0.5  1. 0  1. 0  4.2  1. 0  1. 0 
Billion s  1978  1.7  3.2  5.6  21.0  14.6  6.7· 
~  increase  +240 .. 0  +220.0  +  460.0  + 400.0  +1360.0.  f+;  570.0 
EEC  1970  5.7  3.9  4.0  2.9  4.3  4.3 
[;on~  1978  20.5  15.5  11.7  10.7  41.7  19. '· 
~~asP.  I 
+259.6  +297.4  +  192.5  + 269.0  + 869 .. a  ~ 351.2 
TABLE  A59 
Share  of  each  country or  zone  in  total  OECD  exports  - percentage 
European  t  African  (2)  Latin  (3) 1  Asia  (4)  OPEC  LDCs  (1)  American  · 
1970  16.5  10.8  46.8  30.5  24.1 
1978  13.4  11.5  45.4  25.0  20.3  . 
1970  5.5  15.4  8.1  34.7  12.0 
1978  5.6  12.7  13.9  41.0  17.8 
1970  62.6  60.0  32.3  24.0  51.8 
1978  67.0  61.5  29 •  .0  20.9  50.9 
(1)  Europ~an LDCs  :  Greece,  Portugalp  Yugoslaviap  Turkey~ Cyprus  and  Malta. 
(2)  Afric~ excluding  Algeria,  Libyia,  Nigeria  and  South  Africa. 
(3)  L~tin America  excepting Venezuela. 
(4)  Asia  excepting  Indi 
~our~e  OECD  External  Trade  Statistics 
Eastern 
Countries 
5.0 
11.2 
12.7 
16.7 
54.4 
48.3 
-· 
·-
It • 
•• 
TABLE  A60 
Some  figures  on  EEC,  United  States  and  Japanese  relations  with  LDCs 
EEC  :.:  9  United  States  Japan 
TRADE  with  LDCs  . 1970  • 1978  .1970  . 1978  . 1970  . 1978  . 
BILLIONS 
IfltPORTS  to  LDCs  by  :  24,9  104,6  11,0  73,5  7,6  42,5 
OPEC  9,5  48,0  1,6  29,9  2,9  25,8 
NICs  5,3  25,5  4,0  24,7  1,1  7,2 
Other  LDCs  10,1  31,1  5,4  18,9  3,6  9,5 
EXPORTS  to  LDCs  by  :  22,1  105,0  14,5  56,8  8,2  46,4 
OPEC  4,3  41,7  2,0  16,6  1,0  14,6 
NICs  7,9  29,8  5,9  22 ,3  3,4  18,5 
Other  LDCs  9,9  33,5  6,6  17,9  3,8  13,3 
FINANCIAL  RESOURCES 
MILLIONS  s 
TOT~L  6074  34565  6304  16162  1824  10704 
% of  GNP  composition  :  1,00  1,78  0,63  0,77  0,92  1,09 
(a)  Public  aid  as  % of  2539  8737  3046  5664  458  2215 
GNP  0,40  0,45  0,31  0,27  0,20  0,23  (b)  Net  direct  invest-
ment 
(c)  Net  public  and  1234  3627  1888  5619  262  1318 
private  export  credit 
n.d.  8842  210  704  694  1697 
(a)  Source  :  OECD  External  trade statistics, Series  A. 
(b)  Greece,  Portugal,  Spain,  Turkey,  Yugoslavia,  Brasil,  Mexico,  Taiwanp  Hong  Kong, 
Singapore,  South  Korea. 
(c)  Statistics  from  Reports  of  the  Development  Aid  Committee,  OECD. T
A
B
L
E
 
A
6
1
 
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
E
E
C
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
b
y
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
T
h
i
r
d
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
(
a
)
 
a
n
d
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
F
u
e
l
s
 
E
x
p
o
r
t
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
T
h
i
r
d
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
1
9
7
3
 
0
,
5
 
1
9
7
8
 
2
,
5
 
o
f
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
:
 
L
D
C
 
p
e
:
t
r
o
l
e
u
m
 
1
9
7
3
 
0
,
1
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
e
r
s
 
1
9
7
8
 
0
,
7
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
L
D
C
s
 
1
9
7
3
 
0
,
4
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
,
8
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
E
 
1
9
7
3
 
0
,
.
1
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
1
9
7
8
 
0
,
2
 
(
a
)
 
I
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
M
e
d
i
t
e
r
r
a
n
e
a
n
 
B
a
s
i
n
 
L
D
C
s
 
(
b
)
 
I
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
n
o
n
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
 
.
.
.
.
 
.
 
-
1
7
,
9
 
4
8
,
0
 
1
7
,
0
 
4
4
,
9
 
0
,
9
 
3
,
1
 
1
,
3
 
5
,
0
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
R
f
w
 
M
a
t
e
r
i
a
 
s
 
E
x
p
o
r
t
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
4
,
9
 
1
9
,
0
 
1
0
,
9
 
3
1
,
6
 
0
,
9
 
1
,
4
 
3
,
5
 
2
,
3
 
4
,
0
 
1
7
,
6
 
7
,
4
 
2
9
,
3
 
1
,
3
 
3
,
5
 
1
,
8
 
4
,
5
 
•
o
o
o
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
s
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
s
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
(
b
)
 
E
x
p
o
r
t
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
E
x
p
o
r
t
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
 
3
1
,
1
 
7
,
9
 
3
6
,
9
 
4
4
,
9
 
8
7
,
0
 
2
3
,
2
 
1
0
1
,
7
 
1
0
3
,
3
 
7
,
0
 
0
,
4
 
8
,
0
 
1
8
,
8
 
3
4
,
6
 
1
,
1
 
3
9
,
4
 
4
8
,
3
 
2
4
,
1
 
7
,
5
 
2
8
,
9
 
2
6
,
1
 
5
2
,
4
 
2
2
,
1
 
6
2
,
3
 
5
5
,
0
 
7
,
4
 
2
,
7
 
8
,
_
9
 
7
,
6
 
1
7
 
,
o
 
6
,
9
 
1
9
,
2
 
1
6
,
4
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
G
A
T
T
 
.
.
 
l
 
I
 
l
 
l
 
l
 
I
 
l
 
l
 
l
 
I
 .
.
 
T
A
B
L
E
 
A
6
2
 
E
E
C
 
I
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
,
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
S
t
a
t
~
s
 
a
n
d
 
J
a
o
a
n
 
i
n
 
1
9
7
3
 
a
n
d
 
1
9
7
8
 
-
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
~
n
p
u
t
s
 
a
~
d
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
~
-
-
-
-
,
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
T
~
-
~
 
-
-
1
 
~
 
i
 
0
1
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
E
E
C
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
i
n
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
e
x
t
r
a
 
E
E
C
 
e
x
p
o
r
:
:
s
 
i
n
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
 
~
 
l
 
l
e
 
i
 
-
~
 
i
 
l
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
U
n
i
t
'
=
d
 
'
 
.
 
,
.
,
 
•
'
"
'
:
<
{
 
,
•
 
,
<
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
i
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
r
 
.
•
 
•
 
~
j
'
 
"
,
.
_
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
.
.
.
,
i
.
.
.
_
 
,
.
.
.
 
-
'
 
'
 
!
 
i
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
7
8
 
1
9
7
3
 
1
9
/
8
 
'
 
.
.
.
.
.
_
_
.
.
-
-
p
~
,
 
.
,
.
,
_
.
_
.
.
_
.
.
.
.
_
.
.
 
.
 
~
~
'
-
·
-
·
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
;
 
'
 
i
 
n
 
-
.
1
-
1
 
:
:
o
o
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
,
 
I
 
-
'
 
t
 
d
r
i
n
k
s
,
 
t
o
b
a
c
c
o
 
7
,
2
 
4
,
7
 
1
8
,
6
 
1
6
,
1
 
0
,
8
 
0
,
4
 
8
,
9
 
5
,
4
 
1
7
,
8
 
,
'
t
4
,
9
 
3
,
6
 
3
,
8
 
'
 
3
 
F
u
e
l
s
 
a
n
d
 
I
 
d
e
r
v
a
t
i
v
e
s
 
6
,
4
 
9
,
9
 
2
,
2
 
1
,
5
 
-
-
2
,
8
 
1
,
7
 
1
0
,
5
 
1
3
,
3
 
-
0
,
5
 
i
 
I
 
I
 
,
 
t
 
2
 
+
 
4
 
R
a
w
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
 
7
,
7
 
6
,
7
 
1
4
,
2
 
1
9
,
3
 
0
,
5
 
0
,
8
 
1
1
,
9
 
1
0
,
2
 
9
,
3
 
8
,
8
,
 
4
,
2
 
2
,
7
 
i
 
I
 
-
j
 
5
 
C
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
s
 
7
,
1
 
1
0
,
6
 
3
8
,
0
 
3
6
,
5
 
5
,
6
 
4
,
3
 
8
,
7
 
1
0
,
7
 
8
,
3
 
1
1
,
2
 
4
,
9
 
3
,
8
 
-
7
 
M
a
c
h
i
n
e
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
T
r
a
n
s
p
c
r
t
 
3
,
4
 
3
,
5
 
4
1
,
5
 
3
4
,
7
 
1
2
,
9
 
1
9
,
0
 
7
,
6
 
7
,
4
 
1
6
,
7
 
1
2
,
8
 
2
,
0
 
1
,
5
 
6
 
+
 
8
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
'
 
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
r
s
 
9
,
1
 
7
,
6
 
1
2
,
1
 
1
2
,
4
 
6
,
4
 
5
,
5
 
9
,
0
 
8
,
4
 
1
8
,
2
 
1
4
,
8
 
3
,
7
 
2
,
2
 
'
 
7
,
0
 
7
,
2
 
1
7
,
3
 
1
5
,
9
 
4
,
0
 
4
,
9
 
8
,
1
 
7
,
7
 
1
5
,
9
 
1
3
,
.
.
3
 
2
 
9
 
i
 
?
 
.
 
]
 
_
J
 
,
 
-
-
~
~
 
=
-
~
~
-
,
~
,
 
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
E
U
P
.
O
S
T
A
T
 